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MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND SALES-
BELOW-COST STATUTES: SHOULD THEY BE
REPEALED, AMENDED, OR LEFT ALONE?
by LEON R. GOODRICHt
On various occasions and apparently with little thought to con-
sistency, the Minnesota Legislature has enacted statutes that
proscribe selling commodities below cost and at different prices
in different locations. In this Article, Mr. Goodrich explores the
plethora of prohibitions relating to price discrimination and
sales below cost to point out the similarities and distinctions
among the various statutes. His focus is upon the Minnesota
statutes. However, his analysis of the issues raised by the Min-
nesota statutes and the summary of other states'statutes in the
Appendix will also assist those who must deal with similar stat-
utes in states other than Minnesota. While not attempting to
offer a resolution to the question posed by the title, Mr. Good-
rich has presented a perspective from which the reader may
begin to form an answer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since before the turn of the century, legislative bodies in the
United States have enacted statutes for the purpose of preserving
competition among businesses.' One type of legislation, whether
1. The initial landmark legislation was the Sherman Antitrust Act, enacted by Con-
gress in 1890. Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15
U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976)). Legislation opposed to unbridled competition dates from before the
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or not consistent with the underlying purpose of the basic legisla-
tion, has been prohibitions of price discrimination2 and sales
below cost.3 At the federal level, Congress purported to deal
Revolutionary War. See McAllister, Price Control by Law in the United States: A Survey,
4 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 273 (1937).
2. As used herein, the term "price discrimination" refers to selling the same or similar
products to different purchasers at different prices.
Prohibitions against price discrimination originally developed as a result of economic
changes caused by the evolution of the railroad industry. See Great W. Ry. v. Sutton, L.R.
4 E. & I. App. 226, 237 (1869); Lake, The Development of Legal Restraints on Discrimina-
tion in Prices, 3 LA. L. REv. 559, 567-68 (1941). Prior to that time, the common law
afforded protection from being charged unreasonable rates, but not from being charged a
different rate than that charged another. See, e.g., Great W. Ry. v. Sutton, L.R. 4 E. & I.
App. at 237; Baxendale v. Eastern Counties Ry., 140 Eng. Rep. 1004, 1011 (C.P. 1858);
Lake, supra, at 564-65. The railroad industry's attempts to eliminate independent com-
petitors by adopting preferential rate schemes was the motivating factor in establishing
price discrimination prohibitions. See id. at 585. The first method of assuring that rail-
roads charge uniform rates, followed by the English House of Lords prior to 1845, was the
frequent insertion of clauses prohibiting price discrimination, called Lord Shaftesbury
clauses, into the special incorporating acts granting railroad charters. See Great W. Ry.
v. Sutton, L.R. 4 E. & I. App. at 237. The Railway Clauses Consolidation Act, 1845, 8 &
9 Vict., c. 20, § 90, enacted the language of the Lord Shaftesbury clauses into law generally
applicable throughout the railroad industry. See Great W. Ry. v. Sutton, L.R. 4 E. & I.
App. at 237-38. Thus, price discrimination in the railroad industry was proscribed.
In the United States, legislation prohibiting price fixing was known in colonial times.
See McAllister, supra note 1. The first price discrimination proscriptions, however, may
be found in several state constitutions. See, e.g., MINN. CONST. of 1857, art. 10, § 4 ("[AIll
corporations being common carriers. . . shall be bound to carry the mineral, agricultural
and other productions or manufactures on equal and reasonable terms."). Eventually,
courts in the United States recognized a common law right to relief from the effects of
unlawful price discrimination. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R.R. Ry., 121 Minn.
488, 495, 142 N.W. 3, 6 (1913) ("[T]he modern common law imposes upon common
carriers the duty of equality in tolls to all shippers similarly situated ...."); Messenger
v. Pennsylvania R.R., 36 N.J.L. 407, 412 (Sup. Ct. 1873) (English statutory law represents
American common law view), aff'd, 37 N.J.L. 531 (Ct. Err. & App. 1874).
3. Laws prohibiting sales below cost have an origin distinct from price discrimination
statutes. The early English courts were not receptive to actions resulting from damages
inflicted by a competitor's sales below cost. See McCarthy, Whatever Happened to the
Small Businessman? The California Unfair Practices Act, 2 U. S.F. L. Rav. 165, 167
(1968). In Mogul S.S. Co. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598 (1889), aff'd, [1892]
A.C. 25, the court found no cause of action for damages that were caused by a sale below
cost. Not until the classic Minnesota case of Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946
(1909) did the common law afford a remedy for selling below cost. In Tuttle, a small town
barber's business was threatened with extinction when a competing barber shop was
established by a wealthy businessman who attempted to drive the plaintiff out of business
by various methods, including selling below cost. Because the tort received slow recogni-
tion from the courts and the cause of action required that malicious destruction of an-
other's business be the defendant's sole motive, it is not surprising that statutory prohibi-
tions against selling below cost arose to meet rapidly changing economic conditions. Cf.
Katz v. Kapper, 7 Cal. App. 2d 1, 6, 44 P.2d 1060, 1062 (1935) (demurrer to complaint
alleging damages from sale below cost for sole purpose of driving plaintiff from competi-
tion sustained; unfair methods not actionable and extension of jurisdiction is legislative
0 19791
3
Goodrich: Minnesota Price Discrimination and Sales-Below-Cost Statutes: Sho
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5 °
definitively with price discrimination in 1936 by enacting the
Robinson-Patman Act,' which precludes sellers from discriminat-
ing among purchasers both in price and by various indirect meth-
ods.5 At the state level, a wide variety of statutes have been
enacted to prohibit price discrimination and sales below cost.,
Minnesota is among the states having enacted such statutes.7
This Article will examine the Minnesota statutes prohibiting
price discrimination and sales below cost. Although many of the
Minnesota statutes have been in existence for decades,8 two cur-
rent developments make this Article timely. Recently, the Min-
nesota Legislature has considered passage of additional legisla-
tion relating to price discrimination.9 At the same time, federal
enforcement authorities0 and congressional committees" are
prerogative). In State v. Wender, 149 W. Va. 413, 416, 141 S.E.2d 359, 361-62 (1965), the
court notes that in 1902 South Carolina was the first state to enact a statute prohibiting
selling below cost, but that the current trend of statutes dates from the depression years
when Congress enacted the Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b, 21a (1976)). See generally McCarthy, supra; Comment, Sales
Below Cost Prohibitions: Private Price Fixing Under State Law, 57 YALE L.J. 391, 392-94
(1948).
4. See Robinson-Patman Act, ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§
13-13b, 21a (1976)).
5. See Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976).
6. The state statutes currently in effect are collected in the Appendix to this Article.
While the Appendix does not purport to describe in detail all the features of these statutes,
it does contain references to most of the significant provisions.
7. The current Minnesota legislation of general application is found at MINN. STAT. §§
325.02-.075 (1976). In addition to this general legislation, the Minnesota Legislature has
enacted statutes that apply to various specific products. See notes 15, 171 infra (listing
statutes).
8. The first Minnesota legislation dealing with price discrimination was enacted in 1907
and addressed price discrimination in the petroleum industry. See Act of Apr. 20, 1907,
ch. 269, 1907 Minn. Laws 363. This Act, found to be constitutional in State ex rel. Young
v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 101-02, 126 N.W. 527, 531-32 (1910), discussed in notes
273-78 infra and accompanying text, has endured to the present with only minor changes.
Compare Act of Apr. 20, 1907, ch. 269, 1907 Minn. Laws 363 with MINN. STAT. § 325.82
(1976).
A general act prohibiting price discrimination was enacted in 1921. See Act of Apr. 20,
1921, ch. 413, 1921 Minn. Laws 640 (repealed 1937). The present version of the general
act, MINN. STAT. §§ 325.02-.075 (1976), however, dates from 1937. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937,
ch. 116, 1937 Minn. Laws 180 (amended 1937, 1939, 1941, 1955, 1957, and 1967).
9. See notes 454-501 infra and accompanying text. The two bills that have recently been
considered by the Legislature are reproduced in notes 456, 490 infra. In 1977, the Legisla-
ture not only considered certain bills that would have amended the law on price discrimi-
nation and sales below cost but also enacted a new law relating to the sale of beer. See
notes 224-26 infra and accompanying text.
10. See generally U.S. DEP'T OF JusTicE, R.EoR ON THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1977)
[hereinafter cited as DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT]; notes 509-37 infra and accompanying
text.
11. See generally AD Hoc SUBCOMM. ON ANTITRUST, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, AND
4
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reassessing the desirability and effects of the Robinson-Patman
Act in light of over forty years' experience with it. It is timely,
therefore, to examine the meaning and present significance of the
Minnesota statutes prohibiting price discrimination and sales
below cost and to consider factors pertinent to an evaluation of
any proposed legislation.
The provisions of the various Minnesota price discrimination
and sales-below-cost statutes will first be surveyed, followed by
an examination of judicial decisions construing the statutes. An
attempt then will be made to identify criteria useful to answering
the question posed by the title of this Article: Should the statutes
be repealed, amended, or left alone?
II. THE PROVISIONS OF THE PRESENT MINNESOTA PRICE
DISCRIMINATION AND SALES-BELOW-COST STATUTES
The Robinson-Patman Act has long been assailed as one of the
worst-drafted laws extant.'" Review of the hodgepodge of Minne-
sota price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes, however,
reveals the Robinson-Patman Act, by contrast, to be almost a
model of precision and structure. 3
The Minnesota statutes can be placed somewhat arbitrarily
into two categories: (1) The Act Against Unfair Discrimination
and Competition,' and (2) statutes applicable to particular prod-
ucts. 5 The prohibitions of each will be discussed first, followed
RELATED MATTERs, HOUSE COMM. ON SMALL BUSINESS, RECENT EFFORTS TO AMEND OR REPEAL
THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT, H.R. REP. No. 94-1738, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976)
[hereinafter cited as SUBCOMM. REPORT]; notes 538-49 infra and accompanying text.
12. See, e.g., Automatic Canteen Co. of America v. FT'C, 346 U.S. 61, 65 (1953)
(IPrecision of expression is not an outstanding characteristic of the Robinson-Patman
Act."); Anonymous, Eine Kleine Juristische Schlummergeschichte, 79 HARV. L. REV. 921
(1966); Austern, Presumption and Percipience About Competitive Effect Under Section
2 of the Clayton Act, 81 HARV. L. REV. 773 (1968); Rowe, Price Discrimination, Competi-
tion, and Confusion: Another Look at Robinson-Patman, 60 YALE L.J. 929, 929, 940-41
(1951).
13. For example, the definitional section of chapter 325 of the Minnesota Statutes
contains three definitions of the word "person." See MINN. STAT. § 325.01(12), (13), (16)
(1976). Further anomalies in the statutory scheme are discussed in notes 65-115, 239-47
infra and accompanying text (comparing and contrasting various provisions).
14. MINN. STAT. §§ 325.02-.075 (1976). See notes 16-164 infra and accompanying text.
Critics of price discrimination laws might choose to accept this title literally as identifying
an act "against competition."
15. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 17.14-.19 (1976) (farm products); id. § 32A.04 (dairy
products); id. § 151.061 (prescription drugs); id. §§ 325.64-.76 (cigarettes), as amended
by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 793, §§ 72, 98, 1978 Minn. Laws 1179; MINN. STAT. § 325.82
(1976) (petroleum products); id. §§ 325B.01-.17 (Supp. 1977) (beer); id. § 340.114 (liquor);
19791
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by an examination of the penalties for noncompliance with them.
A. The Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition
The Minnesota price discrimination statute of general applica-
tion was enacted in 193711 and at that time was known as the
Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices Act. 7 With some modifica-
tions,18 the 1937 legislation now appears in sections 325.02
through 325.075 of Minnesota Statutes" and is entitled "The Act
Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition."20 Three main
provisions appear in this Act: the prohibition against locality
statutes cited in note 171 infra (miscellaneous other products); notes 165-247 infra and
accompanying text.
16. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, 1937 Minn. Laws 180 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 325.02-.075 (1976)). The 1937 statute contained three parts: Parts 2 and 3 were,
respectively, addressed to sales below cost and enforcement of the act. Part 1, as observed
by the court in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 83 (D. Minn. 1938)
(per curiam), was in effect a reenactment of a 1921 law, Act of Apr. 20, 1921, ch. 413, 1921
Minn. Laws 640 (repealed 1937), which prohibited sellers from discriminating in prices
between different localities. The scope of the 1921 law was more limited than the 1937
law in that the 1921 law prohibited discriminatory prices only if the seller's purpose was
to injure a competitor. The 1937 law was broader and this broader application of the price
discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes continues to the present.
17. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 72 (D. Minn. 1938) (per
curiam) (referring to the 1937 legislation by this name).
18. The first amendment to the statute occurred the same year it was originally passed.
The inadvertent omission of the word "not" in one provision was corrected by Act of Apr.
26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn. Laws 709. Following the decision in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea
Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam), which held certain portions of
the Act unconstitutional, the Legislature amended the statute in an attempt to remedy
the constitutional defects. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, 1939 Minn. Laws 794. These
amendments were upheld by the Minnesota Supreme Court in McElhone v. Geror, 207
Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940).
In 1941, the Legislature added the word "legal" to the meeting-competition defense,
permitted customary cash discounts to be considered in the cost computation, and made
other technical amendments. See Act of Apr. 21, 1941, ch. 326, §§ 1-4, 1941 Minn. Laws
617. The 1955 Legislature, reversing the determination of the 1941 Legislature, required
the cost computation to be made without a deduction for customary cash discounts,
although a deduction for trade discounts in some instances was added. See Act of Apr. 5,
1955, ch. 339, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 498. Definitions also were added to the law and the
prima facie violations rewritten by the 1955 Legislature. See id. §§ 2-5. Two years later,
the Legislature changed the section 325.03 requirement of anticompetitive purpose and
effect to purpose or effect and created the 8%-retail, 2%-wholesale cost-of-doing-business
presumptions. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 822, § 1, 3, 1957 Minn. Laws 1161.
19. See MiNN. STAT. §§ 325.02-.075 (1976). See also id. § 325.01 (definitions of terms
used in chapter 325).
20. This is the title adopted by the Revisor of Statutes to identify the statute. See 3
MINN. STAT. 4384 (1976). The statute also has been referred to as the "8% law" because
of the presumption that retail sales at less than 8% above cost are violations of the Act.
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price discrimination, 21 the prohibition against selling below cost,2
and the presumptions available in establishing prima facie viola-
tions.2 Unless one has recently reviewed this Act as amended to
date, the following description may contain some surprises.
1. Locality Price Discrimination
Strangely enough, two separate yet overlapping provisions in
the Act each prohibit locality price discrimination. 4 These prohi-
bitions are not merely repetitive but differ in material ways.
a. Locality Price Discrimination Under Section 325.03
The basic elements of a section 325.03 violation can be reduced
to three:
(1) the sale or furnishing of a commodity,
(2) at a lower price in one section of Minnesota than is
charged in another section of Minnesota,
(3) for the purpose or with the effect of injuring a competitor
or destroying competition.2
The first element of a violation-the sale or furnishing of a
commodity-applies "only to the manufacture, production, or
distribution of any commodity, article, goods, wares, or
merchandise in general use or consumption." 6 The apparent pur-
pose of this provision is to make it clear that the prohibition does
not apply to the furnishing of services." In this regard, section
325.03 is similar to the Robinson-Patman Act, which also applies
solely to sales of commodities.' s
Section 325.03 applies to the "furnishing" of commodities as
well as their sale.29 Thus, it would apparently encompass gifts and
perhaps even leases or other devices by which a commodity is
21. See MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976); id. § 325.04, para. 2; notes 24-115 infra and
accompanying text.
22. See MiNN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 1 (1976); notes 116-45 infra and accompanying text.
23. See MINN. STAT. § 325.075 (1976); notes 146-64 infra and accompanying text.
24. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) with id. § 325.04, para. 2.
25. See id. § 325.03.
26. Id. § 325.02 (emphasis added); see id. § 325.03. The prohibition also applies to any
"printed or mimeograph matter." Id.
27. See id. § 325.02. Other state legislatures have included services within their statu-
tory schemes prohibiting price discrimination and sales below cost. See Appendix § C.
28. See Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) ("It shall be unlawful
for any person engaged in commerce . . . to discriminate in price between different pur-
chasers of commodities .... "); notes 470-71 infra and accompanying text.
29. See MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976).
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furnished by one person to another. This conclusion is supported
by the fact that section 325.03 applies to discriminatory rates as
well as discriminatory prices 0 The use of the term "rate" seems
to contemplate leases. Section 325.03, therefore, appears to differ
from the Robinson-Patman Act, which has been interpreted to
apply to sales but not to leases.
31
The second element of a violation-discriminating in price
among different sections of the state-is very broadly stated. The
discrimination is unlawful if it is between different "sections,
communities, or cities. . . or any portion thereof' 32 and includes
"any scheme of special rebates, collateral contracts, or any device
of any nature whereby such discrimination is, in substance or
fact, effected in violation of the spirit and intent of" the Act. 3
This encompasses discrimination by a seller between two differ-
ent purchasers and, in addition, literally includes price discrimi-
nation in two transactions involving the same purchaser if the
sales are made in different sections of the state. However, dis-
crimination among different purchasers at a single location, such
as the seller's plant, may not be covered by this section even
though the purchasers come from different sections of the state.
The third basic element for a violation is discrimination "for
30. See id.
31. See, e.g., SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 394 F. Supp. 384, 385 (D. Conn. 1975)
(Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to lease of copy machine); Gaylord Shops, Inc. v.
Pittsburgh Miracle Mile Town & Country Shopping Center, Inc., 219 F. Supp. 400, 403
(W.D. Pa. 1963) (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable to leased realty); note 470 infra.
32. MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976). Statutes in other states employ similar language. See
Appendix § A.2. The Michigan Supreme Court, in People v. Charles E. Austin, Inc., 301
Mich. 456, 3 N.W.2d 841 (1942), found the reference to "sections or communities" uncon-
stitutionally vague. See id. at 459, 3 N.W.2d at 843-44. Attempts by the South Carolina
Legislature to define locality price discrimination have met with a similar fate. See State
v. Texas Co., 136 S.C. 200, 206-07, 134 S.E. 211, 213 (1926) (court interpreted statute to
prohibit discrimination only if effected between different cities within state). The South
Carolina Legislature's attempt to overrule the result reached in the Texas Co. case was
reviewed in State v. Standard Oil Co., 195 S.C. 267, 10 S.E.2d 778 (1940) and found
unconstitutional. Id. at 292, 10 S.E.2d at 789. Rather than broadening the scope of the
prohibition, the amended statute applied only when discriminatory practices were ef-
fected within the confines of a single city. See id. at 280-81, 10 S.E.2d at 784. In this
context, the court found the use of the word "sections" unconstitutionally vague. See id.
at 282-85, 10 S.E.2d at 785-86.
33. MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976). The laws in other states also attempt to reach similar
practices by prohibiting indirect pricing discrimination. See Appendix § D. The rebate
systems must be discriminatory, of course, as the decision in Baratti v. Koser Gin Co.,
206 Ark. 813, 177 S.W.2d 750 (1944) illustrates. In Baratti, the court concluded that, to
violate the law, a rebate system, in addition to having a tendency to destroy competition,
also must be secret and unavailable to all persons on the same terms and conditions. Id.
at 819-20, 177 S.W.2d at 753.
[Vol. 5
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the purpose or with the effect of injuring a competitor or destroy-
ing competition."'" Presumably, an innocent intent does not
avoid violation if anticompetitive effect is present;3 literally,
however, an unlawful intent, regardless of effect, is also sufficient
for violation." Thus, where unlawful intent is present, there may
34. MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976).
35. See id.; State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 256-63, 21
N.W.2d 792, 796-99 (1946) (price discrimination statute with no requirement of anticom-
petitive intent or effect upheld); cf. McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 585, 292 N.W.
414, 417 (1940) (sales below cost may be prohibited absent requirement of anticompetitive
intent). The constitutional necessity of anticompetitive intent or effect elements in price
discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes is discussed more fully in note 36 infra.
36. While this conclusion is apparent from the language of section 325.03, judicial
construction of statutes requiring anticompetitive intent or effect has resulted in many
diverse holdings. In Hill v. Kusy, 150 Neb. 653, 35 N.W.2d 594 (1949), the Nebraska court
concluded that the words "intent" and "effect" mean "practically the same thing." Id.
at 656-57, 35 N.W.2d at 596. Several state courts have upheld statutes that merely pro-
hibit price discrimination and sales below cost without reference to intent or effect. See,
e.g., May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 242 Iowa 334, 45 N.W.2d 245 (1950)
(sale-below-cost statute within proper police power of legislature); State v. Lanesboro
Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 256-63, 21 N.W.2d 792, 796-99 (1946) (price
discrimination statute upheld against due process attack). Other courts, however, have
held that intent is unnecessary if an anticompetitive effect is present. See, e.g., McElhone
v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 585, 292 N.W. 414, 417 (1940) ("Sales below cost which have the
effect of injuring competition may be prohibited regardless of intent."). Some state courts
maintain an absolute intent requirement. See, e.g., San Ann Tobacco Co. v. Hamm, 283
Ala. 397, 402, 217 So. 2d 803, 806-07 (1968) (amendment adding words "or with the effect
thereof" removed intent element rendering statute invalid).
One commentator has called intent requirements a "legislative draftsman's night-
mare," stating that such a requirement in trade legislation "is pure gobbledygook" be-
cause "intent to increase the seller's own business is inseparable from the intent to cause
a loss to competitors." McCarthy, supra note 3, at 190-91 (footnote omitted).
The controversy surrounding constitutional requirements of intent or effect elements in
price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes originated with the United States Su-
preme Court case of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), in which the Court stated,
"[ilf the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative pur-
pose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are
satisfied." Id. at 537. It has been argued that Nebbia, in effect, overruled the earlier case
of Fairmont Creamery v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927), which had held that price discrimi-
nation cannot be prohibited irrespective of the discriminator's motive. Id. at 8-9; see, e.g.,
Stats v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. at 258, 263, 21 N.W.2d at 798,
799 (Fairmont Creamery no longer states the law); McCarthy, supra note 3, at 188 (Fair-
mont Creamery "is merely an historical footnote of an era when freedom of contract could
justify nullifying any state economic regulation in the name of the Constitution").
Although intent is not constitutionally required in a statutory crime, United States v.
Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252-53 (1922), and one may not plead good faith or ignorance as a
defense to violation of the law, see, e.g., United States v. International Minerals & Chem.
Corp., 402 U.S. 558, 563 (1971), most states have persisted in applying the reasoning of
Fairmont Creamery by requiring either predatory intent or effect as a prerequisite to a
violation of price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes. See, e.g., Wholesale To-
bacco Dealers Bureau of So. Cal., Inc. v. National Candy & Tobacco Co., 11 Cal. 2d 634,
19791
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be a violation with only threatened injury to competition.37
Two express statutory defenses to a section 325.03 violation are
available. First, prices charged by a seller for commodities may
differ to the extent of variations in their grade, quality, or quant-
ity, after equalizing freight charges."5 Second, a discriminatory
price may be charged if it results from a good faith attempt to
meet local competition within the community.2 Except for the
reference to quantity differences, both defenses reflect elements
similar to those in the Robinson-Patman Act. 0
b. Locality Price Discrimination Under Section 325.04
Although entitled "Selling Below Cost Forbidden," section
325.04 also prohibits locality price discrimination.4 Unlike sec-
tion 325.03,12 however, section 325.04 applies to "the selling,
offering, or advertising for sale, giving away or offering or
advertising the intent to give away of any commodity, article,
658, 82 P.2d 3, 17 (1938); Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn,
225, 232-35, 149 N.W.2d 698, 703-04 (1967) (distinguishing Lanesboro; holding that anti-
competitive purpose or effect required to uphold statute).
The issue of whether either intent or effect is necessary to uphold Minnesota's statutes
prohibiting price discrimination and sales below cost has yet to be completely settled. In
Twin City Candy, the Minnesota court distinguished price discrimination statutes from
sales-below-cost statutes, stating that the activity in Lanesboro involved a "patently
unfair practice" with "little room for honest mistake or inconsequential effect." Id. at 234,
149 N.W.2d at 704. Thus, in situations of sales-below-cost prohibitions, Twin City Candy
and McElhone clearly indicate that either an intent or effect element is necessary to
sustain the validity of the statute. However, the only Minnesota case since Nebbia that
has dealt directly with intent and effect elements in a price discrimination statute is
Lanesboro. The Lanesboro court upheld a statute prohibiting discrimination in buying
that required neither intent nor effect. See 221 Minn. at 256-63, 21 N.W.2d at 796-99.
Because Twin City Candy distinguished the evil present in price discrimination from that
involved in sales below cost, it may be argued that, in Minnesota, intent or effect is not a
constitutionally required element in price discrimination statutes. Thus, assuming that
the court would not further distinguish statutes prohibiting discrimination in purchasing
from statutes prohibiting discrimination in selling, in an alleged section 325.03 violation,
the seller should not be able to use as a defense the absence of a statutory requirement of
predatory intent or anticompetitive effect of the sale.
37. In addition, MINN. STAT. § 325.907(3) (1976) authorizes the Attorney General to seek
an injunction against threatened violations of the Act.
38. See id. § 325.03.
39. See id.
40. Compare id. with Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(b) (1976).
41. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976). The first paragraph of this section proscribes sales
below cost. Locality price discrimination is addressed in the second paragraph. The final
paragraph reiterates that indirect pricing practices are prohibited by this section.
42. Section 325.03 applies "only to the manufacture, production, or distribution of any
commodity, article, goods, wares, or merchandise in general use or consumption." Id. §
325.02; see notes 26-31 supra and accompanying text.
(Vol. 5
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goods, wares, or merchandise, in wholesale or retail trade. ""'
The elements of a section 325.04 violation, which in a very
broad sense are comparable to those for a section 325.03 viola-
tion," are as follows:
(1) selling goods,
(2) in any part of this state at prices lower than those ex-
acted by the seller elsewhere in the state,
(3) for goods of like quality and grade,
(4) when the effect of such lower price may be substantially
to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line
of business, or to injure, destroy, or prevent competition. 5
The first element indicates that, as in the case of section
325.03,6 price discrimination in the sale of services is not cov-
ered. 7 However, while section 325.04 refers to any retailer who
sells goods, the section does not include the term "furnishes."4 K
Therefore, contrary to section 325.03,11 leases may not be em-
braced by section 325.04.
Like section 325.03, the second element of a section 325.04
violation reaches any scheme of special rebates or device of any
nature that effects discrimination. 0 However, the second element
differs from section 325.03 in one important respect. Rather than
covering discriminatory sales of goods between different sections,
communities, cities, or any portion thereof,5' section 325.04 pro-
hibits sales "in any part of this state at prices lower than those
exacted by the person elsewhere in the state. '5 2 Although, like
section 325.03, section 325.04 would require discrimination by a
seller between two different purchasers and would also include
43. MINN. STAT. § 325.02 (1976) (emphasis added).
44. See note 25 supra and accompanying text.
45. See MINN. STAT. § 325.02 (1976); id. § 325.04, para. 2.
46. See notes 26-28 supra and accompanying text.
47. See MINN. STAT. § 325.02 (1976) (section 325.04 applies to "the selling ... of any
commodity, article, goods, wares, or merchandise"); Minn. Op. Att'y Gen. 417-E (Aug.
25, 1949) (statute inapplicable to services of photographer); id. 681-B (Dec. 2, 1947)
(statute inapplicable to services connected with food preparation).
48, See MINN. STAT. § 325.02 (1976); id. § 325.04, para. 2.
49. See notes 29-31 supra and accompanying text.
50. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) ("The inhibition hereof against locality dis-
crimination shall embrace any scheme of special rebates .... ") with id. § 325.04, para.
3 ("The inhibition against sales below cost or locality discrimination shall embrace any
scheme of special rebates .
51. See id. § 325.03.
52. Id. § 325.04, para. 2.
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two transactions involving the same purchaser, it is arguable that
two sales in the same city would be within the locality discrimina-
tion prohibition of section 325.03 but not within the prohibition
of section 325.04.
No cases have construed the third element of like quality and
grade. If analogy is made to the Robinson-Patman Act, however,
this element will be satisfied if the commodities have the same
physical appearance and function, even though they have a dif-
ferent brand name or consumer preference. 53
Unlike section 325.03, the fourth element of section 325.04 fo-
cuses only on the anticompetitive effect of the discrimination
rather than on the intent or purpose of the seller. Intent or
purpose, of course, still may be relevant in assessing the anticom-
petitive effect. 5
Defenses to the section 325.04 prohibition against locality dis-
crimination appear in both sections 325.04 and 325.06.6 Two de-
fenses appear under section 325.04. First, price differentials are
permitted if based on differences in overhead expenses, the cost
of doing business, or the cost of delivery to the different locali-
ties.57 Second, price differences are permitted if based on a good
faith attempt to meet the legal prices of a competitor selling the
same commodity in the same locality or trade area.58
Section 325.06 reiterates the meeting competition defense of
53. In FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637 (1966), the United States Supreme Court held
that a seller who distributed evaporated milk under its own nationally advertised brand
at a higher price than the same product sold and marketed under private brands was
nevertheless selling products of "like grade and quality." Id. at 645-46.
54. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) (prohibiting discrimination "for the purpose
or with the effect" of injuring or destroying competition) with id. § 325.04, para. 2 (prohib-
iting discrimination "where the effect of such lower prices may be substantially to lessen
competition"). For discussion of intent or effect requirements, see note 36 supra.
55. See In re Forster Mfg. Co., 62 F.T.C. 852, 893 (1963) (although "intent is not a
necessary element . . . it is certainly relevant in determining whether or not the discrimi-
nations . . . have the effect of substantially injuring competition") (emphasis in original),
vacated on other grounds, 335 F.2d 47 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 906 (1965);
cf. FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 552 (1960) ("[lIt might be argued that
the existence of predatory intent bears upon the likelihood of injury to competi-
tion .... ") (footnote omitted).
56. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976); id. § 325.06.
57. See id. § 325.04, para. 2. The terms "cost of doing business" and "overhead ex-
pense" are defined as "all current costs of doing business incurred in the conduct of such
business." Id. § 325.01(7). See also notes 124-25 infra.
58. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976). See generally State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn.
504, 508-12, 85 N.W.2d 401, 405-07 (1957) (defense available when seller believes in good




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/1
MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION
section 325.04'1 and provides several additional defenses to a sec-
tion 325.04 violation. It states that section 325.04 does not apply
to close-out sales, 0 sales of seasonal goods "where style is the
paramount feature," 8' sales of perishable goods to prevent loss,"
sales of damaged goods," and sales by officers acting under court
order. 4
c. Comparing Section 325.03 and Section 325.04
Locality Price Discrimination
Sections 325.03 and 325.04 both prohibit locality price discrim-
ination and the two sections overlap significantly. In addition to
the minor differences in wording noted above," at least four more
material differences exist between the sections: the persons af-
fected, the commodities covered, the type of competitive injury
that must be shown, and the defenses available.
Turning first to the persons affected, it seems clear that both
sections apply to wholesalers and sub-jobbers," however, section
325.03 emphasizes the manufacturer while section 325.04 is di-
rected to distributors. 7 Because the application of section 325.03
is limited to producers, manufacturers, and distributors, per-
sons such as retailers and vending machine operators are not
encompassed unless they qualify as distributors. Unfortunately,
the term "distribution" is not defined. Section 325.04, on the
other hand, applies only to retailers," wholesalers,"' sub-jobbers,'
and vending machine operators.7" Thus, section 325.04 does not
59. See MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4) (1976).
60. See id. § 325.06(1).
61. Id.
62. See id.
63. See id. § 325.06(2).
64. See id. § 325.06(3).
65. See notes 46-55 supra and accompanying text.
66. See MINN. STAT. § 325.02-.03 (1976); id. § 325.04, para. 2.
67. See id. § 325.03; id. § 325.04, para. 2.
68. See id. § 325.03.
69. See id. § 325.04, para. 2. A "retailer" is "any person selling a commodity to consum-
ers for use." Id. § 325.01(11).
70. See id. § 325.04, para. 2. The term "wholesaler" means "any person selling a
commodity other than a producer or retailer." Id. § 325.01(10); see id. § 325.01(9), (11)
(defining "producer" and "retailer").
71. See id. § 325.04, para. 2. A "sub-jobber" is any person who buys commodities from
wholesalers and sells directly to retailers, but who is not a wholesaler or retailer. See id. §
325.01(24).
72. See id. § 325.04, para. 2. A "vending machines operator" is a person who "owns,
services and supplies ten or more merchandise vending machines placed in various loca-
tions for dispensing such merchandise to consumers." Id. § 325.01(25).
19791
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encompass manufacturers or producers.73
As to the commodities covered, section 325.04 applies to the
sale of commodities in wholesale or retail trade" whereas the
coverage of section 325.03 seems broader, encompassing sales of
any commodity in general use or consumption. 5 Thus, section
325.03 seems to include the commodities affected by the section
325.04 prohibition.
A third distinction lies in the description of the competitive
injury that must be shown to establish a violation of these sec-
tions. Section 325.03, unlike the Robinson-Patman Act,7" applies
to situations in which a seller discriminates in price "for the
purpose or with the effect of injuring a competitor or destroying
competition."77 By contrast, section 325.04, repeating the lan-
guage in the Robinson-Patman Act, applies to situations "where
the effect of such lower prices may be substantially to lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly . . . , or to injure,
destroy, or prevent competition. 78 Thus, section 325.03 seems to
apply only when an injury is intended or actual injury results
from the difference in price, while section 325.04 would apply to
the threatened injury, regardless of intent, as well as to actual
injury .71
It remains unclear, however, whether either of the Minnesota
prohibitions applies to "secondary." line injury as well as
"primary" line injury.80 These terms, which have developed in
73. See id. § 325.02 (section 325.04 applies only to selling in wholesale or retail trade).
74. See id.
75. See id. §§ 325.02-.03.
76. See Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) (price discrimination
prohibited "where the effect of such discrimination may be substantially to lessen compe-
tition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce, or to injure, destroy, or
prevent competition").
77. MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) (emphasis added).
78. Id. § 325.04, para. 2 (emphasis added). Compare id. with Robinson-Patman Act §
1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). For a discussion of intent or effect requirements, see note
36 supra.
79. The United States Supreme Court has held that the Robinson-Patman Act reaches
"discriminations 'in their incipiency' before the harm to 'competition is effected." Corn
Prod. Refining Co. v. F'TC, 324 U.S. 726, 738 (1945). However, only consequences which
"would probably have the defined effect on competition," not a "mere possibility" of such
effect, would be prohibited. Id.
80. The issue has never been presented to the Minnesota Supreme Court. However, two
state courts have ruled that their locality discrimination statutes do not apply to second-
ary line injury. See Harris v. Capitol Records Distrib. Corp., 64 Cal. 2d 454, 460-61, 413
P.2d 139, 143-44, 50 Cal. Rptr. 539, 543-44 (1966); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C.
643, 654-55, 194 S.E.2d 521, 528-29 (1973). But see, e.g., CONN. Gs. STAT. ANN. § 35-45(a)
(West Cum. Supp. 1978) (direct or indirect discrimination prohibited when competition
of recipient of unlawful price or of recipient's customers is affected).
[Vol. 5
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connection with interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act,'
refer to price discrimination that injures the seller's competitors
(primary line)82 or that injures competitors of the seller's favored
customer (secondary line).83 The classic example of unlawful
price discrimination injuring primary line competition is geo-
graphic price discrimination, in which a national or regional seller
reduces its prices only in a particular city in an effort to injure a
smaller local competitor s.8  Secondary line injury is illustrated by
a manufacturer or wholesaler selling at different prices to two
customers in the same locality when the two customers are in
competition with one another and an advantage may be conferred
on the customer receiving the lower price.8
Sections 325.03 and 325.04 are obviously aimed at least at pri-
mary level injury, undoubtedly contemplating what was just de-
scribed as geographic price discrimination." Section 325.03 may
well be limited to primary line injury because it prohibits only
discrimination by a seller for the purpose or effect of "injuring a
competitor or destroying competition."" Section 325.04, by con-
81. See Note, Unlawful Primary Line Price Discriminations: Predatory Intent and
Competitive Injury, 68 COLUM. L. REv. 137, 138-39 (1968). Although the terms "primary"
and "secondary" line injury originated with interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act,
the concepts matured under the Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current
version at 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976)). See George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can
Co., 278 U.S. 245, 252-54 (1929) (secondary line injuries held unlawful under Clayton Act).
82. See Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 654-55, 194 S.E.2d 521, 528-29
(1973); Note, supra note 81, at 139. See generally McCarthy, supra note 3, at 183-84.
83. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 545-46 (1960); Rose v. Vulcan
Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 654-55, 194 S.E.2d 521, 528-29 (1973); Note, supra note 81,
at 139. See generally McCarthy, supra note 3, at 184-87.
84. See FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 538-41 (1960) (brewer with national
distribution reduced prices in single market, allegedly adversely affecting sales of local
brewer); Note, supra note 81, at 139. While a primary line violation under the Robinson-
Patman Act requires probable injury to the seller's competitors, it does not require injury
to the purchaser's competitors. See, e.g., Utah Pie Co. v. Continental Baking Co., 386 U.S.
685, 702 (1966); FTC v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. at 545; Checker Motors Corp. v.
Chrysler Corp., 283 F. Supp. 876, 889 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), aff'd, 405 F.2d 319 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 999 (1969). Injury to the competitors of a purchaser resulting from the
acts of the seller-that is, secondary line injury-is a separate type of violation of the
Robinson-Patman Act. See cases cited in note 85 infra.
85. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 47 (1948) (discounts to certain wholesale
and retail purchasers buying larger quantities than competing wholesale and retail pur-
chasers could be a violation); George Van Camp & Sons Co. v. American Can Co., 278
U.S. 245, 254 (1929) (seller had monopoly on canning process and sold product to plain-
tiff's competition for 20% less); Rose v. Vulcan Materials Co., 282 N.C. 643, 654-55, 194
S.E.2d 521, 528-29 (1973) (seller had no primary line of competition; at best, secondary
line injury existed that was lawful under state statute).
86. See MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976); id. § 325.04, para. 2.
87. Id. § 325.03.
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trast, encompasses both injury to "competition with the person
selling at such lower prices" ' and, similar to the Robinson-
Patman Act,8" the lessening of competition "in any line of busi-
ness. "0 Thus, section 325.04 probably was intended to encompass
competitive injury occurring at levels beyond the primary line.91
However, section 325.04 arguably may include only primary line
injury. That section, as well as section 325.03, applies if two dif-
ferent purchasers are at different locations and, therefore, per-
haps not in competition. Section 325.04 only applies if the cus-
tomers are in different "part[s] of this state." 2 Use of this
phrase compromises the apparent legislative intent reflected in
the "any line of business" language, suggesting that section
325.04 may not encompass secondary line injuries.
Differences also lie in the defenses available under sections
325.03 and 325.04. The section 325.06 defenses-close-out sales,
sales of seasonal, perishable, or damaged goods, and sales under
court order-apply to section 325.04 but not to section 325.03.11
Each section also has different provisions regarding quality dis-
counts. Section 325.03 permits as a defense the making of an
allowance for differences in the grade or quality of a commodity,,
indicating a defense is available if the price difference is a result
of cost savings associated with the lower-grade product. 5 Inferen-
tially, then, selling the higher grade product at a lower price than
is charged for the lower grade would be prohibited if the other
88. Id. § 325.04, para. 2.
89. See Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) ("to lessen competition
or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce").
90. MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976).
91. Cf. George Van Camp & Sons v. American Can Co., 278 U.S. 245, 253-54 (1929)
(phrase "in any line of business" in Clayton Act used to prohibit secondary line type of
injury).
92. MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976).
93. See id. § 325.06(4). Section 325.06 is perhaps the most puzzling section in the entire
Act. The exemptions it provides are expressly applicable to locality discrimination under
section 325.04, but it makes no reference to locality discrimination under section 325.03.
Further, the section states that certain definitions in section 325.01, subdivisions 2
through 6 do not apply to sales exempt under section 325.06. What could that mean?
Finally, section 325.06 provides that section 325.05 does not apply to any sales described
in section 325.06. MINN. STAT. § 325.05 (1976) provides that the invoice cost of goods
purchased at sales outside the ordinary channels of trade may not be used to justify a price
lower than the replacement cost unless the sale is exempt under section 325.06. Does this
mean that the purchase price in an exempt sale under section 325.06 can be used to justify
cost under the sale-below-cost prohibition in paragraph 1 of section 325.04?
94. See id. § 325.03.
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requisites for a violation were present. On the other hand, section
325.04, like the Robinson-Patman Act,"6 is limited in the first
instance to sales of commodities having "like qualities and
grades." 7 Presumably, section 325.04 is inapplicable if the com-
modities differ in quality or grade." This section does not pre-
clude a seller of differing commodities from charging different
prices totally unrelated to cost savings.
Another difference in the available defenses relates to the legal-
ity of quantity discounts. Section 325.03 provides for an allow-
ance based on differences in quantity. Thus, section 325.03, like
the predecessor of the Robinson-Patman Act,'10 may well be
avoided simply by selling to customers at different prices and in
different quantities.' 1 By contrast, section 325.04, as originally
enacted in 1937, applied only to sales of "like quantities and
grades.' '0 2 The law was changed in 1939 by apparent inadvertent
96. See Robinson-Patman Act, § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) ("it shall be unlawful
for any person ... to discriminate in price between different purchasers of commodities
of like grade and quality"); notes 473-75 infra and accompanying text. The federal courts
have had difficulty determining when commodities are of like grade and quality. While
there are no safe generalizations to be made in this area, it appears that when the com-
modities are physically similar and are put to similar uses they are of like grade and
quality. See, e.g., FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 644 (1966) (products physically
identical); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co. v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cases (CCH)
75,054 (D. Utah) (manufacturer of rocket fuel that produced compounds with varied
blends of same chemicals produced commodities of like grade and quality). But see, e.g.,
Morning Pioneer, Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 342 F. Supp. 1138 (D.N.D. 1972) (newspa-
per not of like grade and quality when sold in different cities), aff'd on other grounds, 493
F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974). It has been suggested that two factors
can be used to determine when commodities are of like grade and quality. First, are the
commodities physically similar or identical? Second, do the commodities have distinct or
legitimate physical differences that affect consumer use, preference, or marketability? See
16C J. VON KALINOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION
§ 25.01, at 25-7 (1976).
97. MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976).
98. Reference to cases decided under the Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. §
13(a) (1976), indicates that a finding that the commodities sold were of like grade and
quality is a condition precedent to the applicability of the Act. See, e.g., Morning Pioneer,
Inc. v. Bismarck Tribune Co., 342 F. Supp. 1138 (D.N.D. 1972), a~f'd on other grounds,
493 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 836 (1974).
99. See MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) (allowance for differences in "grade, quality, or
quantity").
100. See Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 2(a), 38 Stat. 730 (1914) (current version at 15 U.S.C.
§ 13 (1976)) ("nothing . . . shall prevent discrimination in price . . . on account of
differences in the grade, quality or quantity of the commodity").
101. See, e.g., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. FTC, 101 F.2d 620, 624 (6th Cir. 1939);
American Can Co. v. Ladoga Canning Co., 44 F.2d 763, 767 (7th Cir. 1930); National
Biscuit Co. v. FTC, 299 F. 733, 739 (2d Cir. 1924).
102. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, para. 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 182 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976)).
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substitution of the letter 1 for the letter n in the word
"quantities."''03 However, because this change in wording was ef-
fected not by act of the Legislature but by typographical error in
the published edition of the 1939 session laws,' °4 it is unclear
whether the alteration from quantities to qualities has any legal
effect.105 The question is not purely academic. Because the error
has been carried over to the present law, '0" arguably section 325.04
only applies to sales of like quantities.
Another defense-meeting competition-also appears in both
sections. 0 7 However, section 325.03 permits this defense only
when the competition is "local,"'" whereas section 325.04 permits
the defense if the competition is in the "same locality" or "trade
area."' 9 Moreover, section 325.04, unlike section 325.03, is lim-
103. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1, para. 2, 1939 Minn. Laws 795 ("like
qualtities [sic] and grades") (current version at MIN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976)).
In addition, the change was not printed in italics, further indicating that it was the result
of error rather than legislative act. The original act, as filed in the office of the Minne-
sota Secretary of State, does contain the phrase "like quantities and grades." The only
conclusion that can be drawn from this evidence is that when printed in the 1939 volume
of the session laws, the error was perpetuated. In 1940, the error was further obscured
when Mason Publishing Company, in compiling the 1940 supplement to the statutes,
changed "qualtities" to "qualities." See MINN. STAT. § 3976-41 (Mason Supp. 1940).
104. See note 103 supra. The change makes Minnesota law consistent with the
Robinson-Patman Act. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976) ("like qualities and
grades") with Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) ("like grade and
quality").
105. The uncertainty stems from the rules of statutory construction. In Welscher v.
Myhre, 231 Minn. 33, 42 N.W.2d 311 (1950), the court was presented with a situation in
which the revisor of statutes had inadvertently omitted language from an act in compiling
the 1945 edition of the statutes. The court stated as a general principle that:
If the statutory language remaining after such omission is clear and unambig-
uous in its expression of legislative intent, there is then no room for construc-
tion or interpretation and no reference may be made to prior enactments. Prior
statutes may be resorted to only for the purpose of solving, and not for the
purpose of creating, an ambiguity.
Id. at 36-37, 42 N.W.2d at 313 (citations omitted). See also State ex rel. Bergin v. Wash-
burn, 224 Minn. 269, 28 N.W.2d 652 (1947) (changes made in codification control over
prior versions of statute when change is substantive and unambiguous). See generally C.
SANDS, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTON §§ 28.12-.13 (4th rev. 1971).
106. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, pars. 2 (1976).
107. See id. § 325.03 (the Act "shall not prevent any person, firm, or corporation from,
in good faith, meeting local competition"); id. § 325,04, para. 2 ("nothing shall prevent
. ..differences in prices in an endeavor made in good faith to meet the legal prices of a
competitor").
108. See id. § 325.03 ("within any one section, community, or city").
109. Id. § 325.04; see McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 589, 292 N.W. 414, 419 (1940)
("same locality" and "trade area" are "common terms, susceptible of reasonable applica-
tion by and to . . .the evidence").
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ited to meeting the "legal" prices of a competitor.""
Finally, both sections contain widely differing "cost savings"
defenses, permitting a lower price to be charged by a seller if it
costs less to sell to the customer receiving the lower price.' Under
section 325.03 the defense is available in the sense that no unlaw-
ful price discrimination exists "after equalizing the distance from
the point of production, manufacture, or distribution and freight
rates therefrom.""' Thus, the section appears to permit different
prices based on variances in shipment costs. Section 325.04 per-
mits price discrepancies for differences not only in the costs of
delivery, but also in overhead expenses and the costs of doing
business."3 The latter two terms, which apparently are synony-
mous, are defined to include delivery costs, wages and salaries,
maintenance expenses, depreciation, insurance, taxes, and other
fixed and incidental costs."' In other words, they include total
costs, not simply variable costs." 5
2. Sales Below Cost
In addition to prohibiting locality price discrimination, section
325.04 of Minnesota Statutes also prohibits certain sales below
cost."6 Like the section 325.04 prohibition against locality price
discrimination, the prohibitions against sales below cost apply
only to retailers, wholesalers, sub-jobbers, and vending machine
operators. "'
110. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976) with id. § 325.03.
111. Compare id. § 325.04, para. 2 with id. § 325.03. The defense may be constitution-
ally required. See Great Ati. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 76-78 (D. Minn.
1938) (per curiam) (finding 1937 Unfair Trade Practices Act unconstitutional in part due
to failure to recognize actual marketing practices).
112. MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976).
113. See id. § 325.04, para. 2.
114. See id. § 325.01(7).
115. The term "total" cost refers to all fixed and variable costs, which represent-the
entire expense of operating a business. See Legman, Accounting for a Manufacturing
Business in ArroRNEY's HANDBOOK OF AcCOUNTING 13-14 to -15 (rev, ed. H. Sellin ed. 1971).
Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with production, including depreciation, taxes, and
management expenses. See Areeda & Turner, Predatory Pricing and Related Practices
Under Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 88 HAuv. L. REv. 697, 700 (1975). Variable costs are
dependent upon the amount or quantity of goods produced, including such items as labor,
materials and energy consumption. See id. The apparent effect of the inclusive definition
of "cost of doing business or overhead expense" in the Act is to reference a higher price
level than would be present if the definition merely included variable costs.
116. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 1 (1976).
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Essentially, a violation has two elements:
(1) selling or offering to sell any commodity at less than cost,
or giving or offering to give away any commodity,
(2) for the purpose or with the effect of injuring a competitor
or destroying competition.""
The prohibitions against sales below cost, like the prohibition
against locality price discrimination," ' applies to "discrimina-
tion" that violates the spirit and intent of the Act.'210
To refer to a sale below cost as "discrimination" is, of course,
a misnomer because discrimination contemplates selling or fur-
nishing the same item to different persons at different prices.'2 '
However, the prohibition against sales below cost does not require
two sales of the same product at different prices.' 2 Theoretically,
a single sale below cost is a violation.
Perhaps the most critical aspect of establishing a violation is
proving the "cost" of the commodity. Although section 325.04
applies to retailers, wholesalers, sub-jobbers, and vending ma-
chine operators,'1' "cost" is defined only with respect to whole-
salers or retailers.'24 As applied to a wholesale or retail vendor,
118. Id. § 325.02; id. 325.04, para. 1. Section 325.04 could be read to require injury to
competition in the case of giving away any commodity but not in the case of selling a
commodity at less than cost. However, the statute has been interpreted as requiring injury
to or destruction of competition in all cases before a violation can exist. See State v.
Applebaums Food Mkts., Inc., 259 Minn. 209, 218, 106 N.W.2d 896, 902 (1960).
119. See MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976); id. § 325.04, paras. 2-3.
120. Id. § 325.04, para. 3. This paragraph applies to both sales below cost and locality
discrimination and contains language similar to an equivalent provision in section 325.03.
Thus, like the Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), the Minnesota prohibi-
tions purport to reach indirect as well as direct forms of price discrimination. However,
unlike the Robinson-Patman Act, the Minnesota statutes do not single out certain indirect
forms of discrimination as being illegal regardless of their competitive effect. Compare id.
§ 1(c)-(e), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)-(e) with MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) and id. § 325.04, para.
3.
121. See Kentucky Traction & Terminal Co. v. Murray, 176 Ky. 593, 597, 195 S.W.
1119, 1121 (1917) (in construing statute prohibiting discrimination by common carriers,
court defined "discrimination" as the failure to treat all alike under substantially similar
conditions); L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2.
122. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 1 (1976) (applying to one "who sells ... at less
than the cost thereof to such vendor").
123. See id.: notes 69-73 supra and accompanying text.
124. See MINN. STAT. § 325.01(5) (1976). Probably, the absence of a definition for "cost"
with respect to vending machine operators can be filled by viewing them as retailers
because of the similarity in the definition of retailers and vending machine operators.
Compare id. § 325.01(2) (retailers are sellers to consumers) with id. § 325.01(25) (vending
machine operators are sellers to consumers). While "sub-jobbers" are defined specifically
not to include wholesalers or retailers, see id. § 325.01(24), "sub-jobbers" are defined as
[Vol. 5
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/1
MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION
"cost" means the lower of either actual current invoice or replace-
ment cost, plus sales taxes, and the cost of doing business "at that
location."' 25 Constitutional infirmities in the original definition of
"cost""'2 prompted the Legislature to clarify the terms referred to
in the definition.2 7 A manufacturer's current published price list,
less published trade discounts, is prima facie evidence of invoice
or replacement cost.'2 1 Moreover, the invoice cost of commodities
purchased by a wholesale or retail vendor at bankruptcy sales,
close-out sales, or other sales outside of the ordinary channels of
trade generally cannot be used in calculating costs.'
2 1
The second element of a violation-competitive injury-can be
sellers performing the "functions of a wholesaler." Id. § 325.01(24). Thus, "sub-jobbers"
probably should be viewed as wholesalers for the purpose of establishing "cost."
125. Id. § 325.01, subd. 5(1). See generally id. § 325.01(7) (definition of "cost of doing
business" includes the following fixed and incidental costs: "[lIabor, including salaries
and bonuses of executives and officers, rent, depreciation, selling costs, maintenance of
equipment, delivery costs, all types of licenses, taxes, insurance, and advertising"); note
57 supra.
126. In Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 78-79 (D. Minn. 1938) (per
curiam), the court found the original definition of "cost" as "the manufacturer's list price
less his published discounts plus the cost of doing business," Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch.
116, pt. 2, § 3, para. 3, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, unconstitutional because it failed to account
for "what a merchant has actually paid in the ordinary course of trade for his goods." 23
F. Supp. at 79. The court explained:
To treat a sale of goods which yields to a merchant all that he has actually
expended for his goods plus his cost of doing business, as an unfair trade practice
merely because the manufacturer has published lists of prices and discounts on
the basis of which it appears that the merchant paid more for his goods than he
actually did pay, seems unjustifiable.
Id.
127. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 2, 1939 Minn. Laws 796 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.01(5) (1976)).
128. See MINN. STAT. § 325.01, subd. 5(2) (1976). In reviewing the original act's defini-
tion of cost, which it found unconstitutional, the court in Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam) remarked:
Had the Legislature seen fit to define "cost" as "actual cost plus the cost of
doing business by said vendor" and to provide that where goods were purchased
by a merchant from a manufacturer who had a published list price, such list
price less published discounts, in effect at the time the merchant acquired the
goods, should be prima facie evidence of their actual cost, an entirely different
situation would be presented, since there would seem to be nothing unreason-
able in assuming, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that a merchant had
purchased at list price less published discounts.
Id. at 79. In revising the Act after the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. case, the Minnesota
Legislature adopted the court's advice. Compare id. with Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, §
2, para. 3, 1939 Minn. Laws 796 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 325.01(5) (1976)).
129. See MINN. STAT. § 325.05 (1976). In addition, MINN. STAT. § 325.05 (1976) provides
that purchases outside the ordinary channels cannot justify a price lower than one based
upon replacement cost unless the goods are kept separate and advertised as purchased
other than through ordinary channels of trade.
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satisfied by an intent to cause injury as well as the actual effect
of causing injury."'" This element is similar to the provision in the
section 325.03 prohibition against locality price discrimination,"'
but different from the section 325.04 prohibition against locality
price discrimination, which requires only threatened injury to
competition. 3 '
Several types of transactions are exempt under section 325.06
from the prohibition in section 325.04 against sales below cost. ::,
When public notice is given, close-out sales, sales of perishable
goods, sales of seasonal commodities when style is the paramount
feature, '1 4 and sales of damaged or deteriorated goods are ex-
empt.'13 Transactions by an officer acting under court order are
also exempt' as are sales, offers, or gifts made in a good faith
attempt to meet the legal prices of a competitor."7
The exemption for meeting competition appeared in the 1937
enactment of the Unfair Trade Practices Act"" and was amended
in 1941 to make it available only to meet the "legal" prices of a
competitor. 3 ' In 1957, it was further amended by providing that
a competitor's retail price of less than eight percent above actual
current delivered invoice cost would be prima facie evidence that
the price was not legal."10 Similarly, prima facie evidence of an
unlawful wholesale price of a competitor would be established if
the price charged was less than two percent above actual current
130. See id. § 325.04, para. 1 ("for the purpose or with the effect of" causing injury).
For discussion of intent or effect requirements, see note 36 supra.
131. See notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
132. See notes 54-55, 76-78 supra and accompanying text.
133. See MINN. STAT. § 325.06 (1976).
134. Id. § 325.06(1).
135. Id. § 325.06(2).
136. Id. § 325.06(3).
137. Id. § 325.06(4).
138. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 6(d), 1937 Minn. Laws 184 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4) (1976)).
139. See Act of Apr. 21, 1941, ch. 326, § 1, para. 2, 1941 Minn. Laws 617 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 2 (1976)); id. § 3(d), 1941 Minn. Laws 620 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4) (1976)). According to one commentator, the change from
"local" to "legal" was necessary because when "local" was employed,
serious evasions developed. One merchant would begin unfair competition by
price slashing in a given locality, and then the other merchants in the locality
would, under the act, be privileged to meet this competition. In the ensuing
price war, matters became so confused that it was impossible for enforcement
officers to know who had begun the unfair competition.
26 MINN. L. REV. 245, 245 n.135 (1942).
140. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 822, § 3, 1957 Minn. Laws 1162 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4), para. 2 (1976)).
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delivered invoice cost.' If a sale is made to meet a competitor's
price that is less than these established levels, the seller cannot
rely upon the meeting competition defense unless he shows the
competitor's price was in fact lawful. 42 The 1957 Legislature also
added a provision to section 325.06 allowing retailers or wholesal-
ers to determine the legality of a competitor's price by asking the
Commissioner of the Department of Business Development to
ascertain and disclose the current manufacturer's published list
prices less published trade discounts on any commodity.'" The
Commissioner was required to ascertain and disclose the informa-
tion within forty-eight hours of the request.' Failure by a seller
to make this request before reducing prices below cost to meet the
price of a competitor is deemed prima facie evidence, presumably
rebuttable, of a failure to act in good faith."
45
3. Presumptions Establishing a Prima Facie Case
Section 325.075 contains rebuttable presumptions"' making
certain sales violative of the Act Against Unfair Discrimination
and Competition." 7 Although applicable to both locality price
discrimination and sales below cost,"41 these presumptions make
little sense in the context of locality discrimination because they
do not describe sales at different prices."9 The presumptions are
unavailable unless two requirements have been satisfied: (1) the
price charged by the seller must have been below the minimum
markup set forth in the statute, and (2) this price must have been
charged for the purpose or effect of injuring competition.'5"
141. See id. (current version at MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4), para. 3 (1976)).
142. See MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4) (1976).
143. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 822, § 3, 1957 Minn. Laws 1163 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4), para. 4 (1976)).
144. The Legislature has since transferred the duties of the Commissioner to the Attor-
ney General. See Act of May 4, 1967, ch. 302, § 1(2), 1967 Minn. Laws 477 (current version
at MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4), para. 4 (1976)).
145. See MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4), para. 5 (1976).
146. See Minn. Op. Att'y. Gen. 417-E (Mar. 23, 1949) (presumption may be overturned
by proof of no intent to injure competitors and no anticompetitive effect); id. 417-E (Nov.
24, 1947) (when retailer proves that actual cost is less than prima facie 8% rule, presump-
tion of cost overcome).
147. See MINN. STAT. § 325.075 (1976).
148. The presumptions in section 325.075 apply to violation of sections 325.02 to 325.07.
Id. § 325.075, paras. 1, 3-4.
149. See id. The statute refers only to sales made at less than certain percentages above
cost, therefore ignoring the fact that the prohibitions against locality discrimination refer
to discriminatory prices in at least two sales regardless of cost.
150. See id. § 325.075, para. 1.
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The minimum markups set forth in section 325.075 parallel the
section 325.06 presumptions of price legality in the context of
establishing the defense of meeting a "legal" price of a competi-
tor.5 ' Essentially, the markups represent a presumption of the
vendor's overhead and cost of doing business. Thus, illegality is
presumed unless retailers place a minimum markup of eight per-
cent,' 2 and wholesalers and sub-jobbers a minimum markup of
two percent,'53 above what they pay for the commodity. Neverthe-
less, wholesalers may sell without a markup if the commodity is
sold to a sub-jobber, vending machine operator, or another whole-
saler. "'54 On the other hand, sales by a "vendor"'' ' at a price at
least fifteen percent above what was paid for the commodity is
an absolute defense against any form of violation. 5 ' The prede-
cessor of this section, enacted in 1937, '17 had provided that a sale
by a retail vendor at less than ten percent above what had been
paid was prima facie evidence of a violation.' However, no prose-
cution could lie for sales by a vendor at prices fifteen percent
above what was paid.'59 What is particularly remarkable about
the 1937 legislation and what might have rendered it largely inef-
fective is the relatively narrow range between prima facie unlaw-
ful and absolutely permissible prices,'"" a feature still retained in
151. Compare id. § 325.06(4), para. 2 with id. § 325.075, para. 1.
152. Id. § 325.075, para. 1.
153. Id. § 325.075, para. 3.
154. See id. (applying only to sales by wholesale vendors or sub-jobbers to retailers).
155. Use of the word "vendor" in paragraph 2 of section 325.075 creates an ambiguity
in the law. This paragraph, defining sales deemed conclusively lawful, immediately fol-
lows the provision containing the presumed violation applicable to retail vendors. There-
fore, paragraph 2 may be a mere elaboration of the earlier paragraph with no intended
application to wholesale vendors. This conclusion is supported by the fact that the pre-
sumptions, when originally enacted, were applicable solely to retail sales. See Act of Mar.
30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 3, 1937 Minn. Laws 183 (current version at MNN. STAT. § 325.075,
paras. 1-2 (1976)). The last two paragraphs relating to wholesale vendors contain no prima
facie valid sale provision applicable to wholesalers. See MINN. STAT. § 325.075, paras. 3-4
(1976).
156. MINN. STAT. § 325.075, para. 2 (1976). Arguably, the 15% provision is applicable
to both retailers and wholesalers. When the Legislature amended the section, it did not
add "retail" before "vendor" in the second paragraph. See id. By not modifying "vendor,"
the Legislature may have intended the provision to apply to both retail and wholesale
vendors. Otherwise, the statute contains no provision allowing wholesalers an opportunity
for making a conclusively lawful sale.
157. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 3, paras. 5-6, 1937 Minn. Laws 182 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 325.075, para. 2 (1976)).
158. See id.
159. See id.
160. See id. (the price range was only five percent).
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the present statutes.'"' Similarly, the bar against prosecution is
incomprehensible when applied to locality discrimination be-
cause that prohibition is based not on cost but on unequal treat-
ment in two or more sales.
The second requirement of a presumed violation-purpose or
effect of injuring competition-substantially weakens the impact
of the statutory presumptions.' 2 While appearing to lessen the
burden of proving a possible sale below cost, the statutory pre-
sumptions are weakened by requiring a victim to prove an anti-
competitive intent or effect. This element is similar to the anti-
competitive intent or effect required to prove a violation of the
section 325.03 locality price discrimination prohibition' 3 and of
the section 325.04 sales-below-cost prohibition.'64 Thus, the net
effect of the presumptions is difficult to assess. Sales below cost
may be presumed but the necessary element of purpose or effect
of injuring competition still will have to be shown.
B. Statutes Applying to Particular Commodities
The Minnesota Legislature also has been particularly con-
cerned from time to time with unfair business practices involving
certain commodities. Provisions prohibiting price discrimination
or sales below cost sometimes appear among statutes governing
particular products. Set forth below is a discussion of the price
discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes applicable to petro-
leum products,6 5 farm and dairy products, "I cigarettes,' 7 beer,
liquor,' and prescription drugs.7 0 A person dealing with a price
discrimination or sales-below-cost question concerning other par-
ticular products should read with care any statutes governing the
161. Presently, the price range between lawful and unlawful prices is seven percent. See
MINN. STAT. § 325.075, paras. 1-2 (1976).
162. See id. § 325.075, para. 1.
163. See id. § 325.03; notes 34-37 supra and accompanying text.
164. See MINN. STAT. § 325.04, para. 1 (1976); notes 130-32 supra and accompanying
text.
165. See MINN. STAT. § 325.82 (1976); notes 172-84 infra and accompanying text.
166. See MINN. STAT. §§ 17.14-.19 (1976) (farm products); id. § 32A.04 (d'airy products);
notes 185-213 infra and accompanying text.
167. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325.64-.76 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 793,
§§ 72, 98, 1978 Minn. Laws 1210, 1217; notes 214:23 infra and accompanying text.
168. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325B.01-.17 (Supp. 1977); notes 224-26 infra and accompany-
ing text.
169. See MINN. STAT. § 340.114 (1976); notes 227-33 infra and accompanying text.
170. See MINN. STAT. § 151.061 (1976); notes 234-38 infra and accompanying text.
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sale of such products as the specific prohibitions frequently are
found among other, more innocuous provisions.''
1. Petroleum Products
The earliest Minnesota legislation dealing with unfair price
discrimination was a 1907 act prohibiting locality discrimination
in the distribution of petroleum products. 7 ' In language similar
to the Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition,17:1 the
petroleum statute, presently section 325.82,11 prohibits any pe-
troleum dealer 75 from "intentionally, or otherwise," discriminat-
ing in price in the sale of petroleum products between different
sections of the state. 7 ' No violation occurs, however, unless the
dealer's purpose was to destroy a competitor's business or to cre-
ate a monopoly.'77 In determining price, allowance is made for
differences in quality and transportation costs. 7 " Corporations
violating the statute may be dissolved, if domestic, or ousted, if
foreign. 7 ' Contracts made in violation of the statute are void and,
171. The following statutes are not described specifically in this Article: MINN. STAT. §
35.58 (1976) (price discrimination in sale of hog cholera serum and virus); id. § 65B.13
(prohibiting rate discrimination in issuing automobile insurance policies); id. § 72A.12(3)-
(4) (prohibiting rate discrimination and rebates in life insurance policies); id. § 72A.20(8)-
(10) (rate discrimination and rebates prohibited as unfair and deceptive acts in selling
accident, health, or life insurance); id. § 126.18 (certain textbooks sold at lower prices
outside Minnesota must be offered for the same price in Minnesota); id. § 235.10 (locality
discrimination in purchase of grain).
172. See Act of Apr. 20, 1907, ch. 269, 1907 Minn. Laws 363 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 325.82 (1976)).
173. Compare MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976) (no discrimination allowed "between differ-
ent sections, communities, or cities of this state by selling or furnishing such commodity
• ..at a lower price or rate in one section, community, or city, or any portion thereof,
than such person . . . charges. . . in another section, community, or city, or any portion
thereof") with id. § 325.82(1) (no discrimination allowed "between different sections,
communities, or cities of this state, by selling such commodity at a lower rate in one
section, community, or city than is charged for such commodity . . . in another section,
community, or city").
174. Id. § 325.82.
175. A petroleum dealer would include "lalny person, firm, company, association, or
corporation, foreign or domestic, doing business in this state, and engaged in the produc-




179. Id. § 325.82(6)-(7). In State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126
N.W. 527 (1910), the defendant argued that the statutory procedure that requires the
Secretary of State to refer complaints charging a corporation with unlawful discrimination
to the Attorney General, see MINN. STAT. § 325.82(5) (1976), had not been followed and
thus the conviction against it was invalid. The court determined that the statute did not
provide the exclusive remedy and the Attorney General on his own initiative properly
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if executory, may be rescinded.""'
The statute specifically provides that neither the remedies in
the Act nor the Act itself are intended to displace any other law.",
Therefore, the provisions of the Act Against Unfair Discrimina-
tion and Competition-a statute of general application-also
should apply to the sale of petroleum."'2 This is anomalous be-
cause, for example, a seller of petroleum prosecuted under section
325.82 would have no meeting competition defense,"' :' whereas
that defense would be available if prosecution were under the
general act.'"4
2. Farm and Dairy Products
Three statutes apply to farm and dairy commodities. One stat-
ute applies to the sale of dairy commodities""X and the other two
apply to the purchase of either dairy"' or farm products."'7
The Dairy Industry Unfair Trade Practices Act,"" passed by
the 1957 Legislature,"'9 contains far-reaching provisions appar-
ently intended to eliminate interlocking relationships between, or
perceived favoritism among, manufacturers and distributors of
dairy products. 9 0 Included among the numerous limitations upon
interrelationships of manufacturers and distributors of "selected
dairy products"' 9 are several provisions dealing explicitly with
price discrimination or sales below cost.
One provision forbids any manufacturer, distributor, or whole-
saler from charging a combined price for any selected dairy prod-
could seek ouster through the courts as well as through reference by the Secretary of
State. 111 Minn. at 93-94, 126 N.W. at 528.
180. MINN. STAT. § 325.82(3) (1976) ("All contracts or agreements made in violation of
any provisions [of this section] shall be void and any money or property paid or trans-
ferred . . . shall be paid back . . . and on failure to so repay, then purchaser may recover
back, in a civil action .
181. Id. § 325.82(8).
182. See id. §§ 325.02-.075.
183. See id. § 325.82.
184. See id. § 325.06; notes 107-10 supra and accompanying text.
185. See MINN. STAT. §§ 32A.04(1)(I)-(m), (o), .07(a) (1976).
186. See id. § 32.11.
187. See id. § 17.15.
188. Id. §§ 32A.01-.09.
189. Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 821, 1957 Minn. Laws 1148 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§§ 32A.01-.09 (1976)).
190. See MINN. STAT. § 32A.02 (1976) (legislative declaration of public policy).
191. "'Selected dairy products' means 'milk' for human consumption in fluid form,
'fluid milk products' as defined in section 32.391, 'frozen foods' as defined in section 32.55,
subdivision 2, cottage cheese, and 'mix' and 'ice cream mix' as defined in section 32.55,
subdivision 4, including ice milk mix." Id. § 32A.03(2).
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uct together with another commodity or service that is less than
the aggregate of the price of the two when sold separately."'2 Se-
lected dairy products, another provision makes clear, are also
subject to the section 325.04 prohibitions. 3 Manufacturers, dis-
tributors, and wholesalers also are prohibited from selling furni-
ture or trade fixtures to retailers at less than cost."'4 Sales of these
items at less than fifteen percent above invoice or replacement
cost are deemed prima facie evidence of a sale below cost. "',
In addition to these relatively recent prohibitions relating to
the sale of selected dairy products, statutes dealing with discrimi-
nation in the purchase of milk and farm products have been in
effect for over half a century.'" In 1909, the Minnesota Legisla-
ture prohibited unlawful discrimination in the purchase of milk,
cream, and butterfat. 97 The legislation was revised in 19211'" to
prohibit buying milk, cream, or butterfat at a higher price in one
locality than in another locality for the same commodity by the
same person, if done for the purpose of creating a monopoly,
restraining trade, limiting competition, or destroying the busi-
ness of a competitor.'" Proof that a higher price was paid in one
locality than in another, after due allowance for the cost of trans-
192. See id. § 32A,04(l)(m) (also prohibiting "any method or device" intending to
circumvent the stated policy of the Dairy Industry Unfair Trade Practices Act).
193. See id. § 32A.04(1)(o).
194. Id. § 32A.07(a). The Act also prohibits giving, lending, furnishing, or leasing furni-
ture or trade fixtures as an incentive or inducement to handle certain dairy products. Id.
§ 32A.04(1)(c).
195. Id. § 32A.07(a). Query the rationale for, in effect, requiring that sales by dairy
wholesalers be at least 15% above cost even though other wholesalers under the Act
Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition are required to sell at only 2% above cost.
See notes 152-53 supra and accompanying text.
196. See Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, 1921 Minn. Laws 373 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 32.11-.12 (1976)); Act of Apr. 23, 1909, ch. 468, 1909 Minn. Laws 564 (repealed
1921).
197. See Act of Apr. 23, 1909, ch. 468, 1909 Minn. Laws 564 (repealed 1921). The statute
came under attack on constitutional grounds in State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co., 117
Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496 (1912), discussed in notes 279-84 infra and accompanying text.
The defendant argued that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the four-
teenth amendment of the United States Constitution, as well as the equality clause of
article 1, section 2, and the prohibition against special legislation, article 4, sections 33-
34 of the Minnesota Constitution. The court upheld the statute as related to the legitimate
purpose of preventing monopoly, 117 Minn. at 191, 134 N.W. at 497-98, and as not being
an arbitrary or fanciful classification since it limited its scope to those intending to create
a monopoly or destroy competition. 117 Minn. at 189, 134 N.W. at 497.
198. The 1921 Act expressly repealed the 1909 law, but reenacted the prohibition with
similar language. See Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, 1921 Minn. Laws 373 (current version
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portation, constituted prima facie evidence of a violation.2 "' A
meeting competition defense also was provided."'
A 1923 amendment limited the statute's application to persons
engaged in the business of buying such products "for manufac-
ture or for sale" and eliminated the requirement of an anticom-
petitive purpose.202 The prohibition against discriminating be-
tween different localities was expanded in 1955 to include dis-
crimination practiced "in the same locality.1
2 3
Discrimination in the purchase of farm products was addressed
by the 1927 Minnesota Legislature. 2" The legislation, duplicating
the coverage of dairy products, also reached the purchase of
"honey, eggs, poultry, and all livestock and products of livestock
such as wool, mohair, hides, and meats."
25
As was the case with the 1923 amendments dealing with dis-
crimination in the purchase of milk products, 26 the 1927 legisla-
tion prohibiting discrimination in the purchase of farm products
does not require any anticompetitive purpose or effect for a viola-
tion.0 7 Furthermore, proof of payment of a higher price in one
section or community than was paid in another, after due allow-
ance for cost of transportation, was also prima facie evidence of
a violation.208 Discriminatory purchase prices were permitted if
paid in good faith to meet competition. 2 9 In 1937 further similari-
200. Id. § 2, 1921 Minn. Laws 374 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 32.12(1) (1976)).
201. See Act of Apr. 25, 1955, ch. 876, § 2, 1955 Minn. Laws 1539 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 32.12(3) (1976)).
202. See Act of Mar. 31, 1923, ch. 120, § 1, 1923 Minn. Laws 120 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 32.11 (1976)). The absence of an intent requirement proved to be trouble-
some when the constitutionality of the statute was attacked. See notes 295-96 infra and
accompanying text.
203. Act of Apr. 25, 1955, ch. 876, § 1, 1955 Minn. Laws 1538 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 32.11 (1976)).
204. Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, 1927 Minn. Laws 374 (current version at MINN. STAT.
§§ 17.14-.19 (1976)).
205. Id. § 2(b), 1927 Minn. Laws 374 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 17.14(3) (1976)).
206. See note 202 supra and accompanying text.
207. See Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, § 3, 1927 Minn. Laws 374 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 17.15 (1976)). The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the statute against
due process attack even though the statute omitted the element of intent. See State v.
Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 263, 21 N.W.2d 792, 799-800 (1946).
In a later decision, the court appeared to interpret Lanesboro as not addressing the issue
of intent. See Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn. 225, 234,
149 N.W.2d 698, 704 (1967) (invalidating prior version of Unfair Cigarette Sales Act due
to absence of requirement of intent or effect).
208. Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, § 4, 1927 Minn. Laws 375 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 17.16 (1976)).
209. Id. § 3, 1927 Minn. Laws 374 (current version at MINN. STAT. § 17.15 (1976)).
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ties between the two statutes resulted when the farm products
statute was amended to reach discrimination "between persons
in the same community." 10 The 1937 amendment also made un-
lawful the failure "to deduct full transportation costs from the
purchase price paid, or . . to deduct the actual cost of hauling
when such products are gathered by wagon or truck." '' When the
requirement of deducting actual transportation costs was found
unconstitutional, 12 the Legislature amended the statute to re-
quire the deduction of "reasonable" transportation costs.
2 :1
3. Cigarettes
In 1961, the Minnesota Legislature passed an act proscribing
sales of cigarettes below cost.214 Six years later, in 1967,215 the
Legislature considered the prohibition again after the Minnesota
Supreme Court found the initial legislation unconstitutional. 2 ,
The current act, entitled the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, 217 pro-
hibits wholesalers or retailers from selling cigarettes at less than
cost when such sales are made for the purpose or with the effect
of injuring a competitor or destroying competition .211 Unless made
in the ordinary course of business, the sale of cigarettes along with
any other item at a combined price also is prohibited if the com-
bined price is below the cost of all articles included in the transac-
tion.2 19 Excluded from the prohibitions in the Act are isolated
210. Act of Apr. 24, 1937, ch. 420, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 611 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 17.15 (1976)).
211. Id.
212. See State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 443-44, 281 N.W. 753,
755-56 (1938) (due process denied when the ability to ascertain costs with reasonable
certainty was not present).
213. See Act of Mar. 23, 1945, ch. 122, 1945 Minn. Laws 180 (current version at MINN.
STAT. § 17.15 (1976)).
214. See Act of May 25, 1961, ch. 35, 1961 Minn. Laws 1540 (repealed 1967).
215. See Act of May 19, 1967, ch. 600, 1967 Minn. Laws 1202 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 325.64-.76 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 793, §§ 72, 98, 1978
Minn. Laws 1210, 1217).
216. See Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn. 225, 234, 149
N.W.2d 698, 704 (1967), discussed in notes 353-61 infra and accompanying text.
217. MINN. STAT. §§ 325.64-.76 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 793, §§
72, 98, 1978 Minn. Laws 1210, 1217. Section 72 of the 1978 law deleted "the chairman of
the commerce commission" from the group of persons permitted to bring actions against
violators for injunctive relief or damages. Section 98 of the 1978 law repealed certain
provisions that granted powers and duties to the chairman of the commerce commission
to promulgate regulations and conduct hearings and cost surveys for purposes of enforcing
the Act.
218. MINN. STAT. § 325.67(1) (1976).
219. Id. § 325.68.
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transactions, clearance sales, sales of damaged cigarettes,"" and
sales to meet competition."'
Also set forth in the statute are certain rebuttable presump-
tions as to the cost of doing business for the purpose of establish-
ing a seller's "cost." Generally, it is presumed that wholesalers
have a cost of doing business equal to four percent of the basic
cost of the cigarettes"'2 and that retailers have a cost of doing
business equal to eight percent of the basic cost of the ciga-
rettes 123
4. Beer
In 1977, apparently inspired by the vicissitudes of a local brew-
ery and its distributors, 24 the Legislature enacted far-reaching
provisions relating to beer brewers and wholesalers.2 5 In addition
to dealing generally with relations between brewers and beer
wholesalers, the Legislature, with utmost simplicity, enacted
the following prohibition: "No brewer shall discriminate among
its wholesalers in any business dealings including, but not
limited to, the price of beer sold to the wholesaler, unless the




Four years before the "beer statute" was passed, the Minnesota
Legislature had enacted similar provisions requiring uniformity
in the pricing of intoxicating liquor. 22 This liquor act provides
that every licensed importer shall offer intoxicating liquor
brought into Minnesota to all licensed wholesalers and manufac-
220. See id. § 325.70.
221. See id. § 325.71. The statute does not include a requirement that the competitor's
price be "legal." See id.
222. See id. § 325.66, subd. 10(2). The presumption is 2% when a wholesaler sells to
another wholesaler. See id.
223. See id. § 325.66, subd. 11(2).
224. See Tape of Hearing on H.F. 1132 Before the Minnesota House of Representatives
Committee on Commerce & Economic Development, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (May
3, 1977). S.F. 1070 was later substituted for H.F. 1132. See 2 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 2146 (1977).
While the original version would have added the beer industry to Minnesota's franchise
statute, the House of Representatives amended the bill to exclude this incorporation. See
id. at 2708. The Senate concurred in this amendment and the bill took its final form. See
2 MINN. S. Joua. 2423 (1977).
225. See Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 328, 1977 Minn. Laws 668 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§§ 325B.01-.17 (Supp. 1977)).
226. MINN. STAT. § 325B.12 (Supp. 1977).
227. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 664, § 2, 1973 Minn. Laws 1753 (codified at MINN,
STAT. § 340.114 (1976)).
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turers "on an equal basis. '2 8 The statute declares a number of
practices illegal, including:
(1) sales to any wholesaler or manufacturer at different
prices than those offered to other wholesalers or manufacturers,
exclusive of transportation costs,29
(2) sales to any wholesaler or manufacturer on terms of pur-
chase different from those offered others unless the customer
will be unable to comply with existing credit terms.2 3"
Furthermore, the statute reaches geographic discrimination
between sales in Minnesota and sales in other states. Importers
or manufacturers are prohibited from selling intoxicating liquor
to any licensed wholesaler in Minnesota at a price higher than the
lowest price charged for the same item in any other state. ' Due
allowance may be made for differences in state taxes and the
actual cost of delivery.232 However, the statute does not apply to
nonintoxicating liquors, wines, or malt beverages regardless of
alcoholic content.33
6. Prescription Drugs
In 1973, the Minnesota Legislature determined that the general
statutory prohibitions dealing with price discrimination were in-
adequate to deal with problems believed to exist in the distribu-
tion of pharmaceutical products. 234 The Legislature required all
wholesalers or manufacturers of prescription drugs to sell their
products at the same price to different purchasers, 5 with due
228. MINN. STAT. § 340.114(1) (1976).
229. Id. § 340.114(2)(b). Quantity discounts based upon actual cost savings may be
uniformly offered to all wholesalers and manufacturers without being subject to the prohi-
bition. See id.
230. Id. § 340.114(2)(c).
231. Id. § 340.114(3), para. 1.
232. See id. § 340.114(3), para. 2 (determination of lowest sale price in any other state
also takes into consideration appropriate reductions to reflect discounts, rebates, and
other inducements given to any wholesaler, state, or state agency purchasing such item
in such other state).
233. Id. § 340.114(4). This provision does not render the statute unconstitutional under
equal-protection guarantees. See Federal Distillers, Inc. v. State, 304 Minn. 28, 43-44, 229
N.W.2d 144, 156, appeal dismissed sub nom. Heaven Hill Distilleries, Inc. v. Novak, 423
U.S. 908 (1975). Nonintoxicating malt liquor, defined in MINN. STAT. § 340.001(2) (1976)
as containing no more than 3.2% alcohol by weight, appears to be covered in the beer
statute. See notes 224-26 supra and accompanying text.
234. See Act of May 24, 1973, ch. 722, 1973 Minn. Laws 2075 (codified at MINN. STAT.
§ 151.061(1) (1976)).
235. MINN. STAT. § 151.061(1) (1976).
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allowance for differences in grade, quality, quantity, and freight
costs.2: However, quantity discounts are considered to be unfair
discrimination unless "reasonably based on actual cost savings to
all like purchasers. '2 37 An exception is made for sales to public
and charitable institutions.38
7. Summary
The various Minnesota laws dealing with price discrimination
in the sale or purchase of specific products differ substantially
from statute to statute. When considered with reference to the
Act Against Unfair Discrimination and Competition,23 1 the stat-
utes relating to specific products result in a substantial collection
of possibly irreconcilable regulations. The statutes relating to the
sale of beer, intoxicating liquor, and pharmaceuticals require
almost absolute price uniformity and apparently do not permit
price differences based on meeting competition.2 10 They seem
aimed at preventing injury at the secondary level-competition
among purchasers of those products. 2 ' However, these stat-
utes-as well as the statutes pertaining to discrimination in the
purchase of farm products 2 2 -require no purpose or effect to in-
jure competition before a violation is present; 243 nor do they apply
to sales below cost.2 " Perhaps these statutes represent a legisla-
tive determination that all price differences as to these products
injure competition.
On the other hand, the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act is directed
solely toward sales below cost and combination sales. 21 By con-
trast, the prohibition relating to sale of petroleum products, like
the general prohibitions of price discrimination,4 6 is concerned
with locality discrimination and primary rather than secondary
level injury. 247 In any event, there is no obvious rationale for the
236. Id. This section also provides for an action for damages, reasonable attorney's fees,
and equitable relief. See id. § 151.061(2).
237. Id. § 151.061(1).
238. See id.
239. See id. §§ 325.02-.075; notes 16-164 supra and accompanying text.
240. See notes 224-38 supra and accompanying text.
241. See id.
242. See MINN. STAT. §§ 17.15, 32.11, 32A.04(o) (1976); notes 204-05 supra and accom-
panying text.
243. See notes 204-05, 226, 229-30, 234-38 supra and accompanying text.
244. See id.
245. See MINN. STAT. §§ 325.64-.76 (1976), as amended by Act of Apr. 5, 1978, ch. 793,
§§ 72, 98, 1978 Minn. Laws 1210, 1217; notes 217-23 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 16-164 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 172-84 supra and accompanying text.
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differing approaches of the various statutes or for singling out
certain products for special treatment.
C. Penalties
Despite possible incongruities in the various Minnesota stat-
utes prohibiting price discrimination and sales below cost, viola-
tions can result in the imposition of substantial penalties. Willful
violation of the general locality discrimination and sales-below-
cost statutes is a misdemeanor2 ' and each separate discrimina-
tory sale is a separate offense. 249 More significantly, any person
damaged or threatened by loss or injury by reason of a violation
of the general act may sue for injunctive relief, as well as actual
damages.10 To obtain injunctive relief, it is unnecessary to allege
or prove the absence of an adequate remedy at law."' Additional
remedies are provided in section 325.907,252 which permits the
injured person to recover damages and costs, including investiga-
tive costs and attorney's fees.
2
5
The Attorney General is expressly authorized to investigate
violations of the law,24 obtain discovery without initiating a civil
action, and to arrest and seek prosecution of persons violating
price discrimination prohibitions.255 In addition, the Attorney
General may sue for injunctive relief against any actual or threat-
ened violation while preserving all other penalties provided by
law.2" Finally, the Attorney General may sue for a civil penalty,
not in excess of $25,000, against any person found to have violated
the general locality discrimination and sales-below-cost stat-
utes.21
248. MINN. STAT. § 325.48, subd. 2(1), para. 1 (1976). See generally id. § 609.02(3)
(Supp. 1977) (misdemeanors are punishable by a sentence of not more than 90 days or a
fine of $500 or both).
249. See id. § 645.24 (1976) (each violation of any act prohibited by a statute constitutes
separate offense).
250. Id. § 325.49, para. 1.
251. Id.
252. See id. § 325.907(3a).
253. Id.
254. Id. § 325.907(1).
255. Id. § 325.907(2).
256. Id. § 325.907(3).
257. Id. These remedies also should be compared with those applicable.to violation of
the basic Minnesota antitrust statute. See Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, ch. 865, 1971
Minn. Laws 1715 (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8011-.8028 (1976 & Supp. 1977)).
Violation of the restraint of trade and commerce section of the Antitrust Act is a felony
punishable by a $50,000 fine or imprisonment for five years or both. MINN. STAT. §
325.8018(2) (1976). Further, any persons injured by a violation are entitled to treble
[Vol. 5
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A variety of remedies also are available for violations of the
price discrimination or sales-below-cost statutes relating to par-
ticular commodities. Violation of the act relating to beer whole-
salers and brewers allows the wholesaler discriminated against to
seek injunctive relief3m However, express authorization for recov-
ery of damages is not afforded.25 Any person injured by unfair
price discrimination in the sale of prescription drugs may recover
both equitable relief and damages.6 0 The sale of cigarettes at less
than cost is a misdemeanor l and any person injured is entitled
to injunctive relief and damages. 22 Discrimination in the pur-
chase of dairy products is a misdemeanor. 231 Violations of the
general prohibition against discrimination in the purchase of
farm products can result in a fine of at least fifty dollars for each
offense, or in default of payment of the fine, by imprisonment for
not less than three months nor more than one year.26' Locality
discrimination in the sale of petroleum products apparently is a
more serious offense. Violation is a gross misdemeanor, punish-
able by a fine of not more than $5,000, or imprisonment not ex-
ceeding one year, or both.
2
6
I. COURT INTERPRETATION OF THE MINNESOTA STATUTES
In their day, various Minnesota statutes dealing with price
discrimination and sales below cost have been the subject of lead-
ing decisions not only by the Minnesota Supreme Court 266 but
also by federal courts,2 7 including the United States Supreme
Court.28 Unfortunately, few of the significant decisions interpret
damages as well as apparently being entitled to seek injunctive relief. See id. §§ 325.8018-
.8020.
258. MtNN* STAT. § 325B.08 (Supp. 1977).
259. See id. Section 325B.08 does allow the recovery of punitive and actual damages,
with attorney's fees, when provisions other than the price discrimination prohibition are
violated.
260. See id. § 151.061(2) (1976).
261. Id. § 325.67(1).
262. Id. § 325.74(1).
263. Id. § 32.11.
264. Id. § 17.181.
265. Id. § 325.82(2).
266. See, e.g., State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery Co., 221 Minn. 246, 21 N.W.2d
792 (1946), noted in 32 IowA L. REv. 125 (1946), discussed in notes 338-48 infra and
accompanying text; State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co., 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753
(1938), discussed in notes 297-300 infra and accompanying text.
267. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938) (per
curiam), discussed in notes 301-21 infra and accompanying text.
268. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927), discussed in notes
295-96 infra and accompanying text.
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the legislation or consider any of the anomalies or incongruities
referred to above. Rather, the decisions have dealt with the con-
stitutionality of the statutes with considerable reference to vague-
ness 269 and to the state of mind required of an alleged violator.270
Generally, the Minnesota Supreme Court has been inclined to
find the statutes constitutional,2' whereas the federal courts have
tended to find the statutes unconstitutional.1 2 While primarily of
historical interest, these decisions will be reviewed not only be-
cause they afford some insight into constitutionality and con-
struction, but also because they explain why various statutes
were enacted or amended at particular times and in particular
forms. Rather than reviewing the cases separately as they con-
strue particular statutes, the constitutional and then the inter-
pretative cases will be discussed chronologically because the deci-
sions are interrelated; a decision interpreting one of the statutes
is often relied upon as precedent in subsequent cases interpreting
different statutes.
A. Constitutional Cases
The first reported decision concerning a Minnesota price dis-
crimination statute is State ex rel. Young v. Standard Oil Co.,f
73
in which the Attorney General had sued to enforce 2 1 the 1907 act
269. See, e.g., Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 83 (D. Minn. 1938)
(per curiam) (finding challenged statute vague in part); McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn.
580, 589, 292 N.W. 414, 419 (1940) (finding challenged statute "definite and certain"). See
generally Thatcher, The Constitutionality of the Unfair Practices Acts, 30 MINN. L. Rv.
559 (1946).
270. See, e.g., State v..Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 514-15, 85 N.W.2d 401, 408-09 (1957);
McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 585-86, 292 N.W. 414, 417-18 (1940). See generally
Thatcher, supra note 269.
271. See, e.g., State v. Lanesboro Produce & Egg Co., 221 Minn. 246, 21 N.W.2d 792
(1946); State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co., 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496 (1912). But see
Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 276 Minn. 225, 149 N.W.2d 698
(1967).
272. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); Great Atl. & Pac.
Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam).
273. 111 Minn. 85, 126 N.W. 527 (1910).
274. A collateral issue in Young was whether the Attorney General had proceeded
properly in his enforcement of the Act. Under the Act, a violation was to be remedied by
revocation of a foreign corporation's license to do business in Minnesota by the Secretary
of State. The Secretary had not acted prior to the commencement of the lawsuit in Young.
Defendant Standard Oil argued that the Attorney General's action was premature because
the Act permitted the Attorney General to bring suit only after revocation of the license
and only if the discriminatory practice continued. The court dismissed this argument,
noting: "The constitution and laws of this state have vested in the attorney general
original discretion which he may exercise in instituting proper judicial proceedings to
[Vol. 5
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prohibiting locality price discrimination in the sale of petroleum
products.7 5 The Minnesota Supreme Court upheld the constitu-
tionality of the statute against an equal protection challenge,27
referring to cases finding statutes regulating such specific prod-
ucts as baking powder, agricultural goods, and dairy products
constitutional .277 The court observed:
Petroleum is taken from the earth in a manner peculiar to itself.
The refined oil is handled as no other product. Its production
and distribution have caused more legislative investigations,
and been the subject of greater legal combats, in recent years,
than any other article of commerce. We think it is more unique,
and justifies special regulation much more, than many of the




secure the enforcement of law." Id. at 94, 126 N.W. at 528. The court regarded the
enforcement provision of the Act as a nonexclusive procedure by which to obtain enforce-
ment of the Act. See id. at 93-94, 126 N.W. at 528.
275. See Act of Apr. 20, 1907, ch. 269, 1907 Minn. Laws 363. Since its enactment in
1907, the statute prohibiting price discrimination in the sale of petroleum has not been
significantly altered. Compare id. with MINN. STAT. § 325.82 (1976).
276. 111 Minn. at 100-02, 126 N.W. at 531-32; cf. State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153
Iowa 702, 709-12, 133 N.W. 895, 898-900 (1911) (statute prohibiting price discrimination
in purchase of agricultural commodities upheld under equal protection analysis). Justice
Lewis, dissenting in the Young case, asserted that the classification made by the Act was
invalid because it did not include all items that naturally fell within its scope. 111 Minn.
at 103, 126 N.W. at 532 (Lewis, J., dissenting).
Equal protection challenges to price discrimination statutes in other states have some-
times been successful. See, e.g., State v. Consumer Warehouse Mkt., Inc., 185 Kan. 363,
371-72, 343 P.2d 234, 240-41 (1959) (general statute that exempted grain and feed dealers
violative of equal protection); San Antonio Retail Grocers, Inc. v. Lafferty, 156 Tex. 574,
578-79, 297 S.W.2d 813, 816-17 (1957) (statute that prohibited grocery stores from selling
below cost violative of fourteenth amendment because of absence of reasonable basis for
classification).
277. 111 Minn. at 96-98, 126 N.W. at 530. The Young court referred to, among others:
State v. Sherod, 80 Minn. 446, 83 N.W. 417 (1900) (baking powder); State ex rel. Beek v.
Wagener, 77 Minn. 483, 80 N.W. 633 (1899) (per curiam) (upholding conviction of defen-
dant who violated provisions of act governing conduct of agricultural-products brokers);
State ex rel. Weideman v. Horgan, 55 Minn. 183, 56 N.W. 688 (1893) (imitation butter);
Stolz v. Thompson, 44 Minn. 271, 46 N.W. 410 (1890) (baking powder); Butler v. Cham-
bers, 36 Minn. 69, 30 N.W. 308 (1886) (dairy products). The Young court also made
reference to federal cases that "fully sustain[ed] the foregoing Minnesota cases," 111
Minn. at 98, 126 N.W. at 530, citing Heath & Milligan Mfg. Co. v. Worst, 207 U.S. 338
(1907) (sales of mixed paints); Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Nat'l Bank, 207 U.S.
251 (1907) (statute regulating transfers of patent rights); Otis v. Parker, 187 U.S. 606
(1903) (provision of state constitution regulating sales of corporate stock upheld); Plumley
v. Massachusetts, 155 U.S. 461 (1894) (statute preventing deception in sale of imitation
butter not violative of commerce clause; Horgan and Butler cited in opinion).
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In State v. Bridgeman & Russell Co.,2 9 the defendant had been
charged with violation of the 1909 statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion in the purchase of dairy products. 9° The Minnesota Supreme
Court, relying on Young, again found no equal protection viola-
tion;28" the distinction between manufacturers subject to the stat-
ute and others not subject to the statute212 was reasonable because
manufacturers purchased farm products in much greater volume
than did individual consumers."' The potential for abuse and
injury to competition was much greater in the case of manufac-
turers than in the case of consumers.284
Thirteen years later, in State v. Fairmont Creamery,'" another
company was convicted of violating the statute prohibiting price
279. 117 Minn. 186, 134 N.W. 496 (1912).
280. See Act of Apr. 23, 1909, ch. 468, 1909 Minn. Laws 564 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 32.11-.12 (1976)). For a history of the dairy products price discrimination statute
between 1909 and 1923, see notes 197-203 supra and accompanying text.
281. See 117 Minn. at 188-91, 134 N.W. at 497-98.
282. By its terms, the Act applied solely to those who purchased milk, cream, or butter
fat for the purpose of manufacture; "by necessary implication," the court observed, the
Act "exclude[d] those engaged in the business of buying such commodities for any
purpose other than for manufacture." Id. at 189, 134 N.W. at 497. This exclusion presum-
ably included purchasers for home consumption.
283. The court apparently took judicial notice of the nature of the dairy manufacturing
business, see id. at 188-89, 134 N.W. at 497, and concluded:
Our consideration of the subject has led us to the conclusion that the business
of buying milk, cream, and butter fat for the purpose of manufacture, when
carried on by parties controlling ample capital, with large central plants and
local purchasing points extending over wide territory, affords special facilities
and motives for the creation of monopolies by the temporary maintenance of
artificial prices at competitive local points, and, further, that there is in this
respect a substantial distinction between the purchase of milk, cream, and
butter fat for manufacture and their purchase for resale or consumption. The
business of buying such commodities for resale or consumption is not one easily
susceptible to monopolistic control.
Id. at 190, 134 N.W. at 497.
The court cited State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 153 Iowa 702, 133 N.W. 895 (1911),
which, upon substantially the same facts, upheld the Iowa statute prohibiting discrimina-
tion in prices of dairy and poultry products purchased at different points in the state. The
Iowa court also recognized the dangers of monopolistic controls in the purchase and
manufacture of dairy products, see id. at 709-11, 133 N.W. at 898-99, and found a legiti-
mate state purpose in the promotion of competition within the dairy manufacturing indus-
try.
284. 117 Minn. at 189-90, 134 N.W. at 497; see note 283 supra.
285. 162 Minn. 146, 202 N.W. 714 (1925), aff'd, 168 Minn. 378, 210 N.W. 163 (1926),
rev'd, 274 U.S. 1 (1927). The Minnesota Supreme Court considered the statute a third
time in another appeal involving the same parties but a different violation in State v.
Fairmont Creamery Co., 168 Minn. 381, 210 N.W. 608 (1926) (per curiam). In this third
consideration of the statute, the Minnesota court summarily affirmed the conviction on
the strength of the prior two decisions.
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discrimination by a manufacturer purchasing dairy products.2
Between the Bridgeman & Russell and Fairmont Creamery deci-
sions, the Legislature had rewritten the dairy product price dis-
crimination statute,287 removing the element of intent to injure or
destroy competition from the statutory violation.28 This proved
to be a fatal mistake when the Fairmont Creamery case ended in
the United States Supreme Court,28 9 becoming for its time a
landmark decision in price discrimination law. The initial Minne-
sota Supreme Court decision had upheld the constitutionality of
the statute against challenges on several bases.2 19 The case came
286. The statute involved in the Fairmont Creamery cases was similar in most respects
to the one construed in Bridgeman & Russell. Compare Act of Apr. 23, 1909, ch. 468, 1909
Minn. Laws 564 (repealed 1921) with Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, 1921 Minn. Laws 373,
as amended by Act of Mar. 31, 1923, ch. 120, 1923 Minn. Laws 120. However, when the
Legislature re-enacted the dairy product discrimination law, it failed to retain any ele-
ment of intent. This failure would become the downfall of the statute. See Fairmont
Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1927); notes 295-96 infra and accompanying
text.
287. In 1921, the specific statute that had been upheld in the Bridgeman & Russell
decision was expressly repealed. See Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, § 4, 1921 Minn. Laws
374. Prior to 1921, the Legislature had amended the Bridgeman & Russell statute twice,
first in 1913 to empower the state dairy and food commissioner to enforce the statute, see
Act of Apr. 9, 1913, ch. 230, § 2, 1913 Minn. Laws 286, and again in 1917 to add a
description of a prima facie violation. See Act of Apr. 17, 1917, ch. 337, 1917 Minn. Laws
473. The 1921 act repealing the Bridgeman & Russell statute also encompassed the repeal
of these two amendments. See Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, § 4, 1921 Minn. Laws 374. In
addition, this 1921 act adopted a new version of the dairy products price discrimination
law. See id. §§ 1-3, 1921 Minn. Laws 373. Two years later, this new version was amended
by Act of Mar. 31, 1923, ch. 120, 1923 Minn. Laws 120. It was this 1923 amendment to
the 1921 law that was at issue in Fairmont Creamery.
288. Compare Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, § 1, 1921 Minn. Laws 373, as amended by
Act of Mar. 31, 1923, ch. 120, 1923 Minn. Laws 120 (Fairmont Creamery statute) with Act
of Apr. 23, 1909, ch. 468, 1909 Minn. Laws 564 (Bridgeman & Russell statute).
289. See Fairmont Creamery Co. v. Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8-11 (1927).
290. The court was presented with certified questions pertaining to the proper venue
of the case, the constitutionality of the statute under the commerce clause of the federal
constitution, and the constitutionality of the statute under the equal protection and
freedom of contract clauses of the state and federal constitutions. See 162 Minn. at 147,
202 N.W. at 715.
Against the defendant's contention that venue would be proper only in the county where
the higher price had been obtained, the court reasoned that, because the violation requires
two sales at different prices and the Legislature could have made purchasing at the lower
price the crime, venue could properly be laid in either the county where the higher price
was obtained or where the lower price was obtained. See id. at 148, 202 N.W. at 715.
Equally short treatment was afforded the contention that the statute violated the com-
merce clause of the federal constitution. The court held that merely because the product
purchased in Minnesota wound up in the hands of an Iowa manufacturer did not invali-
date the proper exercise of the Minnesota Legislature's police power. See id. at 158, 202
N.W. at 719.
The equal protection challenge was resolved in favor of the statute on the strength of,
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before the Minnesota Supreme Court a second time on an appeal
from an order denying a new trial after the defendant had been
convicted."' The defendant argued that the revised statute pro-
hibiting price discrimination in the purchase of dairy products
was unconstitutional because it no longer required intent to in-
jure or destroy a competitor.9 2 This argument was re-
jected-omission of this element was not an arbitrary act by the
Legislature.29
After the Minnesota Supreme Court on several occasions had
upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota price discrimination
statutes,24 the United States Supreme Court entered the picture.
In the Fairmont Creamery case,15 the United States Supreme
Court held that the statute unconstitutionally interfered with the
defendant's right to contract:
We think the inhibition of the statute has no reasonable relation
to the anticipated evil-high bidding by some with purpose to
monopolize or destroy competition. Looking through form to
substance, it clearly and unmistakeably infringes private rights
whose exercise does not ordinarily produce evil consequences,
but the reverse. 96
inter alia, the Young and Bridgeman & Russell decisions. See id. at 148-51, 202 N.W. at
715-16. However, in resolving whether the statute offended the freedom of contract
clauses, the court looked to the effect of the statute to determine whether the statute
unreasonably interfered with this freedom. See id. at 152, 202 N.W. at 717. Finding the
"evil" that the Legislature sought to eradicate was a legitimate objective for the exercise
of the police power, the court found no violation of the contract clause. See id. at 155-58,
202 N.W. at 718-19.
291. 168 Minn. 378, 210 N.W. 163 (1926), rev'd, 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
292. See 168 Minn. at 379, 210 N.W. at 164; 162 Minn. at 148-49, 202 N.W. at 715.
293. 168 Minn. at 380, 210 N.W. at 164; 162 Minn. at 155, 202 N.W. at 718.
294. See State v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 162 Minn. 146, 202 N.W. 714 (1925), aff'd,
168 Minn. 378, 210 N.W. 163 (1926), rev'd, 274 U.S. 1 (1927); State ex rel. Young v.
Standard Oil Co., 111 Minn. 85, 126 N.W. 527 (1910).
295. 274 U.S. 1 (1927).
296. Id. at 9. The issue, as the Court posed it, required an answer to this question:
May the State, in order to prevent some strong buyers of cream from doing
things which may tend to monopoly, inhibit plaintiff in error from carrying on
its business in the usual way heretofore regarded as both moral and beneficial
to the public and not shown now to be accompanied by evil results as ordinary
incidents?
Id. The answer was obvious: "Former decisions here require a negative answer." Id.
The Court acknowledged that certain activities could be prohibited by a state in the
exercise of its police power, but that prohibition must have a real or substantial relation
to the evil sought to be proscribed. See id. at 11. The Minnesota statute, however, had
no substantial relation to proscription of the evil:
Buyers in competitive markets must accomodate their bids to prices offered by
others, and the payment of different prices at different places is the ordinary
[Vol. 5
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Possibly triggered by Fairmont Creamery, the Minnesota Fed-
eral District Court and the Minnesota Supreme Court then em-
barked upon a course of holding unconstitutional price discrimi-
nation and sales-below-cost statutes. In State v. Northwest Poul-
try & Egg Co.,297 the Minnesota court struck down the statute
prohibiting price discrimination in the purchase of farm prod-
ucts.2 9" A provision in the statute requiring a seller to deduct the
"actual costs" of transportation from his price to determine
whether that price was discriminatory was held unconstitu-
tionally vague 29 because the provision failed to specify the factors
to be considered in computing actual cost.
3"0
In Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Ervin, '" the Minnesota
Federal District Court considered the constitutionality of the
then recently enacted Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices Act. 302
The Act's definition of "cost," contained in the prohibition of
locality discriminationw and modeled to some extent after the
Robinson-Patman Act, 4 was found unconstitutional because it
made no provision for selling costs.3" The court remarked:
consequent. Enforcement of the statute would amount to fixing the price at
which plaintiff in error may buy, since one purchase would establish this for all
points without regard to ordinary trade conditions.
Id. at 8-9.
297. 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753 (1938).
298. The statute involved in the case was Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, § 3, 1927 Minn.
Laws 374, as amended by Act of Apr. 24, 1937, ch. 420, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 611 (current
version at MmN. STAT. § 17.15 (1976)). For a discussion of the current farm and dairy
products statute, see notes 185-213 supra and accompanying text.
299. 203 Minn. at 443-44, 281 N.W. at 755-56. But cf. Borden Co. v. Thomasen, 353
S.W.2d 735, 756 (Mo. 1962) (en banc) (term "actual transportation costs" not unconstitu-
tionally vague as "material difficulties or uncertainties" could be corrected by promulga-
tion of rules by commissioner charged with enforcement of law).
300. See 203 Minn. at 443, 281 N.W. at 755-56 (suggesting possible items that could be
considered part of "actual cost"). Justices Stone and Peterson, dissenting, asserted that
"[ciompetent accountants . . . certainly may reduce cost of transportation to something
equivalent to the ton-mile or passenger-mile basis so familiar in railroad accounting." Id.
at 445, 281 N.W. at 756 (Stone, J., dissenting). Thus, in their view, the term "actual costs"
was not unconstitutionally vague or uncertain. Id.
The legislative response to the Northwest Poultry decision came in 1945 with an amend-
ment replacing the word "actual" with the word "reasonable." See Act of Mar. 23, 1945,
ch. 122, 1945 Minn. Laws 180.
301. 23 F. Supp. 70 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam).
302. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, 1937 Minn. Laws 180, as amended by Act of Apr.
26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn. Laws 709 (correcting typographical error in first act).
303. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 181 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976)).
304. Compare Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976) with Act of Mar.
30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 181.
305. 23 F. Supp. at 76-78. The court distinguished the Robinson-Patman Act from the
19791
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Differentials in prices justified by the differences in selling
costs at different stores have not heretofore been considered as
iniquitous, wrongful, or unfair, nor as having any tendency to
destroy competition or to foster monopoly. In fact such price
differentials have been regarded as beneficial to the public and
not harmful to any one, and, even though they may affect com-
petition, they cannot be considered as the evil which the Legis-
lature was seeking to stamp out. The effect upon competition
of differences in prices honestly based on differences in selling
costs is the normal and natural result of fair competition be-
tween merchants whose overhead expenses differ. This type of
competition is to be encouraged in the public interest, rather
than restrained.308
Moreover, this portion of the statute did not require an intent by
the seller to injure competition,107 and thus, in the Qpinion of the
court, declared some legitimate trade practices to be unfair com-
petitive practices.
308
The federal court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. then
turned to the provisions prohibiting sales below cost.0 9 While
Minnesota statute because the federal law recognized a defense for price differentials
resulting from differences in selling costs, but the Minnesota statute did not. See id. at
78.
306. ld.
307. See id. at 76-77. The statute prohibited the sale of goods at different prices in
different localities when the sale had the effect of substantially lessening competition or
tending to create a monopoly. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, 1937 Minn.
Laws 182. Thus, as the court observed: "It is to be noted that the prohibition contained
in the paragraph applies regardless of the actual intent of the merchant." 23 F. Supp. at
77.
308. The court's main bbjection to the statute was the prohibition against "honest price
variations." 23 F. Supp. at 78. In this regard, the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. court
struck down the statute for much the same reason that the United States Supreme Court
struck down the statute in Fairmont Creamery. Compare Fairmont Creamery Co. v.
Minnesota, 274 U.S. 1, 8 (1927) (statute inhibits, irrespective of motive, a person's "liberty
to enter into normal contracts long regarded not only as essential to the freedom of trade
and commerce but also as beneficial to the public") with Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 77-78 (D. Minn. 1938) (per curiam) (statute prohibits, regardless
of actual intent, a person from charging same price for same item despite differences in
selling costs). The statute struck down by the Fairmont Creamery Court, however, con-
tained no requirement of intent to injure competition nor any requirement that the prohib-
ited activity have an injurious effect on competition, while the statute struck down in
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. did contain a requirement that the sale at different prices
affect competition. Compare Act of Apr. 15, 1921, ch. 305, § 1, 1921 Minn. Laws 373, as
amended by Act of Mar. 31, 1923, ch. 120, 1923 Minn. Laws 120 (Fairmont Creamery
statute) with Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 182 (Great Atlantic
& Pacific Tea Co. statute).
309. See 23 F. Supp. at 78-83.
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having no difficulty with the general prohibition,'30 the court
found various definitions in the statute unconstitutional".3 1
"Cost," defined as the manufacturer's list price for a product
minus published discounts regardless of the merchant's actual
cost,3"2 was arbitrary because manufacturers often sell their prod-
ucts at prices other than list cost. 3 The definitions of "cost of
doing business" and "overhead expense"-the average of all costs
of doing business incurred in the calendar year immediately pre-
ceding the violation3"-were unconstitutional because they failed
"to give any effect whatever to a merchant's current selling
costs. 31
5
Finding other provisions also vague and immeasurable,:3 1  the
court concluded that Part 2 of the Act was void in its entirety,
'117
including provisions prohibiting locality price discrimination.
3
11
However, Part 1, 11 which was simply a reenactment of the 1921
310. See id. at 79 (by implication).
311. See id. at 78-79.
312. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 3, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, as amended by
Act of Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn. Laws 709.
313. See 23 F. Supp. at 78-79.
314. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 3, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, as amended by Act
of Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn. Laws 709.
315. 23 F. Supp. at 79.
316. Specifically, the court found that the prima facie violation of the Act, defined as
a sale at a price less than 10% above actual cost, see Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2,
§ 3, para. 7, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, as amended by Act of Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn.
Laws 709, raised an unconstitutional presumption of guilt. See 23 F. Supp. at 82. Although
the court admitted that a "sale below cost" could be defined as a sale at a price less than
10% above actual cost, a merchant could not be presumed to have made such a "sale below
cost" with the intent of injuring competition:
[Sluch sales have not been regarded as indicating an intent to do evil. There
are many reasons, aside from a desire to injure competitors, which might induce
a merchant to make profitless sales of goods. . . . A sudden necessity of paying
claims of importunate creditors might furnish a reason for sales at less than cQst
plus overhead. Other similar illustrations are not wanting.
Id. at 80.
Also, the statute's use of "cost survey" in section 5 of Part 2, see Act of Mar. 30, 1937,
ch. 116, pt. 2, § 5, 1937 Minn. Laws 184, was found to be unconstitutionally vague. 23 F.
Supp. at 83.
In addition, the court found that the provision in the Act holding an officer, director,
or agent of a company violating the Act criminally liable for such violation, see Act of
Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 3, § 1, para. 3, 1937 Minn. Laws 184, contravened the fourteenth
amendment to the federal constitution because it required no intent on the part of the
officer, director, or agent in order for him to be found guilty. See 23 F. Supp. at 82.
317. 23 F. Supp. at 83 (inconceivable "that Legislature would have enacted part 2
without providing for its enforcement").
318. See id. at 83.
319. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 181 (current version at MINN.
STAT. §§ 325.02..03 (1976)).
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locality price discrimination statute,re was found constitutional
without discussion.32
If the 1937 Minnesota Legislature, in enacting the Unfair Trade
Practices Act, had feared that Part 2 would be found unconstitu-
tional, its fear was clairvoyant. The Legislature's concern may
explain why Part 1 duplicated Part 2's prohibition of locality
discrimination. 312 Should Part 2 be struck down, the legislation
would have retained a valid prohibition of locality discrimination
in Part 1.323 Why two separate prohibitions of locality discrimina-
tion are now needed (assuming one prohibition is still desirable)
is unknown. In any event, after Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,
the Legislature set about in 1939 to remedy the unconstitu-
tionality of Part 2 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act.
3
1
The 1939 amendments to the Act 325 were challenged in
McElhone v. Geror32 1 and a companion case, Fredricks v.
Burnquist.317 In McElhone, the Minnesota Supreme Court noted
that, historically, price regulation was permissible only when
businesses were "affected with a public interest, 3 2 but that doc-
trine had since been disapproved by the United States Supreme
Court in Nebbia v. New York. 321 In Nebbia, the Court held that
price control was unconstitutional only if arbitrary, discrimina-
tory, or irrelevant to the policy the legislature is pursuing.3 With
this observation, the Minnesota court then considered whether
320. Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 181 with Act of
Apr. 20, 1921, ch. 413, 1921 Minn. Laws 640 (repealed 1937).
321. See 23 F. Supp. at 83 (bare cite to Central Lumber Co. v. South Dakota, 226 U.S.
157 (1912) in support of holding).
322. Compare Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, para. 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 182
with id. pt. 1, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 181. The present Act contains the same duplication.
See notes 65-115 supra and accompanying text.
323. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. at 83 (finding Part 1 constitu-
tional without discussion).
324. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, 1939 Minn. Laws 794.
325. Id.
326. 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940).
327. 207 Minn. 590, 292 N.W. 420 (1940). In Fredricks, the plaintiffs sought to have the
prohibition against sales below cost contained in Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1, 1939
Minn. Laws 794, declared unconstitutional for failure to distinguish between cash-and-
carry establishments and establishments that furnish delivery service. The court found
the statute constitutional because it provided a defense for sales made in good faith to
meet local prices of a competitor. See 207 Minn. at 591, 292 N.W. at 420 (quoting Act of
Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 3(d), 1939 Minn. Laws 797).
328. 207 Minn. at 584, 292 N.W. at 417.
329. 291 U.S. 502, 536-37 (1934). See generally Thatcher, supra note 269, at 561-62.




William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/1
MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION
Part 2 of the Unfair Trade Practices Act 331 remained unconstitu-
tional because it did not require any intent to injure competi-
tion.3  The absence of this element was not considered fatal be-
cause "[slales below cost which have the effect of injuring com-
petition may be prohibited regardless of intent.' 3: The court dis-
tinguished Fairmont Creamery because the statute considered in
that case did not require the presence or probability of competi-
tive injury.
334
Finally, the court in McElhone reviewed amendments that the
1939 Legislature had made to definitions relating to cost 335 and
found that the defects identified by the Minnesota Federal Dis-
trict Court in Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. had been reme-
died.331 The prohibition against sales below cost in Part 2 of the
Unfair Trade Practices Act was now constitutional..
3 37
Several years later, in State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery
Co., 3 3" the Minnesota Supreme Court exhibited perhaps its most
liberal attitude in upholding the validity of the price discrimina-
tion statutes. The Blue Earth County Attorney had brought a
criminal action against a hatchery company for violation of the
331. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 181, as amended by Act of
Apr. 26, 1937, ch. 456, 1937 Minn. Laws 709, as amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403,
1939 Minn. Laws 794.
332. The 1939 Legislature amended the statute to require the sale below cost to be made
"for the purpose or with the effect" of injuring competition. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch.
403, § 1, para. 2, 1939 Minn. Laws 795 (emphasis in original). If the prohibited activity
had merely the effect of injuring competition, then it was prohibited regardless of the
intention of the seller.
333. 207 Minn. at 585, 292 N.W. at 417; accord, May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax
Comm'n, 242 Iowa 319, 331, 45 N.W.2d 245, 252 (1950) (legislature may prohibit unfair
business practices without regard to state of mind of persons engaging in activity). But
see San Ann Tobacco Co. v. Hamm, 283 Ala. 397, 402, 217 So. 2d 803, 806-07 (1968)
(addition of the words "or with the effect thereof" removed the requirement of intent
rendering statute unconstitutional); State ex rel. Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123
N.J.L. 180, 184-85, 8 A.2d 291, 294-95 (1939) (statute that did not require intent unconsti-
tutionally vague).
The Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. court had invalidated this provision in the prior
law not because of the absence of an element requiring "actual intent" but because the
law had not provided for a good faith meeting competition defense. See 23 F. Supp. at
76-78. The new law had established a number of defenses that apparently adequately
responded to the infirmities. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 3, 1939 Minn. Laws 797
(close-out sales, sales of defective goods, sales pursuant to court order, and good faith
attempts to meet competitor's prices excluded from application of the law).
334. See 207 Minn. at 585, 292 N.W. at 417.
335. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 2, 1939 Minn. Laws 795.
336. 207 Minn. at 587 & n.3, 292 N.W. at 418 & n.2.
337. See id. at 587, 292 N.W. at 418.
338. 221 Minn. 246, 21 N.W.2d 792 (1946).
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prohibition against locality price discrimination in the purchase
of farm products.33' In upholding the statute, the court, as a
practical matter, reversed its decision in Northwest Poultry.
340
After the decision in Northwest Poultry, the 1945 Legislature had
amended the statute to require the deduction not of "actual," but
of "reasonable" costs of transportation. 34' Referring to the devel-
oping techniques of cost accounting, the Lanesboro court found
that the statute, with this seemingly minor change, was no longer
ambiguous.
3 14
The court, sua sponte, also considered whether that statute's
failure to require intent to destroy competition still violated due
process .3 3 In finding the statute valid, the court again distin-
guished the United States Supreme Court decision in Fairmont
Creamery,'4  which had found a similar statute unconstitu-
tional..3 1 ' Although the statute still omitted the element of intent
to injure or destroy competition, 3' the 1927 Minnesota Legisla-
ture, responding to Fairmont Creamery, had amended the statute
to add a defense. for good faith attempts to meet competition.37
The Minnesota Supreme Court simply observed that Fairmont
Creamery "no longer states the law, in view of later decisions by
the Supreme Court of the United States.1
3'
Six years later, in Jensen v. Burnquist,34' retail grocers at-
tempted to induce the federal district court to declare unlawful
the portion of the general sales-below-cost statute prohibiting
giving away, or advertising with the intent to give away, any
commodity, for the purpose or effect of injuring competition.32"
339. See Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, § 3, 1927 Minn. Laws 374, as amended by Act of
Apr. 24, 1937, ch. 420, § 2, 1937 Minn. Laws 611 (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 17.15-
.16 (1976)).
340. See 221 Minn. at 250-56, 21 N.W.2d at 794-96; notes 297-300 supra and accompa-
nying text.
341. See Act of Mar. 23, 1945, ch. 122, 1945 Minn. Laws 180.
342. See 221 Minn. at 251-53, 21 N.W.2d at 793-95.
343. See id. at 256, 21 N.W.2d at 796.
344. See id. at 256-60, 21 N.W.2d at 796-98.
345. See notes 295-96 supra and accompanying text.
346. See note 333 supra. See generally Thatcher, supra note 269, at 562-67 (discussing
various cases construing requirement of intent).
347. See Act of Apr. 19, 1927, ch. 252, § 3, 1927 Minn. Laws 374 (amended 1937).
348. 221 Minn. at 263, 21 N.W.2d at 799. The court reasoned that an evil motive is not
necessary for the commission of a crime; therefore, the Legislature may prohibit an other-
wise innocent act when done under circumstances that experience has shown will probably
result in some harm. Id. at 260, 21 N.W.2d at 798.
349. 107 F. Supp. 446 (D. Minn. 1952) (per curiam).
350. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, para. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, as
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The federal court refused to enjoin enforcement of the Act, find-
ing no present threat of criminal prosecution, 351 and also declined
to rule on the constitutionality of the Act.
352
About ten years ago, the Minnesota Supreme Court issued its
most recent decision concerning sales-below-cost prohibitions. In
Twin City Candy & Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co., 353 one whole-
sale distributor of cigarettes sued to enjoin another distributor
from selling cigarettes at less than actual invoice price in viola-
tion of the Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, passed by the
Legislature in 1961. 311 The plaintiff alleged that the defendant
had sold 454 cartons of cigarettes to one of the plaintiff's custom-
ers at five cents less per carton than the defendant's invoice cost
and would continue to do so unless enjoined.
In finding the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act unconstitutional,35
the Minnesota Supreme Court harkened back to the United
States Supreme Court decision in Fairmont Creamery. 351 Like the
statute in Fairmont Creamery, the Unfair Cigarette Sales Act
prohibition applied without requiring proof that the sales were
with the intent or effect of injuring competition.
3 57
amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1, para. 2, 1939 Minn. Laws 794 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976)).
351. 107 F. Supp. at 449-50.
352. Id. at 449 (court deferred to state court for determination of soundness of constitu-
tional objections and refused to decide constitutional issue when issue concerning an
injunction could be resolved on other grounds).
353. 276 Minn. 225, 149 N.W.2d 698 (1967).
354. Act of May 25, 1961, ch. 35, 1961 Minn. Laws 1540.
355. 276 Minn. at 231, 149 N.W.2d at 703.
356. As in Fairmont Creamery, see 274 U.S. at 9, the issue in Twin City Candy was
"whether an innocent sale, or one which does not affect competition, may constitutionally
he prohibited." 276 Minn. at 234, 149 N.W.2d at 704. The absence of a requirement that
the activity prohibited by the Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act be undertaken with
a "predatory intent or effect" led to the finding that the Act was unconstitutional, see id.
at 236, 149 N.W.2d at 705, a holding which, while based in part on the Fairmont Creamery
decision, found support from cases throughout the United States. See id. at 233, 149
N.W.2d at 703-04 (cataloguing the case law). However, because Fairmont Creamery was
the leading case on this point, and because the court had earlier suggested that Nebbia
had effectively overruled Fairmont Creamery, see State v. Lanesboro Produce & Hatchery
Co., 221 Minn. 246, 258, 263, 21 N.W.2d 792, 798, 799 (1946), the Minnesota court's return
to the Fairmont Creamery analysis in Twin City Candy was surprising.
357. The Unfair Cigarette Sales Act raised an irrebuttable presumption that sales of
cigarettes below cost were injurious to competition. In the Act's statement of purpose, the
Legislature had written:
[Thel offering for sale, or sale of cigarettes below cost in the wholesale and
retail trade is declared by the legislature to have the intent or effect of injuring
19791
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In reaching its conclusion, the Minnesota Supreme Court ex-
tensively reviewed the constitutionality of statutes prohibiting
sales below cost. '" Such statutes were declared a proper exercise
of the state's police power if drafted with appropriate constitu-
tional safeguards affording alleged violators an opportunity to
show that the sale below cost was with innocent intent or without
injurious effect. "
The court in Twin City Candy distinguished Lanesboro,'
3
1
which had sustained the statute prohibiting discrimination in the
purchase of farm products without reference to intent or effect,
on the basis that Lanesboro literally considered only whether the
statute was too vague and, further, dealt with the "patently un-




Twenty years after the 1937 Unfair Trade Practices Act was
passed, the first decision pertaining to the Act's substantive
meaning-as opposed to its constitutionality-was rendered. In
a competitor, destroying or lessening competition, and is deemed an unfair and
deceptive business practice and an unfair method of competition.
Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act, ch. 35, § 1, para. 2, 1961 Minn. Laws 1541.
In drafting this legislation, the Legislature was akparently relying upon the principle
of judicial restraint, one statement of which is found in Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S.
502 (1934):
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of
other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy
may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy
by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either
to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it.
If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative
purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due
process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court
functus officio.
Id. at 537 (emphasis in original). The Minnesota court in Twin City Candy did not
attempt to overrule the legislative policy; it did find, however, that the method of imple-
menting that policy was unconstitutional. See notes 358-61 infra and accompanying text.
358. See 276 Minn. at 233-36, 149 N.W.2d at 704-05.
359. Id. at 228, 149 N.W.2d at 701.
360. See notes 338-48 supra and accompanying text.
361. 276 Minn. at 234, 149 N.W.2d at 704. Apparently disregarded by the Twin City
Candy court was the provision in the Minnesota Unfair Cigarette Sales Act that exempted
sales made in good faith to meet the lawful prices of competitors. See Minnesota Unfair
Cigarette Sales Act, ch. 35, § 8, subd. 1, 1961 Minn. Laws 1544. The statute construed by
the Lanesboro court contained a similar exemption, which the court held was sufficient
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State v. Wolkoff, 311 the state sought to enjoin five "Cut Price
Super Markets" from advertising and selling ketchup, coffee, and
sugar below cost. The trial court had found the advertisements
and sales were not made with the necessary purpose or effect of
injuring and destroying competition in violation of the Act.
3 3
In affirming the trial court's findings of fact and ruling in favor
of the supermarkets, the Minnesota Supreme Court provided the
following interpretations of the prohibition of sales below cost:
(1) The Act is not violated unless both injury to competitors
and destroying competition is established as either the purpose
or effect of a defendant's actions .
3
(2) The defense for sales made "[in an endeavor made in
good faith to meet the legal prices of a competitor"'6 5 in the same
locality did not require a party to establish the actual legality
of a competitor's prices.3 It is sufficient if the merchant in good
faith believes the competitor's price is legal."' If a competitor
362. 250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957).
363. The statute construed by the Wolkoff court, see Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt.
2, § 2, para. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 182, as amended by Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1,
1939 Minn. Laws 794, as amended by Act of Apr. 21, 1941, ch. 326, § 1, 1941 Minn. Laws
617, differed from the present statute in its requirement that the prohibited activity have
the effect or purpose of injuring competitors and destroying competition. In 1957, a few
months before the court handed down the Wolkoff opinion, the Legislature had amended
the Act to require that the prohibited activity either have the purpose or effect of injuring
a competitor or the purpose or effect of destroying competition. See Act of Apr. 27, 1957,
ch. 822, § 2, 1957 Minn. Laws 1161. Thus, the Wolkoff court's interpretation of the Act
that "both injury to competitors and the destroying of competition must be established
as either the purpose or effect of the defendant's actions in order to find or sustain a
violation," 250 Minn. at 507-08, 85 N.W.2d at 405 (emphasis in original), is no longer
viable. Proof that the purpose or effect of the activity was to injure competitors or destroy
competition under the present law would establish a violation. See State v. Applebaums
Food Mkts., Inc., 259 Minn. 209, 213, 106 N.W.2d 896, 899-900 (1960) (noting the amend-
ment); id. at 217, 106 N.W.2d at 902 (noting that the Wolkoff opinion had been decided
without reference to the amendment and that the pendency of Wolkoff in the court had
not influenced the Legislature to amend the statute).
364. 250 Minn. at 507-08, 85 N.W.2d at 405.
365. MINN. STAT. § 325.06(4) (1976).
366. 250 Minn. at 512, 85 N.W.2d at 407-08.
367. In other states, however, statutes that provided for a good faith defense when a
seller attempted to meet the lawful prices of competitors were struck down as unconstitu-
tionally vague. For example, in State ex rel. Lief v. Packard-Bamberger & Co., 123 N.J.L.
180, 8 A.2d 291 (1939), the court commented on the provision in the New Jersey statute
that excepted sellers who were meeting the "legal prices" of a competitor and concluded:
How a person is to determine the legality of the price of a competitor is not
declared [in the statute], and the impracticability, if not the impossibility of
determining the "legality" of a competitor's price is obvious.
A retailer may not only ordinarily not sell below cost to him, but, if he
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advertises a certain price over a long period of time without
being challenged, and apparently without adverse economic ef-
fects, a merchant may be warranted in assuming the price is
legal.6"9
(3) Competitors' prices are relevant not only to establish the
meeting competition defense but also to prove the defendant's
purpose in setting its own prices (for example, destruction of
competition or, to the contrary, business survival) and to prove
the effect of the defendant's prices." '
(4) Because of the variation in wording of price discrimina-
tion statutes from state to state, there was no specific judicial
interpretation elsewhere of the phrase "destroying competi-
tion.' 7 "T That phrase in the Minnesota statute would be con-
strued as not requiring elimination of all competition to estab-
lish a violation but, "at the very least, some substantial damage
to the competitive atmosphere of the defendant's trade area or
to a competitor." ''
A few years after the Wolkoff decision, the Minnesota Attorney
General again attempted to enforce the prohibition against sales
below cost. 372 In State v. Applebaums Food Markets, Inc.,37 3 Ap-
plebaums, which operated eleven retail grocery stores throughout
the Saint Paul area and one in Minneapolis, was accused of sell-
ing goods below cost and of giving away merchandise and trading
stamps. The Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that it was im-
proper for the trial court to have granted a temporary injunction
seeks to meet competition, he must expertly study and determine that he is
buying under market conditions that are justified, or that the price of a competi-
tor, which he must meet, is "legal". It is apparent that the statutory inhibitions
are uncertain and indefinite.
Id. at 185, 8 A.2d at 294; cf. Daniel Loughran Co. v. Lord Baltimore Candy & Tobacco
Co., 178 Md. 38, 47-48, 12 A.2d 201, 206-07 (1940) (provision in statute prohibiting use of
sales that could not be justified by "existing market conditions" in determining cost of
doing business made statute unconstitutionally vague and arbitrary).
368. 250 Minn. at 512, 85 N.W.2d at 407.
369. See id. at 512-13, 85 N.W.2d at 407-08. Thus, the trial court's conclusion that the
defendants were not destroying competition was supported by evidence that the defend.
ant's competitors were advertising the same or lower prices five months before the de-
fendants' advertisements and for some time thereafter; that during the two years preced-
ing the violations, the defendants' relative position in the market decreased almost 21%,
while their competitors' business increased 41% and 46%; and that the defendants' chain
of grocery stores competed with larger chains as well as smaller grocers. Id. at 518-19, 85
N.W.2d at 411.
370. See id. at 516, 85 N.W.2d at 409-10.
371. Id. at 517, 85 N.W.2d at 410.
372. The statute had been amended since the Wolkoff decision. See note 363 supra.
373. 259 Minn. 209, 106 N.W.2d 896 (1960).
[Vol. 5
50
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/1
MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION
against Applebaums, 37' and the state was frustrated again in its
attempt to enforce the statute. The court rejected the position of
the state that the statute as amended after Wolkoff 37 justified
issuance of a temporary injunction upon a simple showing of
"threatened" injury to a competitor. 35 Rather, a showing of the
purpose or effect of injuring a competitor or destroying competi-
tion was necessary.377 All competition injures competitors, the
court observed, because advertising and reductions in the market
price of goods are intended to attract additional customers.378
In a long dissent, Justice Loevinger, with Justice Murphy con-
curring, further described the facts and argued that the tempo-
rary injunction should have been upheld .37  Among the "evils"
being perpetrated was Applebaums' advertising that it would
give away an automobile and certificates worth $100 in the pur-
chase of clothing at a local store.38 0 Essentially, Justice Loevinger
would have allowed injunctive relief whenever the facts, as in
Applebaums, demonstrated sales below cost.38' "[D]efendant's
purpose was to draw business to itself and away from its competi-
tors by the acts mentioned, '312 he remarked, and concluded:
"[N]o proposition is better established in this field of law than
374. See id. at 216, 106 N.W.2d at 901.
375. See note 363 supra.
376. The Commissioner of the Department of Business Development, then charged with
enforcement of the Act, see Act of Apr. 27, 1957, ch. 822, § 3, 1957 Minn. Laws 1162
(amended 1967), attempted to persuade the court to adopt a doctrine of incipiency by
which to determine whether a preliminary injunction should issue. This doctrine would
have permitted a trial court to issue an injunction upon a simple showing of threatened
injury and without any showing of the defendant's purpose or effect in engaging in the
activity threatening the injury. The court rejected this argument not only because its
adoption would have effectively overruled Wolkoff but also because its application could
possibly lead to unconstitutional infringements upon trade such as those found in
Fairmont Creamery. See 259 Minn. at 214 & n.4, 215, 106 N.W.2d at 900 & n.4.
377. See 259 Minn. at 214, 106 N.W.2d at 900 ("A mere sale below cost, absent the
requisite statutory purpose or effect, is not a violation or threatened violation Iof the
Act]."). See also Des Moines Area Dairy Queen Store Operators & Owners, Inc. v. Wa-
pello Dairies, Inc., 226 N.W.2d 9, 12 (Iowa 1975) (complaint that did not allege facts
showing a purpose or effect to injure competition dismissed for failure to state claim under
Iowa price discrimination statute).
378. See 259 Minn. at 215, 106 N.W.2d at 901. This statement was not challenged by
dissenting Justice Loevinger. In his view, this oversimplified observation was not the
crucial question posed by the Act. Rather, the issuie related to "whether or not the means
utilized to divert trade from a competitor is legally permissible." Id. at 223, 106 N.W.2d
at 905 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
379. See id. at 227, 106 N.W.2d at 908 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
380. See id. at 219, 106 N.W.2d at 903 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
381. See id. at 221, 106 N.W.2d at 904 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
382. Id. at 222, 106 N.W.2d at 905 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
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that diversion of trade from a competitor is an injury for which
the law affords a remedy if the means used are improper.", He
also noted that the widely advertised offer to give away valuable
items and sell other items at less than cost-made over a long
period of time and requiring the filling out of coupons and depos-
iting them in one of the defendant's stores-showed that the prac-
tices were undertaken for no other purpose than to unlawfully
divert trade from competitors to the defendant.311
C. Summary of Minnesota Decisions-Relevance of Statutes
from Other States
Court decisions in the over seventy years since enactment in
1907 of the first Minnesota statute prohibiting price discrimina-
tion'3 5 have considered little more than the constitutionality of
such statutes, and have not created a structure of decisional law
by which the legality of any particular practice can be predicted
with any certainty. We know that section 325.03, '31 previously
Part 1 of the 1937 Unfair Trade Practices Act, "3 7 is constitu-
tional.3 1 Similarly, the section 325.04 prohibition against sales
below cost,8 9 derived from Part 2 of the 1937 Act, "31 as amended
after the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. case, :191 is constitu-
tional.32 The constitutionality of the present locality price dis-
crimination provision in section 325.04, '1 however, as amended
following the finding of unconstitutionality in Great Atlantic &
Pacific Tea Co., 314 has not been decided.
383. Id. at 222-23, 106 N.W.2d at 905 (Loevinger, J., dissenting).
384. Id. at 222, 106 N.W.2d at 905 (Loevinger, J., dissenting). Justice Loevinger thus
drew an inference from the evidence that the majority of the court was unprepared to do.
See id. at 224-25, 106 N.W.2d at 906 (Loevinger, J., dissenting) (imposing requirement of
proving purpose or effect would "erect a nearly insuperable barrier to enforcement").
385. The 1907 statute dealt with unlawful sales of petroleum products. See generally
notes 172-84 supra and accompanying text.
386. See notes 25-40 supra and accompanying text.
387. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 181 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976)).
388. See Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Ervin, 23 F. Supp. 70, 83 (D. Minn. 1938) (per
curiam); notes 319-21 supra and accompanying text.
389. See notes 116-45 supra and accompanying text.
390. See Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 116, pt. 2, § 2, para. 1, 1937 Minn. Laws 182 (current
version at MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976)).
391. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 795 (current version at
MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976)).
392. See McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 585, 292 N.W. 414, 417 (1940); notes 325-
37 supra and accompanying text.
393. See notes 41-64 supra and accompanying text.
394. See Act of Apr. 22, 1939, ch. 403, § 1, 1939 Minn. Laws 795 (current version at
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No decisions have interpreted either of the two locality price
discrimination prohibitions in attempting to define the bounda-
ries of permitted or forbidden practices. The two interpretative
cases, Wolkoff 395 and Applebaums, 3  have given a very broad
superstructure on which to base an interpretation of the section
325.04 sales-below-cost provision.3 97 In neither case was the con-
duct in question found unlawful .3 The two decisions afford little
insight into the type of conduct that will constitute an unlawful
sale below cost. In short, there is a dearth of decisional law on the
meaning of either the Minnesota price discrimination and sales-
below-cost statutes of general application or the statutes directed
toward particular products. Of course, a great body of decisions
interpreting the Robinson-Patman Act is available. These deci-
sions are not helpful, however, because the Minnesota statutes
depart so far from the wording in the Robinson-Patman Act. :1'9
If court interpretations from Minnesota offer but little insight
into the Minnesota price discrimination and sales-below-cost
statutes, perhaps statutes in other states, and the interpretations
placed upon them, can offer a surrogate in which an interpreta-
tion can be found. Most other states do have statutes somewhat
comparable to those in Minnesota.'"" Many states prohibit price
discrimination, particularly, locality discrimination.'"' About
half of the states also have statutes prohibiting sales below cost. '"2
In addition, statutes prohibiting price discrimination or sales
below cost with respect to specific products have been enacted by
many state legislatures.0 3
A review of the statutes cited in the Appendix indicates widely
disparate provisions among the various statutes. Some prohibit
price discrimination only when its effect is to injure or destroy
competition; 0 4 others are operative regardless of effect when the
intent is to injure competition." 5 Many provide, in differing
MINN. STAT. § 325.04 (1976)).
395. See notes 362-71 supra and accompanying text.
396. See notes 373-84 supra and accompanying text.
397. See notes 364-71, 374-78 supra and accompanying text.
398. See notes 362-84 supra and accompanying text.
399. Compare MINN. STAT. §§ 325.02-.075 (1976) with Robinson-Patman Act §§ 1-2, 15
U.S.C. §§ 13-13a (1976).
400. See Appendix.
401. See Appendix § A.2.
402. See Appendix § B.
403. See Appendix § E.
404. See Appendix § A.l.a.
405. See Appendix § A.L.b.
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terms, that price discrimination is prohibited when it occurs in
different localities, although what constitutes a locality varies
from state to state. 00 Some statutes expressly deal with indirect
forms of discrimination, such as rebates, while others are silent
on the subject.'"7
Available exemptions also differ widely from state to state."",
Statutes that prohibit sales below cost contain presumptions of
the cost of doing business, or overhead expense, which vary from
twelve percent to four percent for retailers."" Remedies and* pen-
alties also are far from uniform. "" Products singled out for treat-
ment by special legislation range from hearing aids4"' to music;"'
but alcoholic beverages," cigarettes, " farm products,"5 insur-
ance," and petroleum products"7 are commonly treated subjects.
In short, while most state legislatures have been motivated to
adopt statutes directed against price discrimination and sales
below cost, there is little consistency from state to state, and no
"model act" exists to provide a framework against which statutes
in each state can be interpreted." No cohesive body of statutes
or case law creates a generally understood structure defining un-
lawful sales below cost or price discrimination.
As is true in most states, the Minnesota statutes are the sui
generis inventions of the state legislature dealing with problems
as the Legislature perceived them, but lacking the buttressing of
legislation and court interpretations from other jurisdictions that
could give meaning to the Minnesota statutes. There is no body
of national precedent to compensate for the dearth of interpreta-
tion of the Minnesota statutes concerning price discrimination
406. See Appendix § A.2.
407. See Appendix § D.
408. See Appendix §§ A.3, B.3.
409. See Appendix § B.2.
410. See Appendix §§ A.4, B.4.
411. See Arnz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-1901(7)(r) (1974).
412. See, e.g., NEB. REv. STAT. § 59-1405 (1974). The state statutes relating to particular
products are contained in Appendix § E.
413. See Appendix § E.1.
414. See Appendix § E.2.
415. See Appendix § E.3.
416. See Appendix § E.4.
417. See Appendix § E.5.
418. California did provide a model for enactment in the 1930's, which a few states
followed. Thatcher, supra note 269, at 559. As Thatcher notes: "Not a few states, in their
legislative haste, perpetuated a typographical error appearing in the California act in the
section relating to the interpretation of the act inadvertently calling for 'literal' instead
of 'liberal' construction." Id. at 559-60 (footnotes omitted).
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and sales below cost." 9 Thus, the scope and application of the
Minnesota statutes must await further decisions from the Minne-
sota Supreme Court.
IV. THE ULTIMATE ISSUE
In preceding sections of this Article, the present collection of
Minnesota prohibitions against locality price discrimination and
sales below cost has been examined.2 0 It is apparent that the
present statutes, when compared and analyzed together, are
something less than a cohesive and clear expression of legislative
purpose. Further, statutes in other jurisdictions, both state and
federal, supply little assistance due to the lack of uniformity
among the jurisdictions. 2 ' In this section of the Article, the focus
is upon proposals for additional price discrimination legislation
2
as well as for reform . 23 Initially, the purpose of establishing prohi-
bitions against locality price discrimination and sales below cost
will be examined.2 4 By understanding why the statutes were en-
acted, the continued need for the prohibitions can be assessed
with greater certainty. In this connection, the reasons for repeal
of the fair trade laws also will be considered.4 2 Hopefully, this
analysis will assist'the reader in reaching a conclusion on the
ultimate issue posed by this Article: Should the Minnesota prohi-
bitions be repealed, amended, or left alone?
A. The Legislative Purpose
The legislative rationale behind the original enactment of the
Minnesota price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes was
more social than economic. The purpose of the statutes has been
identified in decisions of the Minnesota Supreme Court as the
protection of the small local seller from the competition of the
419. The problem was recognized by the Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Wolkoff,
250 Minn. 504, 85 N.W.2d 401 (1957). In Wolkoff the court sought an interpretation of
the phrase "destroying competition" as found in section 325.04 from the decisions in other
states. See id. at 515-16, 85 N.W.2d at 409-10. Finding no comparable language in other
states that appeared to offer a solution, the court turned to the dictionary to formulate
an interpretation. See id. at 516, 85 N.W.2d at 410.
420. See notes 12-265 supra and accompanying text.
421. See notes 400-19 supra and accompanying text; Appendix.
422. See notes 454-501 infra and accompanying text.
423. See notes 502-53 infra and accompanying text.
424. See notes 426-32 infra and accompanying text.
425. See notes 433-53 infra and accompanying text.
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strong and perhaps more efficient national or regional seller. " In
State v. Northwest Poultry & Egg Co.,4"7 while finding unconsti-
tutional the statute prohibiting locality discrimination in the
purchase of farm products, the court recognized that the statute
promoted a
clear legislative intent to prevent the destruction of local pro-
duce dealers through unfair discrimination by competitors more
amply buttressed with capital. Monopolies gained through the
misuse of an economic advantage to the direct injury of small
merchants and the ultimate injury of producing and consuming
classes are to be forestalled."'
426. As the court commented in McElhone v. Geror, 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414
(1940):
The strong have no unlimited constitutional power so to use their strength as
to crush the weak. . . . The independent merchant, small or large, is a legiti-
mate object of legislative solicitude. It cannot be otherwise in view of his contri-
bution to the building of, and his present place in, our economic structure.
Id. at 583-84, 292 N.W. at 417. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in State v. Langley, 53 Wyo.
332, 84 P.2d 767 (1938), similarly discussed the value of the independent merchant:
Great aggregations of wealth control much of the merchandising field of today.
It is not necessary to say that that is an evil. We may even admit that it is a
benefit. At the same time we still have with us the independent merchants.
They, too, of course, are subject to the prohibition of the statute [prohibiting
sales below costi, but it was probably intended mainly for their benefit. They*
have hitherto been considered as part of the "backbone" of every community,
radiating their influence throughout the length and breadth of the state, main-
taining, not alone fair competition, but adding to, and upholding, the moral
fibre of the communities, upon which, in the long run, the existence of the
commonwealth depends. The legislature has the right, we think, to give them a
fair chance in the field of competition; to give them a chance to remain a pillar
of support, thus at the same time giving an opportunity for the maintenance of
individualism, still of importance in our day, and which, except for such legisla-
tion, might be entirely crushed.
Id. at 351-52, 84 P.2d at 774. See generally May's Drug Stores, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n,
242 Iowa 319, 322-27, 45 N.W.2d 245, 247-49 (1950) (collecting statements of purpose from
various states).
Perhaps one of the more colorful statements of the purpose of price discrimination
legislation is found in Borden Co. v. McDowell, 8 Wis. 2d 246, 99 N.W.2d 146 (1959), where
the court noted that:
The monopolistic tendencies in merchandising practices which the legislature
perceived and believed to be inconsistent with the public welfare were not mere
bogies under the bed but beliefs based on facts which reasonable and honest
men could entertain even if other men equally honest and reasonable might see
the facts differently and reach different conclusions.
Id. at 262, 99 N.W.2d at 155-56.
427. 203 Minn. 438, 281 N.W. 753 (1938), discussed in notes 297-99 supra and accompa-
nying text.
428. 203 Minn. at 442, 281 N.W. at 755.
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Similarly, the court in McElhone v. Geror429 stated that the sales-
below-cost statute "is definitely designed to protect the weak
against the strong."43 0 More recently, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reiterated the same proposition with respect to the Unfair
Cigarette Sales Act. The court stated in Twin City Candy &
Tobacco Co. v. A. Weisman Co. :43,
Virtually every state has adopted a "fair trade" law in one form
or another. The practice of advertising and selling "loss lead-
ers", or what have been sometimes described as loss
"misleaders", has been found by legislatures to result in finan-
cially strong companies driving weaker companies out of busi-
ness, thereby opening the door to the monopolies which the law
is designed to prevent. The charge is made that sales at less than
cost by chain stores result in regional discrimination because the
loss to the vendor in one community must be recouped by exces-
sive charges in another. A further justification for the statute is
the likelihood of deception arising from the public's notion that
if one item is sold below cost, others will be equally cheap,
whereas they may actually be exorbitantly high.'
32
Thus, these purposes seem similar for both locality discrimina-
tion and sales-below-cost statutes.
The most significant indication of the climate in which the
Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices Act was passed is afforded by
knowing the company it kept. On the same day that the Unfair
Trade Practices Act was approved in 1937, the Minnesota Fair
Trade Act also was approved, 33 allowing minimum resale price
agreements between a supplier and its customers whereby the
customers agreed not to resell the products at a price less than
that specified by the supplier.
34
The Miller-Tydings Act,4 35 passed by Congress in 1937,
amended section 1 of the Sherman Act13 to enable states to pass
fair trade acts.437 Without the Miller-Tydings Act, resale price
429. 207 Minn. 580, 292 N.W. 414 (1940), discussed in notes 326, 328-37 supra and
accompanying text.
430. 207 Minn. at 583, 292 N.W. at 416.
431. 276 Minn. 225, 149 N.W.2d 698 (1967), discussed in notes 353-61 supra and accom-
panying text.
432. 276 Minn. at 229, 149 N.W.2d at 701-02 (footnotes omitted).
433. Act of Mar. 30, 1937, ch. 117, 1937 Minn. Laws 185 (repealed 1978).
434. Id. § 2.
435. Miller-Tydings Act, ch. 690, 50 Stat. 693 (1937) (repealed 1975).
436. Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 1, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (current version at 15 U.S.C. § 1
(1976)).
437. See Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836,841 (D. Md. 1953); Pepsodent
19791
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agreements would have violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.4:"
The purpose underlying the Minnesota Fair Trade Act suppos-
edly was to protect the goodwill of a supplier owning a trademark
on a particular product by assuring uniform prices.' :' Of course,
suppliers, in exercising their rights under the Fair Trade Act,
were unlikely to ask their customers to lower resale prices." °
Rather, fair trade acts were perceived and employed as another
vehicle to achieve higher prices."'
Congress repealed the Miller-Tydings Act in 197542 and the
Minnesota Fair Trade Act was repealed in 1978.11: The effect of
the repeal of the Minnesota Act, in addition to acknowledging the
renewed federal prohibition of resale price maintenance, was to
prohibit resale price agreements solely in intrastate commerce."
Co. v. Krauss Co., 56 F. Supp. 922, 927 (E.D. La. 1944); S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess., reprinted in 119751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1569, 1569-70.
438. See Sunbeam Corp. v. MacMillan, 110 F. Supp. 836, 841 (D. Md. 1953); S. REP.
No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1569,
1569-70.
439. Remington Arms Co. v. G.E.M. of St. Louis, Inc., 257 Minn. 562, 566, 571, 102
N.W.2d 528, 532, 535 (1960).
440. See Bowman, The Prerequisites and Effects of Resale Price Maintenance, 22 U.
Cm. L. REv. 825, 838 (1955).
441. See id. at 852-58; Herman, A Note on Fair Trade, 65 YALE L.J. 23, 25, 30 (1955);
cf. Bowman, supra note 440, at 850-52 (citing conflicting studies as to the effect of fair
trade laws on prices). But see Adams, Resale Price Maintenance: Fact and Fancy, 64 YALE
L.J. 967, 973 (1955).
442. See Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801.
443. See Act of Mar. 9, 1978, ch. 473, 1978 Minn. Laws 77.
444. See Tape of Meeting on S.F. 1647 Before the Minnesota Senate Commerce
(ommittee, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (Feb. 3, 1978). Counsel for the Minnesota Senate
Commerce Committee explained the bill repealing the Minnesota Fair Trade Act as
follows:
The proposed legislation repeals those provisions of state law commonly
known as the "Fair Trade Act". These provisions generally authorize contracts
for the sale of trademarked, branded, or named goods to contain provisions
prohibiting the buyer from reselling the goods at less than a minimum price
stipulated by the seller, or prohibiting the buyer from, in turn, selling to another
who will resell at a price less than the minimum stipulated price of the seller.
Were it not for the Fair Trade Act under state law, these agreements would be
prohibited as a form of price fixing or refusal to deal under the state antitrust
statutes.
At the present time, the state Fair Trade Act applies only with respect to
intrastate commerce, i.e. transactions where the buyer and seller and actual
transaction are located within the boundaries of the state of Minnesota.
Up until 1975, the federal antitrust provisions relating to interstate commerce
provided a special exemption from the provisions prohibiting price fixing for
agreements authorized under state fair trade acts. Therefore, prior to 1975,
agreements setting minimum resale prices were specifically authorized both as
to interstate commerce and intrastate commerce. In 1975, the specific exemp-
I Vol. 5
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Legislative commentary on the repeal of the Miller-Tydings
Act is instructive. A United States Senate report concerning the
Consumer Goods Pricing Act of 1975,"15 which repealed the
Miller-Tydings Act, stated that fair trade laws "permit compet-
ing retailers to have identical prices and thus eliminate price
competition between them. Repeal of the fair trade laws should
result in a lowering of consumer prices." ''" The report, noting that
the Federal Council on Wage and Price Stability advocated re-
peal, " 7 also referenced studies by the Department of Justice that
indicated the consumer would be saved $1.2 billion a year by
eliminating fair trade laws that have increased prices on fair-
traded goods by eighteen to twenty-seven percent. " ' Thus, the
Senate report concluded, inflation was caused in part by fair
trade laws and could be curtailed by their repeal. " ' Presumably,
similar considerations may have motivated repeal of the Minne-
sota Fair Trade Act, although the sparse legislative history sug-
gests that the Minnesota Legislature was merely responding to
the congressional action.150
In short, fair trade acts and the Minnesota Unfair Trade Prac-
tices Act of 1937, prohibiting locality discrimination and sales
below cost, were depression-years legislation.'"' The problem ad-
tion to the federal antitrust statute for fair trade laws was removed so that "fair
trading" as the transactions affected interstate commerce was prohibited as
price fixing under the federal antitrust statute. After the 1975 amendment, then,
only fair trading as to wholly intrastate transactions is permitted in Minnesota
and, under this proposed legislation, fair trading in intrastate transactions
would also be prohibited.
Minnesota Senate Counsel, Summary of S.F. 1647 Repealing the Fair Trade Laws, in
MINNESOTA SENATE COMMERCE COMMITTEE BOOK (Feb. 3, 1978).
445. S. REP. No. 466, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1569-72.
446. Id. at 1, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1569-70.
447. Id. at 3, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS at 1571. Other groups
calling for repeal included the Justice Department, the Federal Trade Commission, con-
sumer groups, discount stores, and smaller business associations. Id.
448. Id. at 6, reprinted in [19751 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws at 1572.
449. See id. The report indicates "that fair trade laws increase prices on fair traded
goods by 18-27 percent." Id.
450. The only substantive comments on the bill that proposed repeal of the Minnesota
Fair Trade Act were made in the Senate Commerce Committee. See generally Tape of
Meeting on S.F. 1647 Before the Minnesota Senate Commerce Committee, 70th Minn.
Legis., 2d Sess. (Feb. 3, 1978). Senator Davies, the bill's co-author, stated that because
the Miller-Tydings Act was repealed, the State Fair Trade Law had to be repealed to
eliminate dead language from the statute. See id.
451. See Engman, The Case for Repealing 'Fair Trade,' 7 ANTITRUST L. & ECON. REv.
79, 80 (1975).
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dressed was ever-decreasing prices, not ever-increasing prices45
(the chronic economic disease of the 1970's) .13 The fate of the
companion to the Minnesota Unfair Trade Practices Act should
not in and of itself demand repeal of the Act. The reasons for
repeal of fair trade laws, however, do suggest caution in enacting
further legislation against price discrimination and also indicate
that the Minnesota Legislature should review the economic effect
and continued necessity of the existing prohibitions.
B. Recently Proposed Minnesota Price Discrimination
Legislation
Two bills relating to price discrimination were introduced dur-
ing the 1977 Minnesota legislative session. These bills, House File
340 4 and House File 722, 411 will be examined to determine the
goal each was perceived to accomplish and to assess the ramifica-
tions of each proposal.
1. House File 340
House File 340,156 introduced on February 7, 1977,'41 offered an
452. See id.
453. See id. at 79, 80, 83.
454. H.F. 340, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) is reproduced in pertinent part in
footnote 456 infra.
455. H.F. 722, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) appears in part in footnote 490 infra.
456. The bill read, in pertinent part:
Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Section 325.8015, is amended to read:
325.8015 [PRICE FIXING; PRODUCTION CONTROL; ALLOCATION OF
MARKETS; COLLUSIVE BIDDING; AND CONCERTED REFUSALS TO
DEAL.J Subdivision 1. Without limiting section 325.8013, the following shall
be deemed to restrain trade or commerce unreasonably and are unlawful:
Subd. 2. A contract, combination, or conspiracy between two or more persons
in competition:
Subd. 6. A contract, combination or conspiracy to directly or indirectly dis-
criminate, or the knowing solicitation or receipt of a discrimination in price
between different purchasers of commodities or services of substantially like
grade and quality, where such commodities or services are sold for use, con-
sumption, or resale within this state, and where the effect of such discrimination
may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any
line of trade or commerce in any section of this state. Nothing herein shall
prevent differentials which make only due allowance for differences in the cost
of manufacture, sale, or delivery resulting from the differing methods or quanti-
ties in which such commodities or services are to such purchasers sold or deliv-
ered. Nothing herein shall prevent persons doing business in this state from
selecting their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of
trade, nor shall it prevent price changes from time to time where in response to
changing conditions affecting the market for or marketability of the commodi-
[Vol. 5
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amendment to section 325.801541's of the Minnesota antitrust
law,4" which would have added a new subdivision 6 dealing with
price discrimination." There is no record of legislative action on
H.F. 340, which was assigned to the House Commerce and Eco-
nomic Development Committee."' The purpose of the amend-
ment therefore must be discerned simply by reading its provi-
sions.
As proposed, subdivision 6 appeared to be modeled after the
Robinson-Patman Act,4"' but with some significant differences.
First, unlike the Robinson-Patman Act, subdivision 6 would have
prohibited only a "contract, combination or conspiracy to di-
rectly or indirectly discriminate . . . in price,""6 which appears
to be a grafting of the wording of section 1 of the Sherman Act to
the proposed Minnesota equivalent of the Robinson-Patman
Act. 4 ' Thus, to establish a violation under subdivision 6, a plain-
tiff would be required to prove the existence of a "contract, com-
bination or conspiracy" in addition to a discriminatory prac-
tice." ' While it is doubtful whether the drafters of H.F. 340 in-
ties or services concerned, such as but not limited to actual or imminent deterio-
ration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonal goods, distress sales under
court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of business in the goods
concerned. Upon proof being made, at any hearing on a complaint under this
subdivision, that there has been discrimination in price of commodities or serv-
ices furnished, the burden of rebutting the prima facie case thus made by show-
ing justification shall be upon the person charged with a violation of this subdi-
vision. Nothing herein shall prevent a seller rebutting the prima facie case thus
made by showing that his lower price was made in good faith to meet an equally
low price of a competitor.
H.F. 340, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) (emphasis omitted).
457. See MINN. H.R. JouR. 189 (1977).
458. MINN. STAT. § 325.8015 (1976 & Supp. 1977) contains the general prohibitions
against unlawful restraints upon trade and commerce in effect in Minnesota.
459. See id. §§ 325.8011-.8028.
460. See note 456 supra.
461. See MINN, H.R. JOUR. 189 (1977).
462. Compare H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with Robinson-
Patman Act § 2(a)-(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a)-(b) (1976).
463. H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977). In contrast, the Robinson-
Patman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976) prohibits "any person engaged in commerce...
Ifroml either directly or indirectly [discriminating] in price between different purchas-
ers of commodities."
464. Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976) states: "Every contract, combination.
or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce . . . is declared to be illegal ...
465. While the phrase "contract, combination, or conspiracy" might appear to require
an agreement between sellers, this language has not been so construed by the United
States Supreme Court. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, which contains the same language,
has been held to be satisfied by a contract between a buyer and his seller. See Albrecht
v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149-50 (1968); Sherman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976). This
19791
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tended any substantive difference between proposed subdivision
6 and the Robinson-Patman Act, this anomaly in the drafting of
H.F. 340 can be explained only as the result of folding the basic
price discrimination provision into the Minnesota prohibition
against contracts in restraint of trade.' The consequence may be
to limit the application of subdivision 6 to situations in which,
instead of a single seller discriminating, a group of sellers en-
gages in concerted discriminatory practices." 7 Perhaps the draf-
ters of H.F. 340 believed that any discriminatory transaction
would satisfy the requirement of a "contract, combination or con-
spiracy" with the seller and the buyer (although innocent) being
the two "conspirators."'6 8
Proposed subdivision 6 contains another marked difference
from the Robinson-Patman Act. Unlike the federal legislation,
subdivision 6 would apply equally to discrimination in price be-
tween purchasers of commodities or services."9 The Robinson-
Patman Act is limited in application to purchasers of commodi-
ties,7 0 although other federal legislation may reach discrimina-
tion in the sale of services. 7' Similarly, relatively few states have
construction, in all likelihood, would be followed by the Minnesota court in any interpreta-
tion of the Minnesota Act. See, e.g., State v. Duluth Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 517-
18, 121 N.W. 395, 399 (1909). See generally French, The Minnesota Antitrust Lau, 50
MINN. L. REv. 59, 65 (1965) (principle of construing Minnesota antitrust law harmoniously
with its federal counterpart is firmly fixed). Therefore, the probable interpretation would
be that subdivision 6 is violated even if sellers do not engage in a conspiracy.
466. See notes 462-64 supra and accompanying text.
467. Discriminating in the price of like commodities between two customers by a single
seller, however, is one element of a Robinson-Patman Act offense. See, e.g., FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960) (discrimination means only that seller
charged one purchaser a higher price than another for the same product); Castlegate, Inc.
v. National Tea Co., 34 F.R.D. 221, 229-31 (D.C. Colo. 1963) (sale by same seller to
different buyers at different prices must be shown). See generally W. PATMAN, COMPLETE
GUIDE To THE ROBINSON-PATMAN AcT 11-12 (1964); Lamet, Price and Service Discrimina-
tion Under Federal and State Laws, in ANTITRUST ADvisoR 291, 298 (2d ed. C. Hills ed.
1978).
468. See note 465 supra.
469. See H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
470. See Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The term
"commodities" has been construed to exclude such intangibles as real estate leases, see
Export Liquor Sales, Inc. v. Ammex Warehouse Co., 426 F.2d 251, 252 (6th Cir. 1970),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 1000 (1971), training, owning, or racing horses, see Karlinsky v. New
York Racing Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 937, 939 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and licenses under patents,
see LaSalle St. Press, Inc. v. McCormick & Henderson, Inc., 293 F. Supp. 1004, 1006 (N.D.
Ill. 1968), aff'd on other grounds, 445 F.2d 84 (7th Cir. 1971). Commodities have been
generally defined as "tangible, physical, moveable article[s] of commerce . ABA
ANTITRUST SECTION, ANTIrrRusT LAW DEvELOPMENTS 112 (1975).
471. The Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 99 1-7 (1976), applies equally to sales of goods and
services. It has been applied, for example, to the fixing of attorney's fees, see Goldfarb v.
[Vol. 5
62
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 1 [1979], Art. 1
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol5/iss1/1
MINNESOTA PRICE DISCRIMINATION
general prohibitions against discrimination in the sale of serv-
ices.'72
One fundamental reason can be discerned why price discrimi-
nation statutes have not been extended to reach discrimination
in sales of services. Before it can be determined whether price
discrimination exists, a sameness or commonality among the
items being sold must be present. 7 ' Although sameness obviously
exists with respect to two tangible products manufactured on the
same production line,474 how can it be determined that two wills,
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 785-93 (1975), real estate brokers' commissions, see
United States v. National Ass'n of Real Estate Bds., 339 U.S. 485, 491-92 (1950), as well
as other services. See id. at 491 (noting cases in which the Sherman Act was applied to
transportation, cleaning, dyeing, medical, news and advertising services).
The Federal Trade Commission is empowered to prevent all methods of unfair competi-
tion affecting commerce. See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1976). Pursuant to this power, the FTC
may regulate sales of services. See, e.g., Rushing v. FTC, 320 F.2d 280, 282-83 (5th Cir.
1963) (FTC enforcement action against correspondence school's misleading advertise-
ments), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 986 (1964).
Other federal government agencies also have power to regulate the prices charged in
certain industries. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 205 (1970) (Federal Communications Commission
empowered to fix charges for communications industry); 49 U.S.C. § 15(1) (1970) (Inter-
state Commerce Commission empowered to set rates for interstate carriers).
There is, however, a dearth of cases applying federal antitrust law when the sole viola-
tion was price discrimination in the sale of services.
472. See Appendix § C. As with the federal law, state cases applying the general prohi-
bitions against price discrimination and sales below cost to the sale of services are rare.
473. The Robinson-Patman Act prohibits discrimination in price between different
purchasers of "commodities of like grade and quality." See Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a),
15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976). The like grade and quality requirement has caused serious
problems of definition because the amount of physical similarity necessary to a finding of
like commodities is not clear. Compare FTC v. Borden Co., 383 U.S. 637, 641 (1966)
(consumer preferences as to higher-priced public brand over lower-priced private label
brand irrelevant; determination made on characteristics of product) and Atlanta Trading
Corp., 53 F.T.C. 565 (1956), rev'd, 258 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1958) (ham is ham without regard
to consumer preference) with Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131 (1964) (physical difference
that results in lower consumer preference sufficient for a finding of unlike commodities).
It appears that the emphasis of the "like grade and quality" analysis falls on the physical
differences in the products sold, see Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.,
376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 1967) (lifetime guarantee on one muffler but not on another not
sufficient to differentiate products), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 134 (1968), and that
a physical difference in products may be significant if it results in consumer preference
for one product over another. See Quaker Oats Co., 66 F.T.C. 1131, 1192 (1964). But cf.
L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 218 (like-commodity determination made on objective physi-
cal differences).
474. See, e.g., Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 376 F.2d 692, 702
(7th Cir. 1967) (lifetime guarantee on one muffler not sufficient to differentiate it from
another muffler), rev'd on other grounds, 392 U.S. 134 (1968); Pacific Eng'r & Prod. Co.
v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 1974-1 Trade Cases (CCH) 75,054 (D. Utah 1974) (chemicals
blended and sized differently not sufficiently differentiated when manufacturer and cus-
tomer usage the same).
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two appendectomies, or two haircuts are sufficiently similar to be
comparable for price discrimination purposes? Perhaps applica-
tion of price discrimination laws to the furnishing of services
would simply mean that all customers must be charged the same
hourly rate. However, many providers of services do not base fees
solely or largely on the number of hours worked, nor do they
always perform the same consistent amount of work from hour to
hour.
A sometimes difficult interpretative problem under the
Robinson-Patman Act has been the determination of when com-
modities are in fact, in the statutory words, of "like grade and
quality" '475 to make their prices comparable for purposes of deter-
mining whether price discrimination exists.478 Subdivision 6
would compound this problem by inserting the word
"substantially" before the words "like grade and quality."'77
Subdivision 6 also purports to apply to purchasers as well as
sellers by prohibiting "the knowing solicitation or receipt" of a
discriminatory price.47 The Robinson-Patman Act, on the other
hand, applies to purchasers only when they actually receive goods
at a prohibited price.78 Apparently, under proposed subdivision
6, the mere request or "solicitation" of a discriminatory price
would be sufficient to constitute a violation, 80 although it is diffi-
475. Robinson-Patman Act § 1(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976).
476. See notes 473-74 supra.
477. See H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977). The effect of qualifying
the phrase with the addition of the word "substantially" is difficult to determine. In
another context, the Minnesota Supreme Court has stated that "the term 'substantial' is
relative and its meaning to be gauged by the circumstances." State v. Pahl, 254 Minn.
349, 353-54, 95 N.W.2d 85, 89 (1959) (construing "substantial" destruction of property in
a condemnation proceeding). Other sources indicate that the word "substantially" has a
more certain meaning. BLACK'S LAW DIcTIONARY 1597 (rev. 4th ed. 1968) offers the follow-
ing definition: "Essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance;
materially; in a substantial manner." See also id. (definition of "substantial").
478. See H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
479. The operative language in the Act states: "111t shall be unlawful for any person
engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, knowingly to induce or receive a
discrimination in price which is prohibited by this section." Robinson-Patman Act § 1(f),
15 U.S.C. § 13(f) (1976).
480. The word "solicitation" is defined as "the pursuit, practice, act, or instance of
soliciting." WEBSTER's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2169 (1971). "Solicit" is
defined as "to make petition to ... ; to approach with a request or plea . . .; to move to
action .. .; to strongly urge." Id. The word "soliciting" has been defined as "to ask for
or to request some thing or action in language which convinces that the asking or request-
ing is being done in earnest and that the solicitor wants results." Bittiker v. State Bd. of
Registration for the Healing Arts, 404 S.W.2d 402, 405 (Mo. Ct. App. 1966). Because none
of these definitions requires that the act requested be completed before a solicitation can
be said to have occurred, it would appear that the mere asking for a discrimination in
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cult to understand how the requisite potential injury to competi-
tion could exist if the discriminatory price was not in fact re-
ceived.
Certain prohibitions found in the Robinson-Patman Act are
omitted from subdivision 6. Specifically, no express prohibition
against a seller's paying a brokerage to a buyer " ' nor a prohibition
against a seller's furnishing promotional services or payments to
its customers,"" similar to those found in the Robinson-Patman
Act, are contained in subdivision 6. These prohibitions in the
Robinson-Patman Act have been criticized as creating in effect
per se violations because a violation may exist despite absence of
injury or probability of injury to competition.- Accordingly,
these prohibitions might well be omitted from any Minnesota
legislation. Less desirable, however, may be the omission from
proposed subdivision 6 of a provision similar to the Non-Profit
Institutions Act,""4 which exempts sales to nonprofit institutions
from the prohibitions of the Robinson-Patman Act." 5 Absent a
comparable provision in the Minnesota law, the subdivision 6
prohibitions arguably might apply to sales to nonprofit institu-
tions.""5
With these qualifications, subdivision 6 essentially follows the
wording of the Robinson-Patman Act.' 7 Thus, Minnesota courts
probably would look to the body of federal decisions to find the
meaning of the Minnesota equivalent to the Robinson-Patman
Act. 88 The question should be asked, therefore, whether, even if
price would be prohibited by the language of subdivision 6. See H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th
Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
481. Compare H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with Robinson-
Patman Act, § l(c)-(e), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)-(e) (1976).
482. Compare H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with Robinson-
Patman Act, § 1(c), 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1976).
483. See, e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE RMP r, supra note 10, at 28-31; Fisher, Sections 2(D)
and (E) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Babel Revisited, 11 VAND. L. REV. 453, 467-68
(1958); Miller, Sections 2(d) and (e) of the Robinson-Patman Act: Seller in a Quandary,
45 MARQ. L. REv. 511, 520-21 (1962).
484. See Non-Profit Institutions Act, ch. 283, 52 Stat. 446 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 13(c)
(1976)).
4&5. See id.
486. The statute prohibiting price discrimination in the distribution of pharmaceutical
products, however, does exempt educational institutions and hospitals, among others,
from the provisions of the Act. See MINN. STAT. § 151.061(1) (1976). Also of note is the
absence of an exclusion for sales to governmental bodies, a provision common in other
states. See Appendix §§ A.3, B.3.
487. Compare H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with 15 U.S.C. § 13
(1976).
488. See generally French, supra note 465, at 65 ("principle of harmonious construction
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additional price discrimination legislation is needed in Minne-
sota, the state needs a statute with the complexity, ambiguity,
and tangled web of interpretation of the Robinson-Patman Act.'
[with federal law] has become firmly fixed in Minnesota law").
489. For example, a violation of the Robinson-Patman Act has been found when a seller
charged relatively minor differences in price to customers who purchased the product from
the seller and then resold it in competition with each other. See Purolator Prods., Inc. v.
FTC, 352 F.2d 874, 884-85 (7th Cir. 1965). If the profit margins are narrow, many
Robinson-Patman Act decisions have essentially inferred the requisite probability of in-
jury to competition resulting from the violation. See, e.g., FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334
U.S. 37, 45-49 (1948); Beatrice Foods Co., 76 F.T.C. 719, 744-46 (1969), aff'd sub nom.
Kroger Co. v. FTC, 438 F.2d 1372 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 871 (1971). Does
Minnesota wish such a result?
Similarly, the Robinson-Patman Act essentially prohibits a seller from charging a cus-
tomer lower prices than its competitors are paying when the customer buys larger quanti-
ties or volumes of goods, except to the extent that such lower prices can be cost justified.
See ABA, ANTITRUST SECTION, supra note 470. At the same time, the cost-justification
defense in the Robinson-Patman Act § 1, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1976), which is repeated in
subdivision 6 of House File 340, see H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977),
has been given a very narrow interpretation by the courts. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 18-22. Are these rules needed in Minnesota?
By way of further example, both the Robinson-Patman Act, see 15 U.S.C. § 13(b)
(1976), and subdivision 6, of House File 340, see H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., Ist
Sess. (1977), contain a defense allowing a seller to charge different prices to different
customers if the seller is meeting competition. Federal courts have engaged in a continuing
debate over whether the meeting competition defense is available only to sellers meeting
their competitors' lawful, as opposed to unlawful, prices, compare National Dairy Prod.
Corp., 70 F.T.C. 79, 193-203 (1966), rev'd, 395 F.2d 517, 525 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 977 (1968) with Cadigan v. Texaco, Inc., 492 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1974). Moreover,
whether the meeting competition defense is available only to meet a competitor's individ-
ual prices or may be used to meet a competitor's entire pricing pattern also has found
courts in apparent disagreement. Compare Standard Motor Prod., Inc. v. FTC, 265 F.2d
674, 677 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 826 (1959) with Callaway Mills Co. v. FTC, 362
F.2d 435, 441-42 (5th Cir. 1966). Should Minnesota's meeting competition defense be
similarly circumscribed?
The meeting competition defense in House File 340, see H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn.
Legis., 1st Sess. (1977), does not specifically require that the lower competitive price being
met be "legal" if the defense is to be relied upon. See id. This appears to be inconsistent
with provisions in the present Minnesota statutes allowing price discrimination to meet
competition when the price being met is "legal." See note 110 supra and accompanying
text.
More fundamentally, there is no attempt to relate subdivision 6 to any of the existing
Minnesota prohibitions of locality price discrimination, see MINN. STAT. § 325.03 (1976);
id. § 325.04, para. 2, and sales below cost. See id. § 325.04, para. 1. Consequently, the
Legislature should consider seriously whether subdivision 6 should be enacted without any
effort to relate it to the existing prohibitions of sections 325.03 and 325.04. Additionally,
if new price discrimination legislation is to be enacted in Minnesota, the time appears ripe
to evaluate the contininuing need for the existing legislation.
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2. House File 722
House File 722111 was introduced on March 3, 1977,"'1 and, like
House File 340, was referred to the Committee on Commerce and
Economic Development.' 2 There also is no record of any legisla-
tive action on H.F. 722;113 therefore, like H.F. 340, its purpose and
effect must be discerned largely from reviewing its provisions.
Unlike H.F. 340, H.F. 722 would have been limited to a single
product: motor vehicle fuel.' Nevertheless, H.F. 722 proposed
490. The bill read, in relevant part:
Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Chapter 325, is amended by adding a
section to read:
[325.8131 [MOTOR VEHICLE FUEL DISCRIMINATION.] Subdivision 1.
[DEFINITIONS.) For the purpose of sections 1 and 2, the terms defined in this
section have the meanings given them.
Subd. 2. "Motor vehicle fuel" means all products commonly or commer-
cially known as gasoline and diesel fuel.
Subd. 3. "Person" includes but is not limited to an individual, firm, com-
pany, association, partnership, limited partnership, foreign or domestic corpora-
tion, and any other entity.
Sec. 2. Minnesota Statutes 1976, Chapter 325, is amended by adding a
section to read:
[325.8141 [PRICE DISCRIMINATION.] Subdivision 1. No person doing
business in this state and engaged in the production, refining or distribution of
motor vehicle fuel shall directly or indirectly discriminate in price between
purchasers of motor vehicle fuel of substantially like grade and quality, where
the effect of such discrimination may be to lessen competition, or to injure,
destroy or prevent competition with any person who either grants or knowingly
receives the benefit of such discrimination, or with customers of either of them,
if such motor vehicle fuel is sold for use, consumption or resale within Minne-
sota. Price differentials equivalent to differences in the cost of production, refin-
ing or delivery are permitted. Persons doing business in this state and engaged
in the production, refining, or distribution of motor vehicle fuel are free to select
their own customers in bona fide transactions and not in restraint of trade.
Nothing herein shall prevent price changes from time to time in response to
changing conditions, affecting the market for or the marketability of the prod-
ucts concerned, such as, but not limited to, actual or imminent deterioration of
products, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinu-
ance of business in the products concerned. This subdivision shall not apply to
the purchase of motor vehicle fuel for its own use by the state and its political
subdivisions.
Subd. 2. No person doing business in this state shall knowingly induce or
receive a discrimination in price which is prohibited by subdivision 1.
H.F. 722, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) (emphasis omitted).
491. See 1 MINN. H.R. Jous. 343 (1977).
492. See id.
493. See 5 MINN. H.R. JOUR. 131 (1977-1978) (indicating bill never went beyond first
reading and referral to committee).
494. Compare H.F. 340, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with H.F. 722, 70th Minn.
Legis., 1st Sess. (1977). H.F. 722, § 1(2), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) defines "motor
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what would have been essentially a state Robinson-Patman Act
applicable solely to that product.495
Most of the interpretative issues identified with respect to H.F.
340 also would apply to H.F. 722;1"6 however, H.F. 722 was pro-
posed as a new section rather than an additional subdivision of
an existing section. Therefore, H.F. 722 poses additional inquiries
as well. First, what is the reason for singling out motor vehicle
fuel for special attention? Perhaps the bill was introduced in
reaction to the perceived business failure of many gasoline filling
stations.
What is the relationship of H.F. 722 to other existing law?
Unlike H.F. 340, H.F. 722 specifically states that it is to be cumu-
lative to all other laws and is not to be construed as repealing
any."' The relationship between the proposed, specific law con-
cerning motor vehicle fuel and existing Minnesota law is further
obscured by the fact that legislation dealing with locality price
discrimination in the production, manufacture, or distribution of
petroleum products is already in existence.49"
There are other respects in which H.F. 722 parts ways with
H.F. 340. Unlike the Robinson-Patman Act and H.F. 340, which
apply when the effect of the discrimination may be "substantially
to lessen competition,"' 9 H.F. 722 would apply when the effect
of discrimination merely "may be to lessen competition. 5 "0 Fur-
ther, H.F. 722, unlike H.F. 340 and the Robinson-Patman Act,
contains no defense for lowering prices to meet competition. ' 0"
Why meeting competition should be a defense under the general
act, which applies to any commodity, but not under H.F. 722,
which applies only to motor vehicle fuel, is inexplicable. In short,
despite its narrower reach, H.F. 722 should be approached with
as much caution as H.F. 340.
495. Compare H.F. 722, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with 15 U.S.C. §§ 13-13b,
21a (1976).
496. See notes 456-89 supra and accompanying text.
497. Compare H.F. 340, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with H.F. 722, § 2(8), 70th
Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
498. See MINN. STAT. § 325.82 (1976); notes 172-84 supra and accompanying text.
499. See Robinson-Patman Act § l(a), 15 U.S.C. § 13(a) (1976); H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th
Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
500. See H.F. 722, § 2(1) 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
501. Compare H.F. 722, 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977) with Robinson-Patman Act
§ l(b), 15 U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976) and H.F. 340, § 1(6), 70th Minn. Legis., 1st Sess. (1977).
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C. Price Discrimination at the Federal Level: Contemporary
Opposition to and Support of the Robinson-Patman Act
Commentary on the effects of the Robinson-Patman Act ob-
viously provides an additional source of information on the desir-
ability of retaining existing, and accepting proposed, statutes
prohibiting price discrimination and sales below cost.502 However,
commentary on the federal law is widely divergent with no dis-
cernable conclusion °3
Continuing adverse commentary on the Robinson-Patman Act
in recent years has been offered by the Antitrust Division of the
United States Department of Justice, which shares with the Fed-
eral Trade Commission the responsibility of enforcing the anti-
trust laws, including the Robinson-Patman Act.0 4 Recent expres-
sions of the Department's views may explain why its efforts to
enforce the Robinson-Patman Act have been notably lacking
almost since the Act was passed.
The Justice Department's views are suggested in a speech de-
livered to grocery manufacturers on October 29, 1975, by Jona-
than C. Rose, then acting Deputy Assistant Attorney General for
the Antitrust Division. 505 Mr. Rose opened his speech by stating:
As you know, the Robinson-Patman Act was passed in the
•mid-30s. It was primarily a response to the concern of small
grocers that price discounts granted by the members of your
industry to the larger chain food stores placed them at a serious
competitive disadvantage. Since that time, for some time the
Act has become, in my view, a latter day Bill of Rights for the
small businessmen of America. Consequently, very few public
officials, particularly members of Congress, have had any incen-
502. The complexity of the Robinson-Patman Act has produced evaluation and analysis
by Congress, see, e.g., SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 11, the Department of Justice, see,
e.g., DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10, the American Bar Association, see, e.g., ABA
SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, REPORT ON PRICE DISCRIMINATION IN NoN-SALE AND NON-
COMMODITY TRANSACTIONS (1973) [hereinafter cited as ABA REPORT], and commentators.
See, e.g., C. AUSTIN, PRICE DISCRIMINATION AND RELATED PROBLEMS UNDER THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (2d rev. ed. 1959); D. BAUM, THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1964); F. RowE,
PRICE DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE ROBINSON-PATMAN ACT (1962 & Supp. 1964); Anonymous,
supra note 12; Austern, supra note 12; Austern, Difficult and Diffusive Decades: An
Historical Plaint About the Robinson-Patman Act, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 897 (1966).
503. See notes 508-53 infra and accompanying text.
504. See Hoegh, Ellner & Clyne, The Federal Trade Commission and the Federal Trade
Commission Act, in ANTITRUST ADVISOR 389, 391-92 (2d ed. C. Hills ed. 1978).
505. Address by Jonathan C. Rose, Acting Deputy Assistant Attorney, General Anti-




Goodrich: Minnesota Price Discrimination and Sales-Below-Cost Statutes: Sho
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1979
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
tive to inquire into the actual economic impact of the Act on
both large and small businesses and upon the consumer in
today's economy ...
No other country has a statute like Robinson-Patman, except
for France, and I am told that there it is not really enforced. The
Act can, perhaps, be seen as a "period piece" of the Depression
era. Unlike today, public officials of the 1930s were concerned
about falling prices and the devastating impact of the Great
Depression. Indeed, price cutting was seen by many in that era
as a serious evil, and attempts were made as through the NRA
Codes of Fair Competition to "stabilize" the marketplace.
Today, of course, the world is much different. A primary eco-
nomic concern is inflation as well as institutional structures
which maintain price rigidity and thus inhibit the movement of
prices in response to market forces." 6
Mr. Rose then evaluated the effect of the Robinson-Patman Act,
concluding:
In my personal view, outright repeal is probably the most
intellectually sound and economically defensible approach. I do
not believe that Robinson-Patman has had, or will have, any
significant economic long-run benefits. On the other hand, the
probable economic costs of Robinson-Patman are significant. 5117
In December of 1975, the Domestic Council Review Group on
Regulatory Reform held hearings on the operation of the
Robinson-Patman Act to determine whether it should be re-
tained, modified or repealed.0 8 Thereafter, Antitrust Division
staff members prepared a comprehensive document entitled
"Report on the Robinson-Patman Act,"5 "1 ultimately published in
1977.110 This report represents an in-depth analysis of the Act
from the viewpoint of the Department of Justice."' The report
drew not only on the views expressed at hearings before the 1975
Review Group but also on views expressed at hearings held in late
1975 and early 1976 by the Ad Hoc Subcommittee on the Anti-
trust Laws, the Robinson-Patman Act, and Related Matters of
506. Id. at 1-2.
507. Id. at 15.
508. See Preface to DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10. Over 20 persons testified
at these hearings including members of the academic community, practicing attorneys,
representatives of small business groups, business people, and present and former govern-
ment officials. Id.
509. DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10.
510. Id.
511. See Preface to DEP'T OF JusTicE REPORT, supra note 10.
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the Small Business Committee of the United States House of
Representatives.512
The Antitrust Division's Report first considered the effects of
the Robinson-Patman Act upon competition, prices, efficiency,
and the consumer.513 The Act, according to the Report, has caused
pricing rigidity and has encouraged competitors to discuss pricing
arrangements, a possible violation of the Sherman Act.511 The
Report also criticized the Act as protecting highly concentrated,
local markets from the entry of new competition and as discour-
aging buyers from engaging in hard bargaining with large sell-
ers. 515 In addition, the Report indicated that the Act tends to
preserve a layer of middlemen (wholesalers) even though integra-
tion of certain distribution functions might be more efficient. 516
The Report concluded that manufacturers and distributors are
discouraged by operation of the Act from helping small businesses
meet competitive challenges. 17
The Report continued with a review of the economic, political,
and legislative climate at the time the Act had been passed in
1936.1'8 The economic and policy assumptions underlying the Act
were then evaluated." 9 According to the Report, the climate at
the time of passage was greatly affected by the Great Depression:
Much of the economic thought of the 1930 s [sic] was pre-
occupied with recovery from the depression. No legislature con-
vened during that period could ignore the catastrophic failure
rate of businesses of all sizes, declining wages, and the rapid
decrease of the gross national product. The disruption of eco-
nomic life was such that ordinary people lost confidence in the
free enterprise system; people clamored for government protec-
tion, not competition.52
A number of erroneous assumptions relied upon by the drafters
of the Act were identified in the Antitrust Division's Report. 5 '
One assumption was that the general level of prices should be
higher; a second, that, in the ideal world, prices to all customers
512. Id.
513. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10, at 8-100. But see United States v.
United States Gypsum Co., 98 S. Ct. 2864 (1978).
514. See id. at 99.
515. See id.
516. See id.
517. See id. at 100.
518. See id. at 101-13.
519. See id. at 149-250.
520. Id. at 101 (footnote omitted).
521. See id. at 101-39.
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would be the same."2 According to the Report, in the world of
workable competition, variation among prices charged to individ-
ual customers is to be expected. 23 Further, the Report indicated
that to assume that price discrimination uniformly favors larger
buyers and never results in lower prices throughout the market
was erroneous. 54 In fact, price discrimination is part of a dynamic
process by which excessive price levels in oligopolistic industries
are brought down to a more competitive level.525 Thus, this por-
tion of the Report concluded that compliance with the Robinson-
Patman Act creates a deleterious impact upon competition with-
out any corresponding increase in protection for small busi-
nesses.526 The difficulties in the Act, the Report implied, could
therefore be considered more a result of a defect in its goals than,
as sometimes perceived, a result of poor drafting or improper
statutory interpretation or administration .127
Possible remedies were discussed in the final chapter of the
Report, 528 where the authors commented that "careful reconsider-
ation of the Robinson-Patman Act is timely. . . .[Slerious con-
sideration should be given to repealing the Robinson-Patman
Act ... ."529 The Report offered two alternatives for considera-
tion, both drafts of statutes initially suggested by the Department
of Justice in 1975.531 The first proposal, the Predatory Practices
522. Id. at 150-53. The Justice Department concluded that this assumption was inher-
ent in the Robinson-Patman Act's structure because businesspeople need not decrease
their prices to particular customers if costs or market conditions change in particular
areas. See id.
523. See id. at 153.
524. See id. at 154.
525. See id. at 156. An oligopolistic market is one in which there are so few firms that,
unlike the truly competitive market, a change in output by one firm will be perceived by
the firm as affecting the market-wide price of the commodity. The pricing and output
decisions of firms in an oligopoly are thus interdependent. Most decisions made by a firm
in an oligopoly, therefore, take into account the probable reaction of the other firms in
the industry. See generally F. SCHERER, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE ch. 5 (1970).
526. See DEP'T OF JusTicE REPORT, supra note 10, at 250.
527. See id. at 149.
528. See id. at 260-69.
529. Id. at 260-61. Moreover, the Justice Department Report also concluded:
The simple truth is that Robinson-Patman is a false promise: it provides
little, long-run protection to small businessmen. It is just not possible to legis-
late equality in a free market system. The basic force in changing the structure
of the American marketplace is the consumer. It is the consumer who decides
the type of retail establishment with which he or she wishes to deal.
Id. at 254.
530. See id. at 276-93.
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Act,53 ' would outlaw charging a price below the "reasonably an-
ticipated average direct operating expense" when a seller sup-
plies a customer with a commodity for a sustained period of
time, unless certain defenses are met.5 3 No discrimination would
have to be proved to sustain a violation. 5- The proposed act was
intended to protect a person from the predatory actions of his
own competitors.53' The second proposal, the Price Discrimina-
tion Act, 35 incorporated provisions of the Predatory Practices
531. The proffered legislation provided, in pertinent part:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for the seller of a commodity engaged in com-
merce overtly to threaten a competing or potential competing seller of the com-
modity with economic or physical harm, so as to cause or induce the competing
seller (a) to conform to pricing policies favored by the seller; or (b) to cease or
refrain from selling any commodity to any particular customer; regardless or
[sic] whether any overt action is taken to fulfill such threat.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for a seller of a commodity, engaged in com-
merce, knowingly to sell on a sustained basis such commodity at a price below
the reasonably anticipated average direct operating expense incurred in supply-
ing the commodity, where such commodity is sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States, the District of Columbia, or any other territory
under the jurisdiction of the United States.
Sec. 4. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 3 that an otherwise
unlawful price:
(a) was charged by a person in order to meet in good faith an equally low
price of a competitor;
(b) was charged by a new entrant, a person having at the time of sale a less
than 10 percent share of the sales of the commodity in the section of the country
in which the commodity was sold at such price being deemed a new entrant;
(c) was charged in response to changing conditions affecting the market for
or the marketability of the commodities involved, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable commodities, obsolescence of
seasonal commodities, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the commodities concerned; or
(d) did not clearly threaten the elimination from a line of commerce of a
competitor of the person charging the otherwise unlawful price.
Id. at 277-78.
532. See id. at 262.
533. See id.
534. See id.
535. In relevant part, this proposal stated:
Sec. 2. It shall be unlawful for the seller of a commodity engaged in com-
merce to overtly threaten a competing or potential competing seller of the com-
modity with economic or physical harm, so as to cause or induce the competing
seller (a) to conform to pricing policies favored by the seller or (b) to cease or
refrain from selling any commodity within a geographic area or to cease or
refrain from selling any commodity to any particular customer; regardless of
whether any overt action is taken to fulfill such threat.
Sec. 3. It shall be unlawful for a seller of a commodity, engaged in com-
merce, knowingly to sell on a sustained basis such commodity at a price below
the reasonably anticipated average direct operating expense incurred in supply-
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Act, but also would have prohibited price discrimination that
ing the commodity, where such commodity is sold for use, consumption, or
resale within the United States, the District of Columbia, or any other territory
under the jurisdiction of the United States.
Sec. 4. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 3 that an otherwise
unlawful price:
(a) was charged by a person in order to meet in good faith an equally low
price of a competitor;
(b) was charged by a new entrant, a person having at the time of sale a less
than 10 percent share of the sales of the commodity in the section of the country
in which the commodity was sold at such price being deemed a new entrant;
(c) was charged in response to changing conditions affecting the market for
or the marketability of the commodities involved, such as but not limited to
actual or imminent deterioration of perishable commodities, obsolescence of
seasonable commodities, distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith
in discontinuance of business in the commodities concerned; or
(d) did not clearly threaten the elimination from a line of cqmmerce of a
competitor of the person charging the otherwise unlawful price.
Sec. 5. It shall be unlawful to discriminate either directly or indirectly in
price between different purchasers of commodities of like grade and quality,
where either or any of the purchases involved in such discrimination are in
commerce, where such commodities are sold for use, consumption, or resale
within the United States or any Territory thereof or the District of Columbia or
any insular possession or other place under the jurisdiction of the United States,
where:
(a) the recipient of the discrimination is in competition with others not
granted the discrimination, the discrimination is significant in amount, and the
discrimination is part of a pattern which systematically favors larger recipients
in the relevant line of commerce over their smaller competitors; or
(b) the recipient of the discrimination is in competition with others not
granted the discrimination, the discrimination is significant in amount, and the
discrimination clearly threatens to eliminate from a line of commerce one or
more competitors of the recipient where the effect of such elimination may be
substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a monopoly in any line
of commerce in any'section of the country.
Sec. 6. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that the lesser price
was charged in good faith to meet an equally low price of a competitor. Except
in a suit seeking only prospective relief against all or substantially all of the
competitors practicing the discrimination, the defense shall be allowed even if
the equally low exaction of a competitor is subsequently determined to be un-
lawful.
Sec. 7. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that the lesser price
makes an appropriate allowance for differences in the cost of manufacture,
distribution, sale or delivery resulting from the different methods or quantities
involved in supplying the customers in question. An allowance is appropriate
where the difference in price does no more than approximate the difference in
cost; where the difference in price does not exceed a reasonable estimate of the
difference in cost; or where the estimated difference in cost is the result of a
reasonable system of classifying transactions which is based on characteristics
affecting costs of manufacture, distribution, sale or delivery, under which differ-
ences in price among classes approximate differences in cost.
Sec. 8. It shall be a defense to a violation of Section 5 that: (i) the lesser
price was in response to changing conditions affecting the market for or the
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"systematically favor[ed] larger recipients" or threatened to
eliminate a customer's competitor from a market when the effect
may be to lessen competition . 31 The Report, however, did not
endorse either proposal.
537
The Antitrust Division's Report was followed by a report of the
Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Antitrust, the Robinson-Patman Act,
and Related Matters of the Small Business Committee of the
House of Representatives.5 3 The Subcommittee's Report, which
had the approval of the full committee as well,'531 was issued in
September of 1976.540 Its conclusions, drawn in part from hearings
before the Subcommittee, which had also been one source of in-
formation for the Antitrust Division's Report,54' were contrary to
those of the Antitrust Division. The Subcommittee Report con-
cluded:
1. The Robinson-Patman Act, which is an important part of
the antitrust laws of the United States, should not be repealed
nor emasculated nor weakened in any way whatsoever; neither
should it be amended. However, in order to provide additional
leverage in furtherance of the beneficent purposes of this time-
marketability of the commodities involved, such as but not limited to actual or
imminent deterioration of perishable goods, obsolescence of seasonable goods,
distress sales under court process, or sales in good faith in discontinuance of
business in the goods concerned; or (ii) the lesser price was available, on reason-
ably practical conditions, to the person allegedly discriminated against.
Sec. 9. Nothing herein contained shall prevent any person from refusing to
deal with any person. An offer to deal only on discriminatory terms shall, how-
ever, be treated as a completed transaction for the purpose of according relief
under this Act.
Sec. 10. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act shall not be held
to prohibit any discrimination in price for the sale of commodities, or the receipt
of any such discrimination.
Sec. 11. An order or injunction issued to restrain or prohibit a violation of
Sections 5 through 9 shall remain in effect for a limited time, stipulated at the
time of entry, and reasonably related to the nature of the violation. In no case
shall an order issued to enforce such sections remain in effect more than five
years after the date of entry.
Sec. 12. Section 2 of the Act of October 15, 1914 (38 Stat. 730) commonly
known as the Clayton Act, as amended, and Sections 1 and 3 of the Act of June
19, 1936 (49 Stat. 1528) commonly known as the Robinson-Patman Act, are
hereby repealed. Any orders or decrees entered pursuant to the sections enumer-
ated in the proceeding [sicl sentence shall expire two years after the enactment
of this Act, or sooner if they so provide.
Id. at 280-84.
536. Id. at 281-82.
537. See id. at 272-85 (by implication).
538. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 11.
539. See id. Letters of Transmittal, at III.
540. See id.
541. See Preface to DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10.
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proven law, Section 3 of the Robinson-Patman Act should, by
Congressional action, be included within the term "antitrust
laws."
2. The Robinson-Patman Act has implemented the clearly
expressed national public policy "* * * that the government
should aid, counsel, assist, and protect, insofar as is possible,
the interests of small business concerns in order to preserve free
competitive enterprise * * *." Therefore, the Robinson-Patman
Act must be effectively enforced by those Governmental Agen-
cies which are charged with the duty to execute and enforce its
provisions .51
The Subcommittee deplored the neglect of the Department of
Justice in enforcing the Act. 5 3 More significantly, the Subcom-
mittee criticized the recent absence of enforcement by the Fed-
eral Trade Commission, 544 historically the only federal agency
active in seeking compliance with the Act.545 In an Appendix to
its Report, the Subcommittee included charts of FTC actions
with regard to the Act, purporting to demonstrate a decline in
enforcement .5  For example, the basic prohibition against price
discrimination had been the basis for the issuance of twenty-eight
cease-and-desist orders in 1964 but only one in 1974 and two in
1975.117 Similar declines in Federal Trade Commission enforce-
ment of other provisions in the Act also were noted .5  During the
542. SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 121.
543. See id. at 103-04. The Subcommittee, after being informed by a Justice Depart-
ment representative that he had never brought a suit alleging a Robinson-Patman Act
violation, noted in its report:
It is an elementary principle of Constitutional Law that Executive officers may
not, by means of construction, orders, or otherwise alter, repeal, set at nought
or disregard laws enacted by the Legislative Branch. It is the Congress that
passes laws and it is the duty of the Executive Branch, through its department
heads, to enforce such laws and carry out the Congressional intent and mandate.
Id. at 90-91 (footnote omitted).
544. See id. at 104. In its recommendations to the Executive Branch, the Subcommittee
stated:
(1) That neither it nor any of its Departments consider nor take any action
on proposals to weaken, emasculate, or repeal the Robinson-Patman Act or
other provisions of Federal laws against price discrimination practices which
may injure, lessen, or destroy competition.
(2) That it, through its appropriate Departments and agencies, fully and
effectively enforce the Robinson-Patman Act and all antitrust laws and other
statutes to aid and assist the small business sector of the American economy,
and thereby comply with the express mandate of the Congress.
Id. at 123.
545. See Hoegh, Ellner & Clyne, supra note 504, at 391-92.
546. See SUacoMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 128-32.
547. See id. at 128.
548. See id. at 104.
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same period, the Subcommittee remarked, the Department of
Justice "was bringing no cases under the Robinson-Patman
Act.'
549
Both the Antitrust Division's and the Subcommittee's reports
referred to a substantial amount of legal authority throughout
their respective analyses. Case law as well as the opinions of
various commentators, including persons participating in the var-
ious hearings on the Act, was thoroughly noted."" The report from
the Antitrust Division also utilized some census-type data to sup-
port its proposition that, despite the existence of the Robinson-
Patman Act, the number of small businesses was declining, 5 ' or,
at least, the position occupied by larger businesses or chain stores
was accelerating.5 A striking omission from both reports, how-
ever, is an extensive identification or review of any empirical
studies or data demonstrating the effectiveness or ineffectiveness
of the Act in achieving its objectives or supporting the alleged
economic detriments resulting from the Act. Rather than relying
upon systematically derived economic data, the debate on the
Robinson-Patman Act emphasizes examples of single instances
that are not persuasive because they do not prove industry-wide
effects but appear to reflect the predilection of the particular
advocate utilizing them.53
D. A Suggested Approach
A review of the history, development, and debate concerning
price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes suggests, at a
minimum, that the Minnesota Legislature should move very de-
liberately in considering whether to enact any new legislation in
this area. Indeed, new legislation should not be enacted in the
absence of convincing empirical data demonstrating the need for
and effect of the proposals. Appropriate surveys should be taken
of the businesses to be restricted or benefited by any new legisla-
tion to determine whether the perceived need actually would be
549. Id. (emphasis in original).
550. Cf. id. at 6 (concluding that, as a result of the number of persons testifying and
authorities relied upon, the Subcommittee Report may be the most intensive and exten-
sive study on antitrust law Congress has ever made); DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note
10, at 308-20 (listing the witnesses, cases, statutes, and secondary authorities relied upon
in preparing the Report).
551. See DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT, supra note 10, at 202-06.
552. See id. at 102, 132, 202-06.
553. See, e.g., SUBCOMM. REPORT, supra note 11, at 95-96; DEP'T OF JUSTICE REPORT,
supra note 10, at 65, 69, 71, 73-74.
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promoted. In addition, empirical studies might be sponsored by
the Minnesota Legislature to determine the continued viability
of the present statutes prohibiting locality discrimination and
sales below cost.
Many questions require answers. For example, are businesses
aware of the existence of the prohibitions? Are sellers really inhib-
ited in their pricing practices by reason of the locality discrimina-
tion statutes? Have the prohibitions against sales below cost and
the ambiguities in the available defenses inhibited sellers from
reducing prices or offering bargain prices? Have sellers been dis-
couraged from selectively lowering prices to meet competition
because they did not know whether the competitor's prices were
"legal"?"'
How many small businesses in Minnesota need or rely upon the
protection of the existing statutes? Are some businesses more
vulnerable to being charged higher prices by their suppliers than
others in the same or different communities? In the 1970's, have
most small businesses combined their purchasing power by be-
coming part of franchise organizations or cooperative buying
organizations?
In evaluating the need for existing or new Minnesota legislation
prohibiting price discrimination or sales below cost, the Legisla-
ture also should keep in mind that even in a Minnesota com-
pletely devoid of state statutes specifically prohibiting price dis-
crimination and sales below cost, other laws are available to pro-
hibit such activities. First of all, as long as it remains in effect,
the Robinson-Patman Act would apply to situations in which one
of the two sales involved in a discriminatory transaction crosses
a state line. 55 Price discrimination practiced by regional or na-
tional firms selling in Minnesota that injures their Minnesota
competitors or customers would remain subject, to a considerable
extent, to the federal prohibitions found in the Robinson-Patman
Act.
Moreover, actual predatory pricing resulting in a restraint of
trade, an attempt to monopolize, or actual monopolization,
554. According to the court in State v. Wolkoff, 250 Minn. 504, 512, 85 N.W.2d 401,
407 (1957) (construing a sales-below-cost statute), a good faith belief that the competitor's
prices were legal would, of course, be a basis sufficient for charging a lower price. See notes
365-68 supra and accompanying text. It is doubtful, however, whether affected sellers
realize this.
555. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974); Moore
v. Mead's Fine Bread Co., 348 U.S. 115, 119-20 (1954).
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would violate sections 1 or 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act. " , The
Sherman Act has a greater reach than the Robinson-Patman
Act. 5 1 Under it, wholly local business restraints are prohibited if
they substantially and adversely affect interstate commerce;1'
the Sherman Act does not require a sale to have actually crossed
a state line.55 It also is irrelevant under the Sherman Act whether
the alleged violators actually did intend to affect interstate com-
merce.8 0 Thus, some pricing practices taking place in Minnesota
would be proscribed under the federal antitrust law as it presently
exists.
Perhaps more important for Minnesota businesses are the pro-
visions in the Minnesota antitrust law,5"" which is essentially an
expanded version of the Sherman Act.56 2 The Minnesota law has
been held to conform to the federal;51 3 therefore, federal court
556. See Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. 88 1-2 (1976).
557. The interstate commerce requirement of the Robinson-Patman Act, for example,
is more restrictively construed than the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman
Act. See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 194-95 (1974). Compare id. at
198-99 (Robinson-Patman Act inapplicable when only connection to interstate commerce
is sale of commodity to interstate highway contractors) with Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex
Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 743-44 (1975) (construction of hospital addition, financed
out-of-state and to be serviced with goods from out-of-state, within interstate commerce
for purposes of Sherman Act) and Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S.
207, 213 (1959) (boycott affecting only local store within purview of Sherman Act; viola-
tions are "not to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose
business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the economy").
558. E.g., Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974); see United
States v. Women's Sportswear Mfrs. Ass'n, 336 U.S. 460, 464 (1949) ("If it is interstate
commerce that feels the pinch, it does not matter how local the operation which applies
the squeeze.").
559. See, e.g., Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959);
United States v. Frankfort Distilleries, Inc., 324 U.S. 293, 298 (1945) (attempt to fix price
of liquor within state of Colorado prohibited under Sherman Act).
560. See, e.g., Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Rex Hosp. Trustees, 425 U.S. 738, 745 (1975).
561. MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8011-.8028 (1976 & Supp. 1977).
562. Compare id. with Sherman Act §§ 1-6, 8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
563. See St. Marie & Son, Inc. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 414 F. Supp. 71 (D. Minn.
1976) (by implication) (motion for summary judgment under state antitrust law sustained
in favor of plaintiff-only federal cases cited in support). The former version of the Minne-
sota antitrust law, Act of Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, 1899 Minn. Laws 487 (repealed 1971),
has been construed using federal decisions as a guide. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Plate Glass
Co. v. Paine & Nixon Co., 182 Minn. 159, 166, 234 N.W. 453, 456 (1930); State v. Duluth
Bd. of Trade, 107 Minn. 506, 517, 121 N.W. 395, 399 (1909). Because the current version,
originally adopted in 1971, Minnesota Antitrust Law of 1971, ch. 865, 1971 Minn. Laws
1715 (current version at MINN. STAT. §§ 325.8011-.8028 (1976 & Supp. 1977)), brings the
Minnesota law more in conformity with the federal law than the earlier version did,
compare id. and Act of Apr. 21, 1899, ch. 359, 1899 Minn. Laws 487 (repealed 1971) with
Sherman Act § 1-6, 8, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), the Minnesota court most likely will
continue to follow federal decisions in interpreting the present law.
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interpretations of the Sherman Act should be used to interpret
the state statute. Accordingly, the Minnesota antitrust law
reaches price discrimination and sales below cost in extreme and
predatory forms. 54
When reevaluation of the price discrimination and sales-below-
cost statutes of general application is completed, perhaps the
result will be a guide for reevaluating the extensive number of
statutes applicable to specific products. Some of these statutes
probably also have been derived from the view that depressed
prices, rather than inflated prices, were the prime state and na-
tional economic concern. Further, they also may be based simply
on an inherent egalitarian, not economic, feeling that something
may be wrong if a seller is not charging all its customers the same
price. This feeling apparently is still prevalent today, as the 1977
"beer statute" indicates."5 Perhaps a study of the actual effects
of the newly enacted beer statute's prohibition against price dis-
crimination would be one place to begin an assessment of the
effects of price discrimination statutes.
Continued presence of an egalitarian approach to price dis-
crimination is illustrated by the fact that proponents of uniform
pricing still exist not only in Minnesota but also in other jurisdic-
tions. Recently, for example, the United States Supreme Court
upheld legislation favoring the concept. In Exxon Corp. v. Gover-
nor of Maryland,"'6 the Court upheld a Maryland statute requir-
ing petroleum companies to give uniform discounts to dealers
against a challenge that the Robinson-Patman Act had
preempted the state statute. 67 In its opinion, the Court offered
the following insights into the purposes of such legislation and its
relationship to other antitrust law:
This Court is generally reluctant to infer pre-emption, .. and
it would be particularly inappropriate to do so in this case be-
cause the basic purposes of the state statute and the Robinson-
Patman Act are similar. Both reflect a policy choice favoring the
interest in equal treatment of all customers over the interest in
allowing sellers freedom to make selective competitive
decisions.
Appellants [the oil companies] point out that the Robinson-
564. See generally L. SULLIVAN, supra note 2, § 43, at 108-09; Areeda & Turner, supra
note 115, at 697-700, 724-28.
565. See notes 224-26 supra and accompanying text.
566. 98 S. Ct. 2207 (1978).
567. Id. at 2217-18.
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Patman Act itself may be characterized as an exception to, or a
qualification of, the more basic national policy favoring free
competition, and argue that the Maryland statute
"undermines" the competitive balance that Congress struck
between the Robinson-Patman and the Sherman Acts. This is
merely another way of stating that the Maryland statute will
have an anticompetitive effect. In this sense, there is a conflict
between the statute and the central policy of the Sherman
Act-our "charter of economic liberty." . . . Nevertheless, this
sort of conflict cannot itself constitute a sufficient reason for
invalidating the Maryland statute. For if an adverse effect on
competition were, in and of itself, enough to render a state stat-
ute invalid, the States' power to engage in economic regulation
would be effectively destroyed. We are, therefore, satisfied that
neither the broad implications of the Sherman Act nor the
Robinson-Patman Act can fairly be construed as a congressional
decision to pre-empt the power of the Maryland Legislature to
enact this law.568
In the event the Minnesota Legislature finds it desirable to
have statutes specifically prohibiting price discrimination and
sales below cost, steps should be taken to resolve the many ambi-
guities created by the present statutes. For example, the Legisla-
ture should clarify the interrelationship between the overlapping
prohibitions against locality discrimination contained in sections
325.03 and 325.04 of the general act."9 In addition, the Legislature
should explain the interrelationship among the general prohibi-
tions and the prohibitions applicable to specific products. 7
If price discrimination and sales-below-cost statutes are
deemed appropriate, the Legislature also should consider the
effectiveness of the present prohibitions. Section 325.03 may in
effect be a nullity because it permits an allowance for differences
in quantities"' and therefore probably can be easily avoided.
Also, the competitive injury test by which an unlawful discrimi-
nation or sale below cost is established-purpose or effect of injur-
ing a competitor or destroying competition 57-may be so subjec-
tive and demanding as to render the prohibitions a nullity. Fur-
thermore, the prohibitions also are weakened by the absolute
.568. Id. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
569. See notes 65-115 supra and accompanying text.
570. See notes 239-47 supra and accompanying text.
571. See notes 99-106 supra and accompanying text.
572. See notes 34-37, 54-55, 76-79, 130-32 supra and accompanying text.
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exemption for a vendor who sells at a price at least fifteen percent
above the price at which he purchased the commodity.573
V. CONCLUSION
Existing Minnesota statutes prohibiting price discrimination
and sales below cost are complex and ambiguous. The basic stat-
utes were enacted in an era when social and economic concerns
were widely divergent from those of the present day. 74 Great cau-
tion should be exercised in enacting any further Minnesota laws
prohibiting price discrimination and sales below cost. Any new
legislation must be rationalized with existing legislation, already
duplicative if not inconsistent. These concerns are particularly
applicable if the proposed new legislation is modeled after the
Robinson-Patman Act, which became law in 1936 during the
same era in which the existing basic prohibitions were enacted in
Minnesota.
The current debate on the federal level concerning the contin-
ued desirability of the Robinson-Patman Act should signal a need
for evaluation of existing Minnesota legislation. Prohibitions of
general application and prohibitions applicable to specific prod-
ucts should be reexamined. Fundamental to this evaluation
should be empirical data on the actual effects that have been
experienced under the present laws end would be experienced
under any proposed laws. Whether the Sherman Act in conjunc-
tion with the Minnesota antitrust law is sufficiently broad to
reach anticompetitive forms of pricing-without the need for spe-
cific, more rigid prohibitions directed against locality price dis-
crimination and sales below cost-should be asked and answered.
In short, the necessity for reevaluation is clear. Hopefully, this
Article has suggested the direction that reevaluation should take.
573. See notes 155-61 supra and accompanying text.
574. See notes 426-53 supra and accompanying text.
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A. Price Discrimination: General Prohibitions
The statutes collected in this section contain prohibitions against
discriminating in price among different purchasers in different locali-
ties. The prohibitions apply to any commodities or merchandise with no
particular item being singled out for special treatment. More than half
of the states have enacted such statutes.
1. ANTICOMPETITIVE PURPOSE OR EFFECT
The practice prohibited by these statutes is price discrimination that
has a particular purpose or result: injuring competition. The statutes
can be divided into three groups according to the method by which the
injury to competition is effected.
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a. Effect of Injuring Competition
In some states, price discrimination is prohibited solely on the basis
that it has had the effect of injuring competition. The intent or purpose
of the person engaging in the prohibited practice is irrelevant in estab-
lishing a violation. The following statutes fit this description.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-45 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
IDAHO CODE § 48-202(a) (1977).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (1975).
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3 (1972).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.040 (1977).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-3 (1953).
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.7(a) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 263 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
b. Purpose to Injure Competition
The majority of states prohibiting price discrimination require the
person engaging in the prohibited activity to have as a purpose injuring
competition. In the following states, if the requisite intent to injure
competition is present, it is irrelevant in establishing a violation
whether the price discrimination did in fact have the effect of injuring
competition.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17040 (West 1964).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1973).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2504 (1974).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.01(1) (West 1972).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-1 (1976).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.1 (West 1950).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-149 (1976).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.020 (1970).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:331 (West 1965).
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.701b (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-507 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-501 (1974).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-3(A) (1953).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(c)(5) (1975).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-09-01 (1974).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 81 (West 1976).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-4 (1977).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.020 (1978).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.17 (West 1974).
WYO. STAT. § 40-4-106 (1977).
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c. Purpose and Effect of Injuring Competition
In only one state, the prohibition against price discrimination requires
both that the person engaging in the prohibited practice have intended
to injure competition and that the effect of the prohibited conduct has
been to injure competition.
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.701a (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979).
2. LOCALITY OF DISCRIMINATION
The following statutes require that the price discrimination occur in
different localities. Indicated parenthetically are the terms used by the
statute to describe the locality.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957) ("different locations in. . . sections,
communities, cities or portions thereof").
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17031 (West 1964) (same as Arkansas).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1973) (same as Arkansas).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2504 (1974) ("different sections, communi-
ties, or cities of this State . . . or any portion thereof").
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.01(1) (West 1972) ("different sections, com-
munities, or cities").
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-1 (1976) ("different sections, communities,
or cities, or portions thereof, or . . . different locations in such sections,
communities,. cities, or portions").
IDAHO CODE § 48-202(a) (1977) ("different locations in . . . sections,
communities, cities or portions thereof").
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.1 (West 1950) ("different sections, localities,
communities, cities, or towns").
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-149 (1976) ("different sections, communities, or
cities . . . or any portion thereof").
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.020(1) (1970) ("different sections, communities
or cities, or portions thereof or locations therein").
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:331 (West 1965) ("different sections, com-
munities, cities, or localities").
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.701b (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
("any part of this state").
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3 (1972) ("place in the state").
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-507 (Cum. Supp. 1977) ("different local-
ities in this state").
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-501 (1974) (same as Florida).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-3(A) (1953) (same as Florida).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(5) (1975) ("at a place where there is compe-
tition").
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-09-01 (1974) (same as Florida).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 81 (West 1976) (same as Florida).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.040(1) (1977) ("sections, communities or cities
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or portions thereof or between different locations in sections, communi-
ties, cities or portions thereof").
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-4 (1977) (same as Florida).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.020 (1978) ("different sections of the
same community, city, town, or village").
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 133.17 (West 1974) ("sections, communities, or
cities . . .or any portion thereof").
Wvo. STAT. § 40-4-106 (1977) ("sections, communities or cities or
portions thereof").
3. EXEMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Not every sale that appears to effect a discrimination in price violates
the statutory prohibitions. Certain exemptions and justifications for
charging different prices are available. Common among the states are
the following:
a. Making allowance for differences in the costs of transportation;
b. Making allowance for differences in grade or quality;
c. Meeting in good faith a competitor's price;
d. Making allowance for different quantities;
e. Making allowance for differences in the costs of manufacture;
f. Closing out certain stocks of, for example, damaged, seasonal, or
perishable goods;
g. Engaging in liquidation sales;
h. Selling pursuant to court order;
i. Selecting one's customers.
Set forth below are the statutes that make provision for these exemp-
tions and justifications. Following each citation, the particular exemp-
tion or justification is indicated with reference to the above list. Less
common exemptions and justifications are also indicated.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957), (a, b, c, d).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17040-17042, 17050 (West 1964) (a, b, c,
d, e, f, g, h, i; classifying customers as broker, wholesaler, jobber, or
retailer); id. § 17024 (products and services of publicly-owned utilities).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1973) (a, b, c, d; sales to regulated public
utilities).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-45 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (a, b, c, d,
e, f, g, h, i).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2504 (1974) (a, b).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.01(1) (West 1972) (a, b, c).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-1 (1976) (a, b, c, d; leases of motion pictures;
classifications of rates by public utilities).
IDAHO CODE § 48-202 (1977) (a, b, c, e, f, g, h, i).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.1 (West 1950) (a, b, c; commodities subject to
government regulation); id. § 551.11 (sales to government).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-149 (1976) (a).
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Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.020 (1970) (a, b, c; leases of motion pictures;
classifications by public utilities).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:331 (West 1965) (a, b).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978) (a, b,
c, e, f, g, h, i; employee discounts).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.701c-.701d (West Cum. Supp. 1978-
1979) (a, c, d, e, f, h, i; temporary sales to foster competition).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3 (1972) (a, e).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-507 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (b, c, d, e).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-501 (1974) (a, b).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-11-3(B) to -4 (1953) (a, c, d, e, f, i).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-5(b)(6) (1975) (a, e).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-09-01 (1974) (a, e).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 81 (West 1976) (a); see id. § 85 (b, c for
combinations of sellers).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 646.040-.050 (1977) (a, b, c, e, f, g, h, i).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-4 (1977) (b for discrimination by
sellers); id. §§ 37-1-5 to -6 (a, b, c for discrimination by buyers); id. §
37-1-3.5 (services of public utilities).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-3 (1953) (a, c, d, e, f, g, h, i).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.90.020, .070 (1978) (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h,
i; classifications as broker, jobber, retailer, or wholesaler; services of
public utilities).
WYO. STAT. §§ 40-4-101, -106 (1977) (a, b, c, d; proper commercial
discounts).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 263 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (a, c, d, e).
4. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Violations of price discrimination laws carry various sanctions. In this
section, the remedies provided by the statutes are presented.
a. Criminal Penalties
Most commonly, violations are redressed by the imposition of crimi-
nal penalties in the form of fines or terms of imprisonment. Cited below
are the statutes that establish the criminal sanctions with an indication
of the form of the penalty.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-311 (1957) (fine between $100 and $1,000; up to
six months imprisonment; or both).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17100 (West 1964) (fine between $100 and
$1,000; up to six months imprisonment; .or both).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-116 (1973) (fine between $100 and $1,000; up
to six months imprisonment; or both).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2504 (1974) (fine between $200 and $5,000;
up to one year imprisonment; or both).
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.06 (West 1972) (fine up to $1,000; imprisonment
up to one year).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (serious misde-
meanor).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-150 (1976) (fine up to $5,000; imprisonment up
to one year; or both).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:332 (West 1965) (fine between $500 and
$5,000; imprisonment for between one and two years; or both).
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 445.707 (West 1967) (fine of $50 per day for
each day of continuing violation).
MIss. CODE ANN. § 75-21-7 (1972) (fine between $100 and $2,000 for
each month of violation).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-524 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (fine between
$100 and $1,000; up to six months imprisonment; or both).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-505 (1974) (fine between $500 and $5,000; im-
prisonment up to one year; or both).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-6 (1975) (fine of at least $1,000; imprisonment
for misdemeanor; or both).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-09-02 (Supp. 1977) (class A misdemeanor).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, §§ 81, 83 (West 1976) (fine between $100 and
$500).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.990 (1977) (fine between $100 and $500; up to
six months imprisonment; or both).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-7 (Supp. 1978) (class 6 felony); id. §
37-1-14.2 (civil penalty up to $50,000 and other relief obtainable in
action by state attorney general).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-15 (1953) (fine between $100 and $299; up to
six months imprisonment; or both).
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.11 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (civil penalty of up to
$100,000 for willful or flagrant violation).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.100 (1978) (fine between $100 and
$1,000; up to six months imprisonment; or both).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 133.17(2), .18(2) (West 1974) (fine between $200
and $5,000; up to one year imprisonment; or both).
WYO. STAT. § 40-4-104 (1977) (up to $5,000 fine; up to one year impris-
onment; or both); id. § 40-4-115 (fine between $100 and $1,000; up to
six month imprisonment; or both, for discrimination between localities).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, §§ 265-266 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (corporate
officers personally liable for fines between $2,500 and $25,000; other
persons liable for fines between $5,000 and $50,000, up to one year im-
prisonment, or both).
b. Civil Remedies
Violations may also result in civil liability. Statutes commonly pro-
vide for injunctive relief and for treble damages. Set forth below are the
various statutes providing for private civil relief.
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ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-310 (1957) (injunction, treble damages).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 17070, 17078-17079, 17082 (West 1964)
(injunction, treble damages, costs and attorney's fees).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-111 (1973) (injunction, damages).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-34 to -35 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (in-
junction, treble damages).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-10 (1976) (injunction, treble damages).
IDAHO CODE § 48-204 (1977) (injunction, treble damages, attorney's
fees).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.070(1) (1970) (injunction, treble damages).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(b) (1975) (injunction, treble dam-
ages, costs and attorney's fees).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.711 (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (in-
junction, actual damages, costs and attorney's fees).
MIsS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972) (civil penalty of $500, damages).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-521 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (injunction,
treble damages).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-8 (1953) (injunction, treble damages).
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75-16 to -16.1 (1975) (treble damages, attorney's
fees).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.140 (1977) (injunction, treble damages, costs and
attorney's fees).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-14.3 (1977) (injunction, treble dam-
ages, costs and attorney's fees).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-14 (1953) (injunction, treble damages).
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.12 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (injunction, damages, costs
and attorney's fees; treble damages for willful violations).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.090 (1978) (injunction, damages).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 133.20 (West 1974) (injunction).
Wyo. STAT. § 40-4-114 (1977) (injunction, damages for price discrimi-
nation between localities).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 268 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (treble damages,
costs and attorney's fees).
c. Ouster
Frequently, statutes provide for the forfeiture of the right to do busi-
ness in the state upon a violation of the price discrimination laws. In
the following states, forfeiture or ouster is an additional remedy.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-308 (1957) (ouster after third violation).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-36a (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (forfeiture
of charter rights and privileges; dissolution).
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 540.04-.05 (West 1972) (revocation of permit to do
business; ouster for violation after revocation).
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IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 551.8-.9 (West 1950) (ouster, revocation of license
to do business).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-150 (1976) (ouster for continuing violations).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 51:335-:336 (West 1965) (revocation of permit
to do business; suit to oust following revocation).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-209(a)(3) (1975) (termination of right
to do business).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.702 (West 1967) (forfeiture of privi-
leges; dissolution).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-9 (1972) (forfeiture of charter and right to
do business).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-523 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (ouster or revoca-
tion after third violation).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-508 (1974) (ouster if injunction violated).
N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 51-09-04 to -05 (1974) (revocation of charter or
license to do business).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 82 (West 1976) (revocation of charter or
permit; injunction against doing business).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 133.20 (West 1974) (revocation of charter or permit
to do business).
WYO. STAT. §§ 40-4-102 to -103, -112 (1977) (revocation of charter or
permit to do business).
5. BUYER DISCRIMINATION
Most of the state statutes dealing with price discrimination are di-
rected exclusively against discrimination in selling. In a few states, how-
ever, prohibitions against discrimination by purchasers have been en-
acted. These express prohibitions against buyer discrimination are
found in the following statutes:
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.2 (West 1950).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-149 (1976).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-21-3 (1972).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-508 (Cum. Supp. 1977).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-503 (1974).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-6(B)-(C) (1953).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 37-1-5 (1977).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.18 (West 1974).
6. BUYER LIABILITY
Buyers may find themselves held liable not only for engaging in a
discriminatory practice, as the statutes cited in A.5. BUYER
DISCRIMINATION indicate, but also for receiving a discriminatory price
when they knew the price was discriminatory. The following statutes
prohibit the receipt of such a discriminatory price.
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N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-6(C) (1953).
Ot. REV. STAT. § 646.090 (1977).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-3(0 (1953).
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.7(f) (Cum. Supp. 1978).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 263(d) (Cum. Supp. 1975).
B. Sales Below Cost: General Prohibitions
Nearly half of the states have enacted statutes prohibiting selling
below cost. Significant elements in these statutes are the provisions
requiring an anticompetitive intent or effect to establish a violation,
describing the method of computing cost, outlining the exemptions and
justifications to a violation, and prescribing the remedies and penalties.
This section of the Appendix collects the citations to these provisions
in sales-below-cost statutes.
1. ANTICOMPETITIVE PURPOSE OR EFFECT
Like the price discrimination statutes, the sales-below-cost statutes
usually require that the seller act with an' anticompetitive intent before
the prohibition becomes operative. In a few states, however, an anticom-
petitive effect is all that is necessary. Set forth below are the operative
sections of state sales-below-cost statutes. Following each citation is an
indication whether the statute requires intent or merely effect.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1464 (West 1967) (intent or effect).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-303 (1957) (intent and purpose).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17043 (West 1964) (purpose); id. §§ 17030,
17044 (purpose or effect for violation of loss leader prohibition).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-105(1) (1973) (purpose).
HAWAII REv. STAT. § 481-3 (1976) (intent).
IDAHO CODE § 48-404 (1977) (intent or effect).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.030(1) (1970) (purpose).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:422(A) (West 1965) (intent or effect).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1204-A (Cum. Supp. 1978-1979) (pur-
pose or effect for "any person engaged in distribution"); id. § 1207 (1964)
(intent for retailers and wholesalers).
MD. CoM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-404(a) (1975) (intent).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14F (West 1972) (intent).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-509 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (purpose).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-03 (1974) (intent or effect).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.3 (West 1966) (intent and purpose).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 213 (Purdon 1971) (intent or result).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-3 (1969) (intent).
S.C. CODE § 39-3-150 (1976) (intent or purpose).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-109 (1976) (intent and purpose for manufactur-
ers); id. § 69-303 (intent or effect for retailers and wholesalers).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.33(b)(2) (Vernon 1968) (intent).
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-7(a) (1953) (intent and purpose).
VA. CODE § 59.1-14 (1973) (intent).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.040 (1978) (purpose).
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-1 (1976) (purpose).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(3) (West 1973) (intent or effect).
WYO. STAT. § 40-4-107 (1977) (purpose).
2. COMPUTATION OF COSTS
The definition of cost in a sales-below-cost statute is, of course, a
critical provision. Virtually every state with a sales-below-cost prohibi-
tion defines cost with reference to the costs of raw materials, labor, and
overhead. In addition, nearly every such state defines distribution cost
as invoice or replacement cost (whichever is lower), less noncash cus-
tomary discounts, plus the cost of doing business. Definitions of the cost
of doing business are usually expressed in terms of a percentage or
markup above the seller's product cost (generally invoice or replacement
cost). Collected below are the state statutes that compute the cost of
doing business by such percentages. Indicated parenthetically following
each citation is the percentage above product cost presumed to be the
cost of doing business.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1461(A) (West 1967) (12% for retailers).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17026 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (6% for
distributors).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-3 (1976) (6% for distributors).
IDAHO CODE § 48-403 (1977) (6% for retailers; 2% for wholesalers).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:421(F)-(G) (West 1965) (6% for retailers; 2%
for wholesalers).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1202(1)-(2) (1964) (6% for retailers; 2%
for wholesalers).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-401(b)-(c) (1975) (5% for retailers; 2%
for wholesalers).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14E (West 1972) (6% for retailers; 2%
for wholesalers).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.2(a) (West 1966) (6% for retailers).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 212 (Purdon 1971) (4% for retailers; 2% for
wholesalers).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-1 (1969) (6% for retailers; 2% for wholesalers).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-302 (1976) (6% for retailers).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-7(b)(3) (1953) (6% for retailers).
VA. CODE § 59.1-11 (1973) (6% for retailers; 2% for wholesalers).
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-6 (1976) (7% for retailers; 2% for wholesalers).
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3. EXEMPTIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONS
Not every sale below cost is proscribed by the statutory prohibitions.
Certain exemptions and justifications are available. Common among
the states are the following:
a. Closing out certain stocks of, for example, damaged, seasonal,
or perishable goods;
b. Selling pursuant to court order;
c. Meeting in good faith a competitor's price;
d. Engaging in liquidation sales;
e. Selling to charities or relief organizations;
f. Selling to governmental bodies;
g. Engaging in isolated transactions of sales at less than cost.
Set forth below are the statutes that make provision for these exemp-
tions and justifications. Following each citation, the particular exemp-
tion or justification is indicated with reference to the above list. Less
common exemptions and justifications are also noted.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1463 (West 1967) (a, b, c, d, e, f).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-306 (1957) (a, b, c, d).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17050 (West 1964) (a, b, c).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-110 (1973) (a, b, c).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-6 (1976) (a, b, c; sales pursuant to U.S. army
or naval regulations).
IDAHO CODE § 48-407 (1977) (a, b, c, d, f).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.040 (1970) (a, b, c, d).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:426 (West 1965) (a, b, c, d, e, f; sales by
manufacturers or producers).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1203 (1964) (a, b, c, d, e, f, g).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-402 (1975) (a, b, c, d, e, f).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14G (West 1972) (a, b, c, d, e, f, g).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-513 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (a, b, c, d, f).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-07 (1974) (a, b, c, d, e, f).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 598.6-.7 (West 1966) (a, b, c, d, e, f; bona
fide auction sales).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 216 (Purdon 1971) (a, b, c, d, e, f; sales to
employees of trade equipment).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-5 (1969) (a, b, d, e, f, g).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-304 (1976) (a, b, c, d, e, f, g).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-12 (1953) (a, b, c).
VA. CODE § 59.1-20 (1973) (a, b, c, d, e, f; sales by one wholesaler or
retailer to another for purposes of accommodation).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.070 (1978) (a, b, c).
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-8 (1976) (a, b, c, e, f).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(6) (West 1973) (a, b, c, d, e, f).
WYo. STAT. § 40-4-110 (1977) (a, b, c, d).
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4. REMEDIES AND PENALTIES
Violations of sales-below-cost prohibitions carry various sanctions.
Categorized below are the statutes imposing the remedies and penalties.
In a few states, the sanctions that may be imposed for violating the
sales-below-cost prohibitions are contained in the same sections in
which sanctions against price discrimination violations are described.
For these few states, the reader is referred to the previous section outlin-
ing state price discrimination laws for the full citation and indication
of the sanctions.
a. Criminal Penalties
The most common sanctions imposed for selling below cost are crimi-
nal penalties in the form of fines and terms of imprisonment. The stat-
utes below describe the criminal penalties a violator of a sales-below-
cost statute may face. Following each citation is an indication of the
nature of the penalty.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1466(A) (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (petty
offense).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-311 (1957) (fine between $100 and $1,000; up to
six months imprisonment; or both).
CALIFORNIA: same as in A.4.
COLORADO: same as in A.4.
IDAHO CODE § 48-405 (1977) (up to $500 fine; six months imprison-
ment; or both).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:423 (West 1965) (fine between $25 and $500
for each violation).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1207 (1964) (fine up to $500).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 14F (West 1972) (fine up to $500;
imprisonment between one month and one year; or both).
MONTANA: same as in A.4.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-05 (Supp. 1977) (class A misdemeanor).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.4 (West 1966) (fine up to $500).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 214 (Purdon 1971) (fine between $50 and
$200; in default of payment, imprisonment for up to 30 days).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-3 (1969) (fine up to $500; imprisonment be-
tween one month and one year; or both).
S.C. CODE § 39-3-150 (1976) (fine between $500 and $5,000).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-110 (1976) (fine between $10 and $5,000 for
manufacturers); id. § 69-305 (fine between $5 and $50 for first conviction
for wholesalers and retailers; subsequent offenses, fine between $50 and
$500).
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.33(d) (Vernon 1968) (felony; im-
prisonment between two and ten years).
UTAH: same as in A.4.
VA. CODE § 59.1-15 (1973) (misdemeanor).
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WASHINGTON: same as in A.4.
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-11 (1976) (fine between $100 and $1,000; im-
prisonment up to 90 days; or both).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(4) (West 1973) (fine between $50 and $500
for first offense; fine between $200 and $1,000 for subsequent offenses;
between one and six months imprisonment).
WYo. STAT. § 40-4-115 (1977) (fine between $100 and $1,000; up to six
months imprisonment; or both).
b. Civil Remedies
Violations may also result in civil liability. Set forth below are the
statutes providing for private civil relief.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1465 (West 1967) (injunction).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-310 (1957) (injunction, treble damages).
CALIFORNIA: same as in A.4.
COLORADO: same as in A.4.
HAWAII: same as in A.4.
IDAHO CODE § 48-406 (1977) (injunction, damages).
KENTUCKY: same as in A.4.
LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:424 (West 1965) (injunction, attorney's fees).
ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1205 (1964) (injunction, treble dam-
ages, attorney's fees).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-405 (1975) (injunction).
MONTANA: same as in A.4.
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-06 (1974) (injunction).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 598.5 (West 1966) (injunction, actual dam-
ages, costs).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, § 215 (Purdon 1971) (injunction).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-306 (1976) (injunction against wholesalers and
retailers).
UTAH: same as in A.4.
VA. CODE § 59.1-16 (1973) (injunction, actual damages, costs).
WASHINGTON: same as in A.4.
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-9 (1976) (injunction, treble damages).
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 100.30(5) (West 1973) (injunction, costs and attor-
ney's fees).
Wvo. STAT. § 40-4-114 (1977) (injunction, damages).
c. Ouster
An additional penalty is afforded in some states with the provision for
forfeiture of the right to do business upon a violation of the sales-below-
cost statutes. Set forth below are the citations to the statutes that con-
tain this remedy.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-311 (1957) (ouster after third violation).
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LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:423 (West 1965) (revocation of pernit to do
business).
MONTANA: same as in A.4.
S.C. CODE H§ 39-3-160 to -170 (1976) (ouster).
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-10 (1976) (ouster upon third violation).
C. Sales of Services: General Prohibitions
State prohibitions against price discrimination and sales below cost
usually apply solely to sales of commodities. In a number of states,
however, the sale or rendition of services is expressly included within the
prohibitions. The statutes with such provisions are set forth below.
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957) (service or output of service trade
within price discrimination law); id. § 70-303 (same within sales-below-
cost law).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17024 (West 1964) (definition of "article or
product" within price discrimination and sales-below-cost laws includes
service or output of service trade).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103 (1973) (service or output of service trade
within price discrimination law); id. § 6-2-105 (same within sales-below-
cost law).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 540.01(2) (West 1972) (definition of "commodity"
in price discrimination law includes service or output of service trade).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-1 (1976) (service or output of service trade
within price discrimination law); id. § 481-3 (same within sales-below-
cost law).
IDAHO CODE § 48-202 (1977) (services within price discrimination law).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 551.1 (West 1950) ("commercial services" within
locality price discrimination law).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.020(1) (1970) (service or output of service trade
within price discrimination law); id. § 365.030(1) (same within sales-
below-cost law).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a) (1975) (services within price
discrimination law).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-502 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (definition of
"article of commerce" in price discrimination and sales-below-cost laws
includes service or output of service trade).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-2(D) (1953) (definition of "commodity" in
price discrimination law includes commercial services).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 79, § 85 (West 1976) (price discrimination by
combinations rendering services to public prohibited).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.040 (1977) (service or output of service trade
within price discrimination law).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-12 (1953) (one who "performs work upon,
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VA. CODE § 59.1-9.7 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (services within price discrim-
ination law).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.010 (1978) (definition of "article or
produce" within price discrimination and sales-below-cost laws includes
service or output of service trade).
WYo. STAT. § 40-4-110(b) (1977) (one who "performs work upon, reno-
vates, alters or improves . . personal property" within sales-below-
cost law).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 263 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (services within price
discrimination law).
D. Indirect Pricing Practices
Indirect methods of achieving price discrimination or of effecting a
sale below cost, such as granting a secret rebate, discount, commission,
or allowance, are frequently prohibited by special provisions in the state
statutes. Five basic categories of these special provisions can be dis-
cerned:
a. Provisions stating that the payment of a secret rebate or other
indirect price discount is a practice included within the price discrimi-
nation proscriptions;
b. Provisions stating that the payment is a practice included within
the sales-below-cost proscription;
c. Provisions simply making the payment a separate unlawful prac-
tice;
d. Provisions making the payment an unlawful practice when condi-
tioned upon the agreement that the recipient not deal with the seller's
competitors;
e. Provisions making the payment unlawful when unavailable to all
purchasers on the same terms.
The prohibitions against indirect pricing practices are set forth below.
Following each citation is an indication of the nature of the prohibition,
with reference to the above list when applicable.
ALA. CODE § 8-11-4 (1975) (c for officers, agents, or servants of rail-
road, manufacturing, or mining corporations).
ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.030 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (d).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 70-301 (1957) (a); id. § 70-307 (c).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 17045 (West 1964) (c); id. § 17049 (a, b).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-2-103(3) (1973) (a); id. § 6-2-108 (c).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 35-29 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (d).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 481-1 (1976) (a); id. § 481-7 (c).
IDAHO CODE § 48-202(c)-(d) (1977) (c except for services rendered; e).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.020(1) (1970) (a); id. § 365.050 (e).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. § 11-204(a)(4) (1975) (e).
MASSACHUSETTS: Act of July 17, 1978, ch. 459, § 6, 1978 Mass. Legis.
Serv. 462 (West) (to be codified as MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 93, § 6)
(d).
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MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 445.701b (West Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(prohibits discounts, rebates, allowances, and advertising service
charges over and above those available to competitors).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 416.031(3) (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978) (d).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 51-507(3) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (a).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1605 (Cum. Supp. 1976) (d).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 49-11-5 (1953) (c except for services rendered); id.
§ 49-11-6 (e).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-10-04 (1974) (b).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.010 (1977) (a); id. § 646.060 (c except for services
rendered); id. §§ 646.070-.080 (e).
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 15.33(b)(2) (Vernon 1968) (c with
intent to injure competition).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 13-5-3(c) (1953) (d).
VA. CODE § 59.1-9.7(c) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (c except for services ren-
dered); id. § 59.1-9.7(d) (e).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.90.040 (1978) (b).
W. VA. CODE § 47-11A-3 (1976) (e).
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 133.185 (West 1974) (e).
WYo. STAT. § 40-4-106 (1977) (a); id. § 40-4-111 (e).
P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 10, § 263(b)-(c) (Cum. Supp. 1975) (e).
E. Particular Products: Specific Prohibitions
Most states have statutes prohibiting price discrimination and sales
below cost that apply only to particular commodities. These statutes
have been enacted despite the fact that the specific products are often-
times subject to one of the general prohibitions. Set forth below are the
statutory prohibitions against price discrimination and sales below cost
affecting individual products.
1. ALCOHOLIC BEVERAGES
The following states have statutes that prohibit price discrimination
or selling below cost in the sale of alcoholic beverages.
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 25503 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (manufac-
turer prohibited from locality discrimination).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-46-112(2)(a) (1973) (unlawful to supply com-
modities at less than market price for purpose of influencing sale of
particular fermented malt beverage).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 30-63 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (manufactur-
ers, wholesalers prohibited from discriminating among purchasers); id.
§ 30-68b (retail sales not below cost).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2906(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (manufactur-
ers required to give all retailers same voluntary allowances and to rent
equipment at uniform rates).
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IDAHO CODE § 23-1029 (1977) (requiring beer wholesalers, brewers, and
dealers to submit price list with uniform prices for same class of buyers
in same trade area); id. § 23-1033(1) (Cum. Supp. 1978) (prohibiting
rebates by beer wholesalers, brewers, and dealers).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 41-1101 (1973), as amended by Act of Apr. 19, 1978,
ch. 185, § 3, 1978 Kan. Sess. Laws 842 (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion).
Ky. REV. STAT. }9 244.500, .560 (1970) (prohibiting gifts, premiums,
prizes, and rebates in sale of malt beverages).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 305 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978-1979)
(prohibiting rebates, refunds, or concessions in sale of liquor).
MD. ANN. CODE art. 2B, § 108 (1976) (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion).
MASS. GE . LAWS ANN. ch. 138, § 23A (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(providing for suspension of license upon violation of general sales-
below-cost statute).
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 311.332 (Vernon 1963) (prohibiting price discrimi-
nation by wholesalers).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-168.03 (1974) (prohibiting amendments to price
schedule that create price discrimination between retailers).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:1-89 to -90 (West 1940) (prohibiting price dis-
crimination and rebates in sales to retailers).
N.Y. ALCO. BEV. CONT. LAW § 101-b(2) (McKinney 1970 & Cum.
Supp. 1978) (prohibiting price discrimination); id. § 101-bb ("cost"
defined as cost plus 12%; sales below cost prohibited).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 37, § 536 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (prohibiting
price discrimination and rebates).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 471.465-.470 (1977) (prohibiting granting of rebates
by wholesalers or acceptance of rebates by retailers).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 2-207 (Purdon 1969 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(liquor control board may not fix discriminatory prices).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 35-4-52 (1977) (prohibiting valuable gifts
or concessions to promote sales).
TEX. ALco. BEV. CODE ANN. tit. 4, §§ 102.04, .07 (Vernon 1978) (pro-
hibiting rebates and valuable concessions to induce sales).
VA. CODE § 4-118.15 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion by breweries among their wholesalers).
W. VA. CODE § 11-16-13a (1974) (prohibiting price discrimination in
sale of nonintoxicating beer, ale, or other malt beverages).
2. CIGARETTES AND TOBACCO
The following state statutes prohibit price discrimination or sales
below cost with regard to the sale of cigarettes or other tobacco products.
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CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-322 to -329 (West 1972 & Cum. Supp.
1978) (prohibiting sales below cost).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 2601-2608 (Supp. 1977) (prohibiting sales
below cost).
GA. CODE ANN. § 92-2204(h)-(i) (1974) (prohibiting sales below cost).
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 24-3-3-1 to -13 (Bums 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(prohibiting sales below cost).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 551A.1-.11 (West 1950 & Cur. Supp. 1978) (pro-
hibiting sales below cost).
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 248.350-.360 (1970), as amended by Act of Mar. 30,
1978, ch. 270, §§ 2, 5-6, 9, 1978 Ky. Acts 789 (prohibiting price discrimi-
nation by warehouses or warehousemen); Ky. REv. STAT. §§ 365.260-.380
(1970) (prohibiting sales below cost by wholesalers or retailers).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 1201-1207 (1964 & Cum. Supp. 1978-
1979) (prohibiting sales below cost).
MD. COM. LAW CODE ANN. §§ 11-501 to -510 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(prohibiting sales and purchases below cost).
MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 64C, §§ 12-21 (West 1969) (prohibiting
sales below cost).
Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 75-23-1 to -27 (1972) (prohibiting sales below
cost).
MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 51-301 to -314 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (prohib-
iting sales below cost and rebates).
NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 59-1501 to -1518 (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978) (pro-
hibiting sales below cost and rebates).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:7-18 to -38 (West 1964 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(prohibiting sales below cost and rebates).
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-3-1 to -13 (1966 & Supp. 1975), as amended
by Act of Apr. 7, 1977, ch. 249, §§ 31-32, 1977 N.M. Laws 1457 (prohibit-
ing sales below cost).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1333.11-.211 (Page 1962 & Supp. 1977) (pro-
hibiting sales below cost).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §§ 599.1-.18 (West 1966) (prohibiting sales
below cost).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §§ 231.1-.15 (Purdon 1971) (prohibiting sales
below cost).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-401 to -413 (1976) (prohibiting sales below
cost).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 19.91.010-.110 (1978) (prohibiting sales
below cost and rebates).
3. FARM AND DAIRY PRODUCTS
Statutes that prohibit price discrimination or sales below cost in the
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ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 3-631 (West 1964) (prohibiting locality dis-
crimination in sale of milk, cream, or butterfat).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-123 to -125 (1957) (prohibiting locality discrim-
ination in sale of certain dairy products); id. §§ 70-701 to -707 (prohibit-
ing sale of milk at less than cost plus 4%).
CAL. AGRIC. CODE § 61384 (West 1968) (prohibiting sales below cost
of milk, cream, or any dairy product).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-243, -245(2), (4) (West 1975) (granting
Commissioner of Agriculture power to prohibit and issue a cease-and-
desist order against price discrimination, sales below cost, and rebates
in sale of milk and milk products).
IDAHO CODE §§ 22-1601 to -1606 (1977) (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion in the sale of farm products); id. §§ 37-1001 to -1015 (prohibiting
locality discrimination in buying by manufacturers of milk, cream, or
butterfat; prohibiting locality discrimination, rebates, and sales below
cost of milk, cream, or any dairy product).
IND. CODE ANN. § 24-4-1-1 to -6 (Bums 1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(prohibiting locality price discrimination in sale of milk or milk prod-
ucts).
IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 192A.1-.4, .6 (West 1969) (prohibiting locality
price discrimination and rebates in sale of any dairy product).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 260.705 (1970) (prohibiting locality price discrimina-
tion, sales below cost, and rebates in sale of milk, cottage cheese, or
frozen dairy products).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94A, § 14(d)-(e) (West 1972) (prohibiting
sales below cost, price discrimination, and rebates in sale of milk).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.553 (West 1968) (prohibiting locality
price discrimination in the purchase of poultry, eggs, milk, cream, or
butterfat); id. § 750.554 (prohibiting locality price discrimination in the
purchase of potatoes, grain, or beans).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-31-59 (1972) (prohibiting locality price discrimi-
nation in purchase and sale of any dairy product); id. §§ 75-31-301 to
-313 (prohibiting locality discrimination, sales below cost, and rebates
in sale of milk products).
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 416.410-.485 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978) (prohibit-
ing locality price discrimination, sales below cost, and rebates in sale of
any milk product).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 584.570, .583 (1977) (prohibiting sales below cost
and rebates in sale of fluid milk, fluid cream, butter, or "fresh dairy
byproducts").
N.Y. AGRIC. & MKTS. LAW §§ 258-s to -z (McKinney Cum. Supp.
1978) (prohibiting sales below cost, price discrimination, and rebates in
sale of fluid milk and fluid milk products).
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N.D. CENT. CODE § 4-14-04 (1975) (prohibiting locality price discrimi-
nation in sale of farm products).
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1331.15 (Page 1962) (prohibiting locality price
discrimination in sale of milk, cream, or butterfat).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 419.3(i)-() (West 1973) (prohibiting locality
price discrimination within a given county, rebates, and sales below cost
by wholesalers, producers, and distributors of dairy products).
OR. REV. STAT. § 583.600 (1977) (prohibiting sale of fluid milk below
cost).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13-2.1 (1970) (prohibiting sale of milk or any
services connected with sale of milk below cost, and rebates which bring
price below cost).
S.C. CODE §§ 39-33-1010 to -1060 (1976) (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion, rebates, and sales below cost in sale of milk).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § § 37-3-11 to -14, -17 to -20, -29 to -30 (1977)
(prohibiting sales below cost, rebates, price discrimination, locality
price discrimination, in the sale of, and acceptance of such benefits in
the purchase of, dairy products); id. § § 38-14-1 to -3 (prohibiting locality
price discrimination in sale of grain or flaxseed).
TENN. CODE ANN. § 52-332(1)(a), (c)-(f), (2)(a), (c)-(d), (3)-(4) (1977)
(prohibiting sales below cost, locality price discrimination, and rebates
in sale of, and acceptance of such benefits in purchase of, any milk
product).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 5-4-6 (1971) (prohibiting price discrimination be-
tween different producers of agricultural commodities).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 6, § 2751 (1972) (prohibiting locality price discrim-
ination in purchase of dairy products).
WiS. STAT. ANN. § 100.201(2) (West 1973) (prohibiting rebates, price
discrimination, and sales below cost in sale of "selected dairy prod-
ucts"); id. § 100.22 (prohibiting locality price discrimination in pur-
chase of milk, cream, or butterfat).
4. INSURANCE
The following states have statutes that prohibit unreasonable rate
discrimination or indirect pricing practices in the selling of some or all
types of insurance.
ALA. CODE §§ 27-12-11 to -14 (1975).
ALASKA STAT. §§ 21.36.090-.110 (1966 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-448 to -451, -1061 (West 1975).
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 66-3005(7)-(8) (Cum. Supp. 1977).
CAL. INS. CODE § 790.03(f) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104(1)(f)-(g) (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1976), as
amended by Act of Mar. 21, 1978, ch. 52, 1978 Colo. Sess. Laws 295.
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 38-59, -149, -172 (West 1969).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2304(13)-(15) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
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FLA. STAT. ANN. § 626.9541(7)-(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
GA. CODE ANN. § 56-704(7)-(8) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 431-643(7)-(8) (1976).
IDAHO CODE §§ 41-1313 to -1315, -1405 (1977).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 763-764 (Smith-Hurd 1965 & Cum. Supp.
1978); id. § 848, as amended by Pub. Act No. 80-1373, 1978 Ill. Legis.
Serv. 905 (West); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 73, §§ 849, 976 (Smith-Hurd 1965
& Cum. Supp. 1978).
IND. CODE ANN. § 27-1-20-30 (Bums Cum. Supp. 1978); id. § 27-4-1-
4(7)-(8) (Bums 1975).
IOWA CODE ANN. § 507B.4(7)-(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 40-2404(7)-(8) (1973).
Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 304.12-080 to -110, .13-030(b), .17-390(3), .22-
020(2), .29-540(1) (1970 & Cum. Supp. 1976).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1214(7)-(8) (West 1978).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, §§ 2159, 2160-2163 (1974).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 176D, § 3(7)-(8) (West Cum. Supp. 1978),
as amended by Act of July 15, 1978, ch. 446, § 6, 1978 Mass. Sess. Law
Serv. 448 (West).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 500.2017, .2019-.2020, .2024-.2025 (West
1967).
MISS. CODE ANN. § 83-5-35(g) (1972).
Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 379.318(4), .356 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1978); Act
of June 8, 1978, H.B. No. 1447, § 1, 1978 Mo. Legis. Serv. 196 (Vernon)
(to be codified as Mo. ANN. STAT. § 375.936(7)-(8)).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 40-3509 to -3512 (1961 & Cum. Supp.
1977).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-1525(7)-(8) (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 686A.100-.140 (1971).
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 417:4(VIII)-(IX) (Supp. 1977).
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17B:30-12(c)-(d), -13 (West Cum. Supp. 1978).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-9-25(G)-(H) (Supp. 1975).
N.Y. INS. LAW §§ 183(c), 188, 209 (McKinney 1966 & Cum. Supp.
1978).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 58-54.4(7)-(8) (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
N.D. CENT. CODE § 26-30-04(7)-(8) (1978).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 3911.18-.19 (Page 1971).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 1204(7)-(8), (10) (West 1976).
OR. REV. STAT. §§ 737.310, 746.015, .018, .025, .035, .045, .055, .160
(1977).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, § 1171.5(7)-(8) (Purdon Cum. Supp. 1978).
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 27-4-1, -6 (1968 & Cum. Supp. 1977).
S.C. CODE §§ 38-55-120 to -130(3) (1976).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 58-33-12 to -14, -24 to -26 (1978).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 56-1204(7)-(8), -1214 (1968 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
TEx. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 5.09 (Vernon 1963); id. art. 21.21, §
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4(7)-(8) (Vernon 1963 & Supp. 1978).
UTAH CODE ANN. § 31-27-14 (1974).
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 4724 (1958 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
VA. CODE § 38.1-53(7)-(8) (1976 & Cum. Supp. 1978).
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 48.30.140-.150, .170 (1961 & Supp. 1978).
W. VA. CODE § 33-11-4(7)-(8) (1975).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 625.11, 628.34(2)-(3) (West 1978).
WYO. STAT. §§ 26-13-109 to -112 (1977).
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 35-1333 (West 1968).
5. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS
The state statutes listed in this section prohibit price discrimination
or sales below cost in the sale or purchase of petroleum or petroleum
products.
ALASKA STAT. § 42.06.380 (1976) (pipeline carriers; prohibiting local-
ity price discrimination and rebates).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-521 to -524 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (prohibiting
locality discrimination in purchase of crude oil).
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 21200-21203 (West Cum. Supp. 1978)
(prohibiting locality discrimination in sale of motor fuel by refiners,
manufacturers, distributors, or transporters).
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 2906(a)-(b) (Cum. Supp. 1977) (manufactur-
ers of motor fuel required to be uniform in granting voluntary allowances
and in renting equipment).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 94, § 295P (West 1972) (motor fuels; pro-
hibiting sales below cost by retail dealers).
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.171-.184 (West 1967) (prohibiting lo-
cality price discrimination, sales below cost, and inducements in sale of
petroleum products by manufacturers, producers, or distributors); id. §
750.555 (West 1968) (prohibiting locality price discrimination in sale of
petroleum products by producers, manufacturers, or distributors).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. §§ 60-401 to -407 (1970) (prohibiting locality
price discrimination in sale of "standard petroleum products").
NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 708.090-.140 (1973) (prohibiting price discrimina-
tion by common carriers of crude oil or petroleum, including pipeline
carriers).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:6-2(b), (e) (West 1964) (prohibiting sales below
cost and rebates in retail sale of motor fuel).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 23, 240 (West 1969) (common purchasers
of natural gas; prohibiting price discrimination); id. § 54 (common pur-
chasers of petroleum; prohibiting price discrimination).
OR. REV. STAT. § 646.880(2) (1977) (prohibiting price discrimination
in retail sale of diesel fuel).
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 37-2-1 to -4 (1977) (prohibiting locality
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TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-723 (Cum. Supp. 1978) (prohibiting price dis-
crimination in sale of petroleum products by refiners, distributors, or
producers).
Wyo. STAT. § 40-4-117 (1977) (prohibiting locality price discrimina-
tion in sale of petroleum and petroleum products).
6. MISCELLANEOUS PRODUCTS
The following state statutes prohibiting price discrimination and sales
below cost deal with miscellaneous products that do not fit into the
other five categories.
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-1901(7)(r) (West 1974) (hearing aids;
prohibits sharing profits with doctors as an inducement to influence
others to purchase from the seller or refrain from dealing with seller's
competitors).
ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 70-126 to -129 (1957) (news service; prohibiting
locality price discrimination).
COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-11-105(2) (1973) (contract motor carriers; pro-
hibiting price discrimination).
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19-242 (West 1977) (drugs; prohibiting sale
by retailers at less than wholesale price).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 364.09 (West 1968) (prohibiting rebates on tele-
phone or telegraph service) (repealed by sunset law in 1980).
HAWAII REV. STAT. § 269-16(a) (1976) (public utilities; commissioner
may prohibit rates that discriminate between localities or users).
IDAHO CODE § 61-310 (1976) (common carriers; prohibiting price pref-
erences and rebates); id. § 61-315 (public utilities; prohibiting locality
price discrimination and price preferences).
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 111 2/3, §§ 38-39 (Smith-Hurd 1966 & Cum. Supp.
1978) (public utilities, common carriers; prohibiting locality price dis-
crimination, rebates, and discrimination on basis of customer's use of
solar power).
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 50-201 (1976) (news service; prohibiting price dis-
crimination); id. § 66-107 (1972) (common carriers and public utilities;
prohibiting price discrimination); id. §§ 66-154 to -154a (railroad com-
panies and common carriers; prohibiting rebates and price discrimina-
tion); id. §§ 66-1, -112e (contract motor carriers in competition with
other common carriers; prohibiting price discrimination).
Ky. REV. STAT. § 365.210 (1970) (foreign news service corporations;
prohibiting price discrimination); id. § 365.230 (telephone, telegraph,
and other news-gathering companies; prohibiting price discrimination).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522, para. 2 (West 1965) (drug retailers; prohib-
iting rebates and sales below cost).
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, §§ 102-103 (1978) (public utilities; pro-
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MD. ANN. CODE art. 78, § 26 (1975 & Cum. Supp. 1978) (public service
companies; prohibiting locality price discrimination, including rebates
and special rates).
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 159B, § 19 (West 1970) (commercial motor
carriers; prohibiting price discrimination); id. ch. 160, § 211 (West 1976)
(railroads; prohibiting price discrimination).
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 445.171-.184 (West 1967) (bakery prod-
ucts; prohibiting locality price discrimination, sales below cost, and
inducements by producers, manufacturers, or distributors).
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 8-703 (1968) (common carriers; prohibiting
price preferences); id. § 70-114 (1971) (public utilities; prohibiting re-
bates that effectively change rates charged).
NEB. REV. STAT. § 59-1405 (1974) (musical compositions; prohibiting
price discrimination).
NEV. REV. STAT. § 706.766 (1975) (common or contract motor carriers;
prohibiting rebates that effectively change rates charged).
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 68-6-6 (1974) (public utilities; prohibiting locality
price discrimination); id. § 69-3-16 (railroads; prohibiting locality price
discrimination).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4905.33 (Page 1977) (public utilities; prohibit-
ing price discrimination, rebates, and sales below cost); id. §§ 4907.35-
.38 (railroads; prohibiting price discrimination, concessions, prefer-
ences, and rebates).
OR. REV. STAT. § 625.320 (1977) (bakery products; prohibiting any
form of valuable concession in connection with sale); id. §§ 57.310-.330
(public utilities; prohibiting price discrimination, rebates, and accept-
ance of such benefits); id. §§ 760.170-.180 (railroads; prohibiting locality
price discrimination, rebates, and acceptance of such benefits); id. §
767.410 (common carriers; prohibiting price discrimination and re-
bates).
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 66, § 1144 (Purdon 1959) (public utilities; prohibit-
ing locality price discrimination).
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-13.1-13 (Cum. Supp. 1977) (electric and gas appli-
ance manufacturers and parts distributors; prohibiting price discrimi-
nation).
S.C. CODE §§ 58-17-1960 to -2000 (1976) (railroads; prohibiting price
discrimination, locality price discrimination, and rebates); id. § 58-17-
2790 (railroads; prohibiting price discrimination against connecting rail-
roads).
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 69-113 to -115 (1976) (news services; prohibiting
price discrimination).
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 15.05(b) (Vernon 1968) (public
utilities; prohibiting locality price discrimination); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
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UTAH CODE ANN. § 50-2-4 (1970) (news services; prohibiting price
discrimination); id. §§ 54-4-4, -7-20 (1974 & Supp. 1977) (public utili-
ties; authorzing commission to correct prices determined to be discrimi-
natory and order reparation to complainant).
WIs. STAT. ANN. § 100-31 (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (drugs; prohibiting
price discrimination); id. §§ 194.19, .34 (West 1957 & Cum. Supp. 1978)
(common motor carriers; prohibiting price discrimination); id. § 195.11
(West 1957) (railroads; prohibiting price discrimination).
WYo. STAT. § 37-8-108 (1977) (competing contract motor carriers; pro-
hibiting price discrimination); id. § 40-13-104 (music licenses; prohibit-
ing price discrimination by "music licensing agencies").
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 43-201a (West Cum. Supp. 1978) (public utili-
ties; prohibiting price discrimination).
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